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THE

HISTORY

OF THE

CAMPAIGN

OF

1799,

IN

GERMANY & SWITZERLAND.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

VOL. III.

London:

PRINTED BY J. BARFIELD, WARDOUR-STREET,

AND SOLD BY

CADELL and DAVIS, Strand; EGERTON, Charing-
Cross; WRIGHT, Piccadilly; and GARDINER,
Princes-Street, Cavendish-Square.

1800.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE
CAMPAIGN
OF 1855

BY
GENERAL
G. S. STANLEY



London: Published by
G. S. Stanley, 1855.
CHAS.

CONTENTS

OF THE

CAMPAIGN

OF

1799

IN

GERMANY & SWITZERLAND.

CHAPTER I.

SSTATE of the forces of the French Republic at the end of the month of February, 1799—Causes of the reduction of their numbers—Force and position of the armies of Germany and Switzerland, at the same period—Plans of the French—Force and position of the Imperial armies—The line of conduct to be followed by their leaders—General Jourdan receives orders to begin the campaign

VOL. III,

b

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

*The French pass the Rhine at Basle and at Kehl—
 They plunder the villages on the right bank—Note
 delivered by the Republican Ministers to the De-
 puties of the Empire at Rastadt—Proclamations
 of the Directory and of General Jourdan—The
 French occupy Manheim, and summon Philips-
 burgh to surrender—Letter sent by General
 Bernadotte to the Governor of that fortress, and
 the answer returned—Jourdan's army advances
 into Suabia, and lays that country and the Pa-
 latinate under contribution—Rastadt declared
 neutral by the French—Jourdan appointed Com-
 mander in Chief of the armies in Germany and
 Switzerland.*

10

CHAP. III.

*Positions of the Austrians in the country of the Gri-
 sons, and in the Voralberg—The French prepare
 to drive them thence—Massena summons General
 Auffenberg, and attacks him at the same time—
 Auffenberg taken, with the greatest part of his
 troops*

CONTENTS.

troops—The French make themselves masters of
 Chur, and almost all the valley of the Rhine—
 General Hotze attacks them without success—Re-
 flections upon these events—Plan of the French to
 complete the conquest of the country of the Grisons
 —Massena attacks the Austrians in the Voralberg
 twice, and is repulsed with much loss—General
 Lecourbe defeats the Austrians in the valley of the
 Inn, and seizes on the High and Low Engadine—
 He is repulsed at St. Martinsbruck—General
 Loudon surprises and takes General Mainoni—
 General Dessolles attacks the post of Bormio—Re-
 pulsé at first, but afterwards succeeds—General
 Lecourbe is again repulsed on the frontiers of the
 Tyrol—Reflections on these events. 27

CHAP. IV.

The army of the Archduke Charles passes the Lech,
 and advances in Suabia—Order addressed by
 that Prince to his Generals—Movements made
 and positions taken by the Austrian and French
 armies—Jourdan apprises the Archduke of the
 declaration of war made by the Legislative Body
 —He at the same time attacks the Prince's van-

guard, and is repulsed—Both sides prepare for a battle on the 21st—The Archduke attacks first, and beats the French—Fault committed by Jourdan, who falls back to Stockach and Engen—Defeat of the French at the former of these two places on the 25th—They attack again on the 26th, but without success—They retire towards the Black Forest—General Sztarray forces them to repass the Rhine a few days after—The Austrians occupy almost all Suabia—Reflections upon these events

49

CHAP. V.

Massena on the 23d makes a general attack upon the position of the Austrians in the Voralberg—He is repulsed with great loss—Lecourbe attacks on the 26th the Austrians in the vallies of the Inn and of Munster, makes himself master of them, and takes a great many prisoners—The inhabitants of the Tyrol take up arms against the French, who are obliged to evacuate the country after being defeated—Excesses of which they were guilty—General Bellegarde detaches a part of his army to favour the operations of the Allies in Italy—He

recon-

<i>reconnoitres the passages of the Grison country—</i>	
<i>An Austrian column experiences a check in the</i>	
<i>valley of the Inn</i>	91

CHAP. VI.

<i>Proclamation of the Archduke Charles to the people</i>	
<i>of Switzerland—Object of that Proclamation—</i>	
<i>Unfortunate situation of the inhabitants of that</i>	
<i>country—Insurrections occasioned by the Law, for</i>	
<i>forced enrolments—Capture of the town of Schaff-</i>	
<i>hausen, and of Petershausen by the Austrians—</i>	
<i>Massena is named Commander in Chief of the</i>	
<i>armies of Switzerland, of the Danube, and of</i>	
<i>Observation—Situation and force of his army,</i>	
<i>and of that of the Archduke at the end of April</i>	
<i>—Breaking up of the congress at Rastadt</i>	104

CHAP. VII.

<i>General situation of the Allies—Generals Hotze</i>	
<i>and Bellegarde combine a plan for an at-</i>	
<i>tack upon the country of the Grisons—The</i>	
<i>latter of these Generals takes possession of the</i>	
<i>Upper and Lower Engadine, after several en-</i>	

gements—The former fails in an attack upon Luciensteig—He renews it thirteen days after, and is completely successful—The French are entirely driven out of the country of the Grisons, and the Austrians take post upon the left bank of the Rhine—General Bellegarde goes to co-operate with the army of Italy. - - 124

CHAP. VIII.

The French endeavour to force the Austrians to re-pass the Rhine at Wallenstadt, but are repulsed—Massena evacuates the eastern part of Switzerland—All the army of Hotze passes the Rhine—The advanced guard of the Archduke, and almost all his army, also pass that river—Massena makes a successful attack on the 25th, notwithstanding which, the armies of the Archduke and of Hotze effect a junction the next day—They attack, in their turn, on the 27th, and force Massena to retire behind the Toss—He falls back to the Glatt two days afterwards, and retreats still further, to occupy the entrenched position of Zurich—Progress made by the left of the army of Hotze—General Bellegarde, after having made

made himself master of the Valteline, embarks, with the greatest part of his army, on the lake Como, and passes into Italy—The rest under the orders of General Haddick, continues to act in the lesser Cantons—He defeats the enemy on the 28th, and drives them from St. Gothard, and from the greatest part of the valley of the Reuss—Generals Lecourbe and Loison make a successful attack a few days afterwards, but in consequence of manœuvres of the Austrians, are obliged to retire behind the lakes of the four Cantons—Advantageous situation of the Allies at that time.

143

CHAP. IX.

Strang position taken by Massena in front of Zurich—The Archduke resolves to drive him from it—Bloody battle of the 4th of June—Massena leaves his position the day after, and goes to take up a better one between the Reuss and the Limmat—On the 9th, the Austrians attempt to extend themselves between those two rivers—They succeed but partially—Situation of the Archduke, and causes of his inaction—Massena attacks with success on

the 15th, but in the end is repulsed—That General and the Archduke reinforce themselves, and mutually threaten each other on the right bank of the Rhine—Their motives for doing so—Engagements of the 26th of June, the 4th and the 6th of July in the vallies of Kintzing, Renchen, Ettenbach, and Acheren—Petty warfare carried on upon the Rhine and the Nidda—Engagement of the 29th of July, upon the latter of these rivers - - - - - 162

CHAP. X.

Massena causes an attack to be made on the 3d of July, on the left wing of the Archduke in the cantons of Schweitz and Zug—He gains some posts, but loses them again the same or following day—Positions of the opposite armies in Switzerland—Reconnoitering made on the 16th by the Austrians in the Valais, which produces a trifling skirmish—Plans and military preparations made by the French—They form two new armies, one called that of the Rhine, and the other that of the Alps—Political measures of the Allies—Imperial decree presented to the Diet of Ratisbon—

The

<i>The Elector of Bavaria, and the Duke of Wurtemberg enter into the coalition—The Emperor of Russia sends a fresh army into Germany—</i>	
<i>Projects of the Allies</i>	181

CHAP. XI.

Surprising inaction of the opposed armies in Switzerland—Plan of a general attack formed at Paris—Particular plan of Massena—The Austrians are attacked on the 14th of August along their whole line—They maintain themselves before the Limmat, but their left is broken on all points—Operations of General Lecourbe, and his attacks on the 14th, 15th, and 16th—The Austrians entirely driven from the Cantons of Schwitz and Uri—The praise due to General Lecourbe—Observations on the estimated loss of the Austrians—The first column of the Russian auxiliary army arrives at Schaffhausen on the same day that the French make their first attack—Measures taken by the Archduke to stop the progress of the Republicans—Causes which assisted him in this design—The invasion of Suabia determined on by the French—Their motives for it 196

CHAP. XII.

The French army of the Rhine commanded, ad interim, by General Muller, concentrates itself in the Palatinate, and the Electorate of Mentz—It passes the Rhine at many points, on the 25th of August, and gets possession of Manheim, and of Heidelberg, and invests Philipsburg—The Generals Sztarray and Meerfeld, send reinforcements to the Necker and to the Enz—The French fall back—The different forces opposed to them—Object of the court of Vienna—Conduct of the Archduke—This Prince quits Switzerland with his army—A part of his troops march towards the Necker—The French make a vain attack in front of Kehl—The levy of troops in the Electorate of Mentz detains the French upon the Mein—They raise the siege of Philipsburg, and preserve on the right bank of the Rhine, only Manheim and Neckeräü—They are driven thence sword in hand, and are also obliged to return into Mentz—State of affairs and expectations of the public, towards the end of September

220

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Reasons why the Russians supplied the place of the Austrians badly—Affairs of the 5th, 6th, and 8th of September—Unaccountable inactivity of Massena—The Directory displeased at it, resolve to deprive him of his command—He determines at length to attack—Projects which the Allies were forming at the same instant—Massena prevents them—On the 25th he attacks their whole line on the Linth and the Limmat—General Hotze is killed—General Petrarch, who succeeds him, retreats—The passage of the Limmat forced, and Zurich surrounded—Bad conduct of the Russian Generals—General Korsakow evacuates Zurich on the 25th—Fault that he commits on his retreat—The defeat in consequence—March of Marshal Suworow from Italy into Switzerland—He traverses the canton of Uri—Carries the St. Gothard—Arrives at Altorf—Operations of Generals Auffenberg, Lincken, and Feltachich—Defeat of Lecourbe and of another French corps—Suworow learns the events of the 25th and 26th, as Massena does the arrival of Suworow—Defeat

of

the French on the 30th of September, and 1st of October—The Russians arrive at Glarus, and retire into the country of the Grisons, by the valley of Fleims—They assemble at Chur on the 9th—The Archduke returns from the Palatinate into Suabia—Attempt at a diversion in favour of Marshal Suworow, but undertaken too late—Triple action of the 7th of October at Constance, Dissenhoffen, and Schlatten - - 242

CHAP. XIV.

Observations upon the events described in the preceding chapter—Examination of the causes which brought on the disasters of the 25th and 26th of September—Degree of blame which ought to be imputed to the Archduke Charles, or to the court of Vienna—Unfortunate effects of the death of General Hotze—Faults of General Petrarch and Korsakow—Faults of Massena—Praises merited by Marshal Suworow and his army—Estimate of the loss of the French and Allied armies, from the 25th of September to the 9th of October 285

CHAP. XV.

The French and Imperialists supposed to entertain offensive views, none of which prove real—Marshal Suworow quits the country of the Grisons, and General Korsakow the canton of Schaffhausen—They form a junction behind the lake of Constance—The forces remaining to them—Estimate of their Losses—The French make an attack in the country of the Grisons on the 31st of October—They gain some ground—The Archduke reinforces the troops which guard that country—March of the Russian army towards Bavaria and the upper Palatinate—It halts in Bohemia—Last operations which take place in the country of the Grisons—Conclusion of the campaign in Switzerland.

305

CHAP. XVI.

Respective positions of the Imperial and French troops from Kehl to Mentz, at the end of September—The latter recommence offensive measures the following month—On the 4th and 5th
of

of October, they pass the Rhine on many points— Possess themselves of all the country situated between the Mein and Lahn—Enter Frankfort, and drive from Manheim and Heidelberg the Imperial troops, who retire to the Enz—Position of the opposed troops on the 1st of November—Dangerous and embarrassing situation of Prince Charles—Military measures which he adopts—Proclamation addressed by him to the States, and inhabitants of the Empire—Declaration also made to them by the Emperor of Russia—Effect produced by these two political papers—The Austrians having been reinforced, attack the French, and defeat them on the 3d, and following days—Compell them to withdraw into the angle formed by the Necker and the Rhine—and raise the blockade of Philipsburg—General Lecourbe on the 16th, makes a new attack and again invests this fortress—The Austrians fall back as far as the Enz—The Archduke sends General Sztarray with fresh reinforcements—The latter on the 3d of December makes a general attack, which meets with full success—Philipsburg is relieved, and Lecourbe is forced to retire to Manheim—He proposes an armistice, which is accepted on condition

dition that it is ratified by the Archduke—This Prince refuses to do it—The French evacuate Mannheim and Neckerau, and completely repass the Rhine—End of the campaign. - 320


CHAP. XVII.


Four principal periods presented by this campaign—Examination of its result, as to territory—Review of the faults committed on each side—Estimate of the respective losses—Interest excited by this campaign, arising from the novelty of the theatre upon which it was acted, and of the species of war which it required—It will be looked upon as a model in future. - 356

Part of the
THEATRE of WAR
in
GERMANY,
in the Campaigns of
1796, 1797, and 1799.

British Statute Miles.
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






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CHAPTER I.

State of the forces of the French Republic at the end of the month of February, 1799—Causes of the reduction of their numbers—Force and position of the armies of Germany and Switzerland, at the same period—Plans of the French—Force and position of the Imperial armies—The line of conduct to be followed by their leaders—General Jourdan receives orders to begin the campaign.

AT the moment when the Directory imprudently determined upon a war, in which it had to encounter all the strength of the Emperor of Germany, and part of that of the Emperor of Russia, it had not more than 320,000 French soldiers in Europe, and with this number of men, supported by about 80,000 auxiliaries, Dutch, Swiss, Piedmontese, Cisalpines, Ligurians, Romans, Neapolitans, and Poles,

it hoped to be able to defend its conquests, or its frontiers from Amsterdam to Naples, a space of 2000 miles; to protect its coasts or those of its allies, from the Texel to Bayonne, and to command the obedience of forty millions of men, anxious to throw off its yoke*. The Republican army had been

* When the minister at war, Scherer, went to take the command of the army of Italy, he laid an account of the Republican force, as it then stood, before the Directory. The total amount at that period, was 392,000 men, of whom 353,000 were under arms, and only 45,000 cavalry. Subtracting the army of Egypt, estimated at 31,000 men, it will be found that about 320,000 men remained in Europe, who, with nearly 80,000 auxiliaries, formed a total of 400,000 French soldiers and allies, at the disposal of the Directory.—But it evidently could not employ more than 250,000 of that number in Germany, in Switzerland, and in Italy, being obliged to keep the rest in France, in Holland, in the conquered countries, and in the three islands of Corsica, Malta, and Corfu. The Conscripts were not comprized in this estimate, but 40,000 of them had already been incorporated into the armies, and the remainder could not be expected to do more than compensate for the loss of men daily occasioned by the sword, by sickness, and by desertion. We may say, therefore, that France was engaging in war with 250,000 effective men, while the Emperor could hardly oppose 200,000. But the forces
of

been reduced to this number, so inferior to what was in 1794, the æra of its greatest strength, by the losses it had suffered in the two last campaigns against the Austrians, in the war against Switzerland, in that which still continued in the kingdom of Naples, and by the return of a multitude of requisitionary soldiers to their homes. This deficiency had not been filled up, owing to the impoverished state of the French finances, and because, the Directory dreading the future intervention of the army in the affairs of France, was not desirous that the military force should be more than sufficient to secure dominion without, and to maintain despotism within: because too, the terror with which the continent was struck, and the moral power

B 2

which

of that Prince were assembled and united upon three points of attack, while those of the French were dispersed from Naples to Mentz, and had not only to oppose the Austrians, but it may almost be said the whole population of the countries which they occupied. Besides, the whole mass of their soldiers could not be compared to that of the Imperial troops, as in the 250,000 men, there were 80,000 bad soldiers, Conscripts and Italians, while the Austrian army was finer, better disciplined, and animated with a better spirit than it had ever before been.—The French then had the numerical, but their enemies had the relative superiority.

which the Directory had acquired, seemed to be equivalent to an increase of physical strength; and because it could summon to the armies at will, not only the Requisitionists, whose desertion it had overlooked, but also all the individuals of the second and third classes who had not yet marched. We may remember, that this latter measure was adopted at the end of 1798, and that the Directory caused a levy of 200,000 Conscrip̄ts to be decreed—about 40,000 of whom had joined the armies at the conclusion of the month of February.

Of the 320,000 men who composed the French army, 45,000 under the orders of General Massena, occupied Switzerland and the left bank of the Rhine, almost from its source, to the western extremity of the lake of Constance, and from that point, the two banks of the river as far as Basle*. Between this town and Dusseldorf, were stationed about 65,000 men, commanded by General Jourdan, and forming what was called the army of Mentz. They occupied

* Although Scherer, in his estimate, only stated this army as consisting of 39,000 men, it is reckoned above, at 45,000, as it was the first that received reinforcements of Conscrip̄ts, and because too, some thousand Swiss auxiliaries were joined to it.

occupied the fort of Kehl, upon the right bank of the Rhine, lined the left bank from the frontier of Switzerland to Mentz, and from the latter town to Dusseldorf, possessed all the country upon the two banks. The corps in the latter position, amounting to about 20,000 men, was called the army of observation, and was under the command of General Bernadotte.—It was therefore, with 110,000 men only, that the French had to carry the war into Germany, to hold themselves in readiness to repulse the neutral army, in case it should march against them, and to keep in subjection Switzerland, and all the countries situated between the Sarre, the Moselle, the Roër, and the Rhine.—90,000 men was the utmost force that could be applied to the execution of the offensive plans of the Directory.

These projects were the very same which had been pursued in the campaigns of 1795 and 1797, the invasion of the hereditary states of the House of Austria, and the junction of the French armies under the walls of Vienna. In the first of these two campaigns, the army of Italy had been unable to share in the execution of this plan; in the second, the armies of Germany had taken an active part in it, too late;—in 1799, the Directory flattered itself,

that by making them act at the same time, and with more concert, they might at length realize all its hopes.

That such might be the result, it was necessary that the army of observation should take possession of Philipsburg, the only fortress remaining to the empire upon the Rhine; that the army of Jourdan should cross that river, traverse the defiles of the Black Forest, extend itself into Suabia, turn the lake of Constance, and the southern part of the Tyrol; that the army of Switzerland should drive the Austrians from the country of the Grisons, attack the Tyrol in front, and seize the vallies of the Leck and of the Inn, while the army of Italy should penetrate into Germany, either through the Tyrol or through the Friuli. It is evident, that in this manner, the Austrian troops posted upon the lake of Constance, in the country of Bregentz, and that of the Grisons, would have been encompassed by Jourdan's army, and that of Massena; and that those which defended the Italian Tyrol and the Veronese, would have been hemmed in between the army of Switzerland, and that of Italy.

Such

Such were the force, the position, and the views of the French at the time they resolved to renew the war in Germany. The situation of their enemies, in these three respects comes next to be examined.

When the French ministers at Rastadt, formally demanded of the minister of the Emperor, and of the deputies of the Empire, that the Russian troops should be sent back, the cabinet of Vienna, unable and unwilling to accede to it, judged not only that war was inevitable, but that the French would commence it early in the season. It hastened, therefore, to prepare the means of defence, and in the course of the month of February, all the Austrian army was put upon the war establishment with its full complement, and the different divisions assembled upon those points which it was essential to occupy.

The Archduke Charles concentrated more than 60,000 men upon the Lech: 20,000 collected in the Palatinate, in the environs of Amberg, or at Wurtzburg, under the orders of General Sztaray: a like number was under those of General Hotze, in the Voralberg, and in the country of the Grisons: near 25,000 commanded by General Bellegarde, were upon the frontiers of the last mentioned country, and of the Tyrol. The army of Italy, part of which

was upon the Adige, and the rest in the Friuli and Carynthia, was reckoned more than 60,000 strong. — Thus the Emperor had to oppose to the French 185,000 fighting men, 90,000 of whom were in a situation to act immediately against Jourdan and Massena.

It would be useless to examine what the proportion of strength in the hands of the Austrians might have permitted them to undertake, had they chosen to begin hostilities. Determined, however, as they were, to let the odium fall upon the French, their first operations could only be defensive, and dependant upon those of their enemies. Generals Hotze and Bellegarde, could do nothing but watch the motions of the French, and fortify and defend, as well as possible, the posts occupied in Suabia, Tyrol, and the country of the Grisons, as likewise those held on its frontiers, in the Valteline, and in Italy.

The Archduke was, on his part, to confine himself, in the first instance, to preparations for the passage of the Lech with all his army, the moment he should hear that the French had passed the Rhine, and was in that event to advance so rapidly as to come up with them, not only before they
should

should arrive upon the river Iller, but even before they could push beyond the lake of Constance, in order to carry into execution their design of attacking General Hotze's position at Bregentz, while Massena would endeavour to carry it from the opposite extremity of the lake.

The hope of being able to effect this decisive operation before Prince Charles could have time to prevent it—the desire of laying all the countries between the lake of Constance and the Mein, under contribution, and of subsisting their troops at the expence of those countries, blinded the Directory, as to the obstacles which must oppose the progress of its armies, and determined it to order General Jourdan, in the end of February, to make a sudden irruption into Germany, without any previous declaration of war, thus violating the treaty concluded with the Emperor, the armistice with the Empire, and every principle of the law of nations. These last considerations had but little weight with the Directory, and on this occasion, as in every other political transaction, they had in view, not what was just, but what was profitable.

CHAP. II.

The French pass the Rhine at Basle and at Kehl—They plunder the villages on the right bank—Note delivered by the Republican Ministers to the Deputies of the Empire at Rastadt—Proclamations of the Directory and of General Jourdan—The French occupy Mannheim, and summon Philipsburg to surrender—Letter sent by General Bernadotte to the Governor of that fortress, and the answer returned—Jourdan's army advances into Suabia, and lays that country and the Palatinate under contribution—Rastadt declared neutral by the French—Jourdan appointed Commander in Chief of the armies in Germany and Switzerland.

AT break of day, on the 1st of March, General Jourdan passed the Rhine at Kehl, with the vanguard, centre, and left wing of his army, while General Ferino passed it with the right wing, at Huningen and at Basle. The first step taken by this army was, to put every kind of provision found in
the

the villages on the right bank of the river in requisition, having left the magazines in Alsace entirely empty, and having with them, when they passed the Rhine, not even the ordinary rations of bread and forage. While the Commissaries and the general staff were employed in plundering the rich valley which they had just entered, the army overran it, and advanced to the foot of the mountains which enclose it. In the morning of the same day, the French legation at Rastadt, presented the following note to the deputation of the Empire.

“ The undersigned Ministers plenipotentiary of
 “ the French Republic for the negociation with the
 “ German Empire, have received orders from the
 “ Executive Directory, to acquaint the Deputation
 “ of the Empire with the inclosed proclamation.—
 “ They obey those orders, by joining to the present
 “ note, a copy certified by themselves of that
 “ proclamation, and of the address of General
 “ Jourdan to the army he commands.

“ The undersigned are at the same time charged
 “ to declare, that this march of the army ought
 “ only to be considered as a *precaution commanded*
 “ *by circumstances*; that the desire for peace upon
 “ the part of the French government, continues to
 “ be

“ be as ardent, as sincere ; and that it wishes still to
“ conclude it with the Empire, in the supposition
“ that the Empire will declare itself against the
“ march of the Russian troops.”

(Signed)

BONNIER.

JEAN DEBRY.

ROBERJOT.

Proclamation of the Executive Directory.

“ The troops of his Majesty the Emperor, in
“ contempt of a convention concluded at Rastadt,
“ on the 1st of December 1797, have repassed the
“ Inn, and have left the hereditary states.”

“ This movement has been combined with the
“ march of the Russian troops, who loudly declare
“ that they come to attack and combat the French
“ Republic, and who are at this moment in the
“ states of the Emperor.”

“ Always faithful to the obligations imposed upon it,
“ always animated with the sincere desire of main-
“ taining a state of peace, always disposed to presume
“ the same sentiments on the part of his Majesty the
“ Emperor, the French government has demanded

“ a sa-

“ a satisfactory declaration upon the march of the
 “ Russian troops, and upon the passage which is
 “ granted to them.

“ *The Emperor has remained silent.* The Di-
 “ rectory, therefore, under the necessity to defend
 “ itself, and forced by the duty incumbent upon
 “ every state to provide for its own safety, has
 “ caused the French armies to take such positions
 “ as circumstances render necessary. But it at the
 “ same time declares, that its desire for peace is
 “ invariable, and that the very moment his Ma-
 “ jesty the Emperor shall acquaint them by an
 “ amicable declaration, that the Russians have eva-
 “ cuated his dominions, and that his own troops
 “ have again taken the positions, determined by the
 “ convention concluded at Rastadt, the French
 “ armies shall, on their side, return to the positions
 “ they have occupied up to this time.”

20th February, 1799.

General Jourdan's proclamation, on account of
 its length, and its resemblance to the numerous pro-
 ductions of this kind, which the public has been
 condemned to read since the beginning of the
 French

French revolution, does not merit insertion in a compleat state.—It began thus :

“ Soldiers ! in contempt of a solemn convention,
 “ the troops of Austria have first passed the line of
 “ demarcation.”—and lower—“ The Executive Di-
 “ rectory *has done every thing for peace*; but if war is
 “ wished, it will make it—Soldiers let us come out
 “ of our lines, and recommence that career we have
 “ hitherto pursued with so much glory.” Intending
 to impose again upon German simplicity, he next
 orders his soldiers, under the severest penalties, to
 respect common and individual property, and in-
 forms them, that the Commissary-General shall alone
 have the right of making requisitions, adding, how-
 ever, “ *that the Generals and Commanders of detached*
 “ *corps might levy requisitions on occasions of ur-*
 “ *gency.*” This proclamation ended thus :—“ The
 “ inhabitants of Germany will, I hope, remain
 “ calm in the midst of the storm, and be convinced,
 “ that the best means they can take to preserve their
 “ property, will be to remain peaceably in their
 “ habitations. But, if on the contrary, notwith-
 “ standing what I have engaged myself to, the
 “ French army find, the towns deserted and villages
 “ abandoned, if their inhabitants oppose its march,
 “ or

“ or refuse to furnish it with such supplies as are in
 “ their power, then I declare, with the same frank-
 “ ness, that I will take other measures to punish
 “ them, and to make them repent their temerity.”

The French, by beginning with the three above-mentioned notes or proclamations, instead of a frank and open declaration of war, evidently acted with a view of throwing the odium of the war on the cabinet of Vienna, of alienating the other Princes of the Empire from the Emperor, of inducing them to continue the negotiations for a separate peace, and of representing as a declaration of war on the part of the Emperor, the first step that should be made by his troops to meet the French army.

In the character of the Directory there was so much presumption joined to perfidy, that it is impossible to say whether they intended to deceive others : it is enough to say that they deceived none but themselves*.

On

* The Deputation of the Empire at Rastadt, having deliberated upon the note of the French Ministers, the day after receiving it, adopted the following *Conclusum* :
 “ That the note of the French Plenipotentiaries should
 “ immediately be sent to the General Diet of the Empire,
 “ with the documents annexed to it ; that it should at the
 “ same time be remarked to the Diet, that the majority of
 “ the

On the 2d of March, a detachment of the French army of observation, took possession of the town of Mannheim, in consequence of a capitulation. The fortifications of this place, since the last siege it had sustained, were in so bad a state, that the Palatine commander could not have refused them admission, had he even wished so to do. On the same day,
General

“ the Deputation was convinced, in consequence of that
 “ note, that the General Diet must be persuaded, how
 “ urgent it was to put it in the power of the Deputation
 “ to give an answer to the note of the French Legation,
 “ of the 2d of January, for the purpose of resuming
 “ the negotiations already too long suspended ; that the
 “ present deliberation should be transmitted according
 “ to custom, to his Imperial Majesty’s Minister ; that
 “ he should be requested to communicate to the French
 “ Plenipotentiaries the decision of the Deputation, and to
 “ express to them the anxious desire with which it is
 “ animated, of concurring with all its power, in pro-
 “ curing a speedy and lasting peace; and that finally the
 “ French note and the documents annexed to it, should
 “ be communicated to all the respective Deputies who
 “ are at Rastadt.”

It does not belong to the present subject to enter into the remaining proceedings of the Congress at Rastadt, which by referring to the Diet at Ratisbon, and the Emperor’s Ministers, evaded the propositions contained in the note of the French Plenipotentiaries. It held very nearly the same conduct until its dissolution, an event which will be noticed in its proper place.

General Bernadotte presented himself before the town of Philipsburg, which in compliance with the treaty of Campo Formio, was only garrisoned with troops of the Empire, commanded by the Rhingrave of Salm*. General Bernadotte sent him a long summons, which was so insolent and extravagant, that little as the military declarations of the French commanders are entitled to notice, a few paragraphs of this deserve to be recorded. Historians of former wars have been able to pass over epistolary communications of Generals in silence, because they were almost all of them conformable to the principles of honour and to the rights of nations; but as the Republicans have wished to extend their revolution over every thing, and their Generals having introduced in the camps the eloquence of the tribunes of Paris, as if anxious of emulating the orators of the clubs and councils, in their arrogance and contemptuous conduct towards strangers; the opportunity ought not to be neglected of manifesting the spirit which the French have uniformly evinced in the course of the present war. The language of its officers, and the behaviour of their armies, have served more to undeceive cotem-

VOL. III.

C

poraries,

* It was this same Rhingrave of Salm, who commanded the Dutch patriots in 1788.

poraries, and will more effectually enlighten posterity on this head, than any metaphysical dissertations upon the nature and causes of the French revolution.

After having endeavoured, in the same manner as the Directory and Jourdan, to throw the blame of the renewal of the war upon the cabinet of Vienna—after having said that the taking possession of the town of Ulm, which he was pleased to call a fortress, rendered it necessary for the French to seize upon Philipsburg, and after warning the Rhingrave that the garrison of that place was not in a state to defend it, General Bernadotte adds:

“ I must tell you yet farther, General : I know
 “ that your garrison is discontented ; that the officers
 “ of it are too *wise* and *enlightened*, to lavish their
 “ blood to gratify the selfishness and caprice of a few
 “ arrogant men ; and that the soldiers only wait the
 “ signal of attack to declare their dissatisfaction.
 “ When the inhabitants shall see that their houses are
 “ soon to become a prey to the flames, they will
 “ presently determine which side to take. The artil-
 “ lery of Landau, which is advancing, will furnish
 “ them with what they have long waited for, a
 “ sufficient motive to compel their Commandant to
 “ deliver up the keys.”

“ The

“ The terrible example which General Mack has
 “ given to all those who lead soldiers to battle against
 “ their will, must have afforded you ample matter
 “ for alarming reflections. But without adverting
 “ to those considerations, the army, under my com-
 “ mand, has sufficient means to compel the fortress
 “ to surrender. I cannot repeat often enough,
 “ General, that I will not place a garrison in your
 “ fortress, *as an enemy*—far from it; I mean *only*
 “ *to hold the place for the German Empire*; and I
 “ call the world to witness, that I declare, that I
 “ will restore Philipsburg to the Empire, as soon
 “ as the French government shall be satisfied that
 “ the Empire can defend it against the ambition of
 “ *the House of Austria*. Should you oblige me to
 “ give orders for the assault, I am sure I cannot but
 “ succeed, as the number of troops I have with me,
 “ and the other means I possess, render *it impossible*
 “ I should fail. But the *punishment* of those who
 “ have been the cause of resistance to the French
 “ Republic, shall be *terrible*, *nor will I restrain* the
 “ rage of the soldiers who will give way to their fury
 “ against you.”

This ridiculous and barbarous summons does not
 require very long comment;—it is probably the very

first time, that a Commandant has been informed that the officers of his garrison, are too *wise and too enlightened* not to compel their chief to surrender as soon as he should be attacked; that a General professing a determination to take a place, cost what it would, should pretend that he did not wish so to do as *an enemy*; that he should look upon a failure as *impossible*; threaten a soldier with a terrible punishment for doing his duty, and declare that he would take no measures to *restrain the rage of the soldiery*—None, perhaps, but General Bernadotte could have shewed so much folly, insolence, and atrocity*.

The

* This General had served before the Revolution, as a common soldier, in the regiment of *Royal la Marine*, which he left after having attained the rank of Serjeant. He became clerk to the Parliament of Pau (the town in which he was born). When the Revolution gave rise to the establishment of the National Guards, his good appearance, his service in the regular troops, and above all his violent democracy procured him the adjutantcy in the Guards, at Pau. On the breaking out of the war he went to the armies, where he shewed courage, boldness, and activity, and made a rapid progress. He commanded Jourdan's advanced guard in 1796, and was completely beaten. When sent to Buonapart's army in 1797, he distinguished himself in the short campaign of that year, by summoning the town of Gradisca, more briefly indeed, but

The only consequence which resulted from this summons, was the disgrace of the General who sent it.—The Rhingrave of Salm was neither deceived nor intimidated, and returned the following answer :

“ General, Your letter, which was brought to me
 “ by Adjutant Goudin, is of such a nature as I
 “ could not have expected to receive at this moment,
 “ when peace is on the point of being signed between
 “ the German Empire and the French Republic.
 “ Surely, General, it must be your own opinion,
 “ that I should be culpable, were I to deliver up a
 “ fortress, the command of which has been entrusted
 “ to me by the General in Chief of the Army of the
 “ Empire. He is not far distant; and the place
 “ where the Deputies to the Congress for the peace
 “ of the Empire now meet, is still nearer.

“ The orders and instructions which I may re-
 “ ceive from those two quarters, will regulate my
 “ conduct. While in expectation of these orders,
 “ which when I receive I shall immediately com-

C 3

“ municate

but not in a more honourable manner than he did Philipsburg. Being dissatisfied with Jourdan and the Directory, he left the army a short time after the opening of this campaign, and was placed by the Jacobins at the head of the war department.

“ municate to you, at present I can only act as
 “ every man of honour must act in my place.

“ The situation of the fortress under my com-
 “ mand, is not such as you appear to believe, nor
 “ do I know of any discontent among the garrison.
 “ I must, therefore, declare to you, that I will not
 “ receive a French garrison into the place, nor com-
 “ mence hostilities, though I will resist any attack.
 “ The assailants will be answerable to our cotem-
 “ poraries, and to posterity, for all the calamities
 “ which may follow, in consequence of their attack.”

This spirited and moderate answer was justified by the conduct of the garrison, composed of nearly 2000 chosen troops of the Empire, who had served with distinction during the preceding campaigns. Far from affording any reason to doubt their fidelity, the officers imitated the zeal of their leader, and protested with indignation against the dishonourable views attributed to them by General Bernadotte. He did not indeed find it so easy to carry his threats into execution, as to utter them. The inundations which form the principal defence of Philipsburg, (its fortifications having been rebuilt only with earth) prevented him from approaching near enough to be able to reduce the place in a short time. These
 local

local circumstances, and the events which took place in Suabia, compelled him to turn the siege into a blockade, and even this he was obliged to raise soon after, as will be seen in its place.

On the 2d of March, and on the following days, Jourdan's army continued to advance in the direction it had taken. General Ferino, with the right wing, proceeded along the valley of the Rhine, through the forest towns, and arrived on the 5th at Engen, and on the 6th at Blumberg. The space between the latter place and Shaffhausen was occupied by a demi-brigade, detached from the army of Switzerland, to establish its communication with that of Mentz. The centre divided itself into two columns, which advanced, one by the valley of Hell, and the other by the valley of Kinche, both directing their course towards that of the Danube.—Jourdan, who had accompanied the latter column with his staff, had his head quarters at Gengembach on the 3d, at Haslach on the 4th, at Homberg on the 5th, and at Villingen on the 6th.—At the last date, the van-guards of the two centre columns had arrived, one upon the left, and the other upon the right bank of the Danube. The left wing, which took the road to Knäebis, under the orders of General St. Cyr, arrived on the

2d at Frydenstadt, quitted it on the 4th, traversed the Duchy of Wurtemberg, directing part of its force towards Rothweil and part towards Tubingen, and reached the Necker at the same time that General Jourdan arrived on the Danube.—Thus we see, that on the 6th the whole of the French army was beyond the mountains of the Black Forest. Its right was at Blumberg, near Schaffhausen, and its left at Rothweil. The army of observation at the same time spread itself into the country of Hesse Darmstadt, and into the Palatinate, and was busily employed in repairing the fortifications of Mannheim.—The different corps of Jourdan's army met with no impediment in their march, as the Austrians were still at a great distance, and the Duke of Wurtemberg, the only Prince who could have thrown any obstacles in their way, observed the strictest neutrality, to which he was compelled, by the armistice subsisting between France and the Empire, by his own military weakness, and still more by the dread of giving the French a pretence for revolutionizing his states.—The French plenipotentiaries had, during the winter, taken advantage of their residence at Rastadt, and of the differences then existing between that Prince and his subjects, to dispose the latter to revolt. That the
entry

entry of the French into the Duchy of Wurtemberg did not produce a revolution in that state, is to be attributed to the hope they entertained of being able to detach the Princes of the Empire from the cause of the Emperor, and to a consciousness of the uncertainty attending military events. They contented themselves with preying upon that country in spite of General Jourdan's fine promises, and treated it almost as badly as the Brisgaw, on which they levied all kinds of contributions. Their amity with the new Elector of Bavaria did not even protect the Palatinate from their rapacity. The absolute necessity under which the French government laboured, of subsisting its armies, and the impossibility of doing that at its own expence, outweighed every other consideration. The district of Rastadt was alone respected : that town was declared neutral, and General Jourdan gave a safe-guard to the Congress, which being almost separated from Germany by the advance of the French armies, and having moreover but a very precarious and limited communication with the rest of the Empire, gave hopes to the Cabinet of the Luxemburg, of realizing its project of a partial pacification. Relying as much on the success of its arms as on its political intrigues, and on the talents

talents of General Jourdan as much as on those of the negociators Bonnier, Roberjot, and Jean Debry, the Directory, with an affectation of Roman pride, changed the name of the army of Mentz, to that of the army of the Danube, and appointed Jourdan Commander in Chief of the three armies of the Lower Rhine, the Upper Rhine, and of Switzerland. Bernadotte commanded the first, and Massena the last, of these two armies, under his superior command.

C H A P. III.

Positions of the Austrians in the country of the Grisons, and in the Voralberg—The French prepare to drive them thence—Massena summons General Auffenberg, and attacks him at the same time—Auffenberg taken, with the greatest part of his troops—The French make themselves masters of Chur, and of almost all the valley of the Rhine—General Hotze attacks them without success—Reflections upon these events—Plan of the French to complete the conquest of the country of the Grisons—Massena attacks the Austrians in the Voralberg twice, and is repulsed with much loss—General Lecourbe defeats the Austrians in the valley of the Inn, and seizes on the High and Low Engadine—He is repulsed at St. Martinsbruck—General Loudon surprises and takes General Mainoni—General Dessolles attacks the post of Bormio—Repulsed at first, but afterwards succeeds—General Lecourbe is again repulsed on the frontiers of the Tyrol—Reflections on these events.

IT has been seen in the first chapter, that the plan of the French was to form a junction upon the eastern
side

side of the lake of Constance, between the armies of Jourdan and Massena. To execute this plan, the former had only to march through countries without defence, but the latter had in the onset to encounter the Austrians, to pass the Rhine in spite of their opposition, to drive them from the country of the Grisons and from the Voralberg, and to force them to retreat into the Upper Tyrol.

The difficulties attending these operations rendered it necessary for Massena to begin his attack before the Archduke could oppose the march of Jourdan, and find time to send reinforcements to the lake of Constance.

It may be remembered, that soon after Switzerland was revolutionized, the Grisons being threatened with the same fate, had the wisdom to place themselves under the protection of the Austrians. As these were as much interested in granting it as the former were in demanding it, they lost no time in sending a body of troops into that country. That body, consisting of about 6000 men, and commanded by Major-General Auffenberg, was in possession of some posts above Chur, of that town, Mayenfeld, and the fort of Luciensteig, and communicated along the left bank of the Rhine, with
the

the army of General Hotze, from which it had been detached, and which was part at Feldkirch and part at Bregentz, and the intermediate places. In this manner were the Austrians shut up in a narrow valley, having the Rhine before them, and behind them a chain of extensive mountains, rendered impassable during almost the whole year by snow. Although they had but an inadequate force, and the position afforded but few local resources in case the passage of the river should be effected, yet they still possessed so many means of impeding that passage, that any attempt from the enemy to cross, must have been attended with great difficulties and dangers.

It was of so much importance to the French, not to fail in their enterprize, that they resolved not only to employ superior military means, but also the auxiliary resource of perfidy. General Massena having therefore assembled with dispatch a great part of his army in the Cantons of Glaris and of Appenzel, took post in the evening of the 5th of March, along the left bank of the Rhine, from the point where the two sources of that river unite, as far as the lake of Constance,—Every thing being ready for the attack, he sent, before day-break, on the 6th,

6th, an officer to General Auffenburg, with the following summons :

“ General, *according to the wishes of the people of*
 “ *the Grisons*, I am ordered by my Government to
 “ take possession of that country, and to cause it to
 “ be evacuated by the troops whom you command
 “ within two hours after this summons, which I am
 “ commissioned to make. In case of a refusal on
 “ your part to evacuate this country, or in case
 “ you should delay your retreat beyond the pre-
 “ scribed time, my orders are to attack the Austrian
 “ troops wherever I may find them. I therefore
 “ summon you, General, to evacuate the country
 “ of the Grisons within two hours after the present
 “ summons, which will be transmitted to you by an
 “ officer of my staff. I inform you at the same
 “ time, that the army which I have the honour
 “ to command, *is marching* against the Grisons
 “ country.”

But without waiting for an answer to this demand, as insolent as it was absurd, and with which it was phisically impossible to comply, even if General Auffenberg had been willing, and authorized to do it, he made a general attack through all the line. By this perfidious subterfuge, he flattered himself that
 he

he would avoid the odium of having begun the war without declaring it, and at the same time, secure to himself all the advantages of a surprise.—The French made demonstrations of an intention to attack all along their line, but while they at the same time threatened to pass the Rhine opposite Balzers and Flaish, as also between Mayenfeld and the Zollbrücke, and that a column which had passed by Mount Kongel an Vettis, turned the valley of Chur, and endeavoured to penetrate by Reichenau and Embs; Massena caused a bridge to be thrown over the river at Asmoos, opposite the narrow pass of the Luciensteig, and marched to that point with 5000 or 6000 men.

The Austrians, though not surprised, yet not having sufficient time to make every preparation for their defence, stood firm.—They checked the enemy by a well continued cannonade at Balzers and near Mayenfeld, and bravely defended the approach to the Steig. The possession of this post being the principal object the French had in view, it was there that they united the greatest force, and the engagement at that point was very obstinate during the whole day.—The Austrians had the superiority in position, and their enemies in numbers, with the additional
 advantage

advantage of having concerted beforehand all their measures. This circumstance in the end turned the scale, and towards the evening of the 6th, the French made themselves masters of the passage and fort of Luciensteig, which commands the road from Chur to Bregentz. While things were in this progress in the centre, the French had likewise gained ground on their right above Chur, and their left, commanded by General Oudinot, which had forded the Rhine at Hag, near Wordenberg, kept General Hotze in check near Feldkirch, and prevented him from sending reinforcements to the troops which defended the country of the Grisons.

The loss of the important post of the Steig, having entirely interrupted the communication between the corps of Generals Hotze and Auffenberg, the latter had no other resource left but to concentrate his remaining forces for the defence of Chur, and he therefore retreated to that town.—This he was obliged to do, maintaining at the same time constant fight, being closely pursued by the French. After several combats during the night and the morning of the 7th, he had reached the heights near Chur, when he found another column of the enemy advancing on his rear. Attacked on all sides, notwithstanding

withstanding his inferiority in number and the fatigue of his soldiers, he still endeavored to defend himself, but in vain; he was obliged to surrender with all his forces.—The day was not less propitious to the French on the left. General Hotze perceiving that there was no time to be lost in giving assistance to General Auffenberg, had in the morning of the same day the 7th, made every effort to penetrate into the valley of the Rhine, but he could not overcome the resistance of the French, and was obliged to return to Feldkirch, with the loss of several pieces of cannon and of a considerable number of men.

General Massena estimated the loss of the Austrians in those two days, at 21 pieces of cannon and 5000 men taken. The official reports of the Austrians give no reason to believe that this assertion was much exaggerated; but they pretended that the loss of the French amounted, by their own acknowledgement, to 4000 men. There is reason to believe, that it was not much less, both from seeing from the letters of Massena, the exertions which these successes cost him, and the obstinacy with which the Austrians defended themselves, and from considering that the latter were greatly supe-

rior in point of position and of Artillery, of which the former had none in their first attacks. The French therefore must have bought the passage of the Rhine, and the possession of the fort of Luciensteig, which they did not carry till after several obstinate attacks, at a high price in killed and wounded. General Hotze besides took from them several hundred prisoners.

Before we proceed to the events which followed, it may be necessary to make some remarks upon the operations which have been just detailed.

If we may give credit to the report of some eye-witnesses, General Auffenberg might have more effectually opposed the formation of the bridge at Azmooz; however, as he received not only the approbation of his Government, but the praises of the enemy themselves, it seems that no blame can justly attach to his conduct.

The successes of the French in these two days, though to be attributed principally to the advantage of surprize joined to the great superiority of their force, were also partly the result of a want of presight in the Austrians. When they took possession of the country of the Grisons, they should have sent more troops thither; and should

should have put the small, but important fort of Luciensteig in a better state of defence, in order to secure to themselves a safe place of retreat, and to keep open the communication between Chur and Feldkirch.*—These two precautions were necessary for the security of their position in a narrow valley of great length, every passage to which is during a great part of the year, almost entirely shut up with snow and ice.—One simple point of that line being forced, all the troops in the higher part must of course be cut off without hope of succour, or possibility of retreat, which in reality happened.—It will be said, perhaps, that the Austrians being perfectly at peace with the French, had no reason to expect an attack so sudden as to prevent them from getting reinforcements in time: But the event proved that too much trust ought not to have been

* The Steig was fortified about the beginning of the 17th Century, by the Imperialists. It commands the communication between Germany and Italy, through the country of the Grisons. Its entrenchments which have been kept up ever since, form what is called the fort of San-Luciensteig, which is the principal defence of the Grison country, on the side which borders on the states of Austria.

been reposed, either in the good faith, or the apparent inactivity of the Republicans.

But even putting these considerations out of the question, common prudence required that the Austrians should concentrate their forces in the valley of the Rhine, and should augment them, when they saw the French, in the month of February, assume a menacing tone, and put themselves upon a war establishment.

The principal cause which prevented them from sending a larger body of troops into that country, was probably the difficulty of finding subsistence for them. — That obstacle was a serious one, but it might have been surmounted, especially if attempted earlier. It besides appears, that the Austrians flattered themselves that they should receive powerful assistance from the Grisons, which had undoubtedly been promised them by the Chiefs of that Government. Their partial assistance, however, was of no avail, for a very small number of individuals took up arms in favour of the Austrians. A much greater proportion quitted the country when the French entered it; But the fear of falling into their hands, was a stronger motive than

than the desire of sharing the fortune of defeated allies. It does not come within the limits of this work, to enquire into the causes why the Austrians received so little support from the inhabitants of a country which they had saved from the dominion of the French, and rescued from the rapacity of a few democrats. They certainly did not conciliate the affections of the inhabitants, but it is probable that the fault was not entirely on their side.

Massena being master of a part of the country, and of its capital, published a proclamation, in which he declared, that he would evacuate the territory of the Grisons, as soon as the court of Vienna would engage to send no troops thither; and promised the inhabitants, that as long as he should occupy it, personal liberty, property, and opinions, both religious and political, should be respected. The promises of the Republican General were, according to the invariable custom, immediately followed by a complete revolution throughout the country. Massena transferred its government into the hands of some expelled patriots, whom he had brought back with him, and

whose individual wishes were as on former occasions, declared to be the joint and collective wishes of the whole Grison people.

The military operations which General Massena had executed on the 6th and 7th, were only a prelude to those which the army of Switzerland was destined to accomplish in co-operation with that of Italy. However advantageous the possession of the valley of the Rhine might be to the French, that success could neither lead to others, nor even be secure, as long as the Austrians were masters of the Voralberg, and of the upper country of the Grisons. It was necessary to drive them from those positions in order to attack with advantage the Tyrol, and to complete the execution of the grand plan.

The situation and the force of the army of Switzerland, did not permit its commander to act at the same time against the Voralberg, the county of Pludentz, and in the southern parts of the country of the Grisons. The latter part of this task belonged more properly to the army of Italy; and it was determined that it should be undertaken by a body of troops detached from those which occupied the Valteline and the Italian Bailiwicks.

General

General Massena proposed at the same time to attack the Voralberg; his right wing under General Lecourbe was to act between the two, and attack the west side of the Tyrol; in a word it was by the three valleys of the Rhine, the Inn, and the Adige, that the French hoped to penetrate into that Austrian province.

Massena being the nearest to the enemy, began his attack upon the 11th, but he found the position of Feldkirch so well fortified and its approaches so well defended, that all the efforts which he made against it that day, were fruitless, and ended only in a great loss of men. Little discouraged by the resistance of the Austrians, and hoping from the success he had obtained a few days before, that victory would be as faithful to him in 1799, as it had been in 1796 and 1797, he recommenced the attack on the following day, with a still larger force and greater vigour. He was not however more successful, and after having returned six times to the charge, and tried every point of attack, he was obliged to retreat with very considerable loss. He sent no account of these two engagements, or if he did, the directory never published any.

General Lecourbe, who had begun his march at the same time towards the valley of the Inn by the Splugen and the lesser Rhine, collected his troops at Sylva Plana. A small corps of Austrian troops under General Loudon, which guarded the upper Engadine, endeavoured in vain to prevent the French from entering it; and after several engagements, the most considerable of which was near the Village of Pont, it was obliged to retreat, partly by the road which leads from Zernetz to St^e. Marie, and partly into the Lower Engadine. This retreat however could not be effected without much loss; yet, the number of prisoners, by no means, amounted to 3,500, as stated by General Lecourbe.—A small detachment posted at the sources of the Inn, finding itself cut off, was obliged to take refuge in the valley of Puschiavo, where it fell into the hands of Dessolles. Thus the French, in twelve days, made themselves masters of almost all the valley of the Upper and Lower Engadine.*—Encouraged by these first suc-

cesses

* These two parts of the valley are about fifty miles in length, and are separated from one another by the Bridge of Auta. The valley is very fertile, well inhabited, and one of the best parts of the country of the Grisons,

cesses, Lecourbe having left some posts at Zernetz and at Schulz, advanced in the valley of the Inn to the frontier of the Tyrol, and on the 14th in the morning, attacked the Austrians at St. Martinsbruck and at Finster-Munster. Though they were inferior in number, they defended themselves so well against Lecourbe's attack, that notwithstanding its violence, and its being often renewed, he could not, the whole day, gain an inch of ground, but was obliged to retreat with the loss of several hundred men.

General Lecourbe had entered the valley of the two Engadines, only from a persuasion that Dessolles would at the same time march up that of the Adda, and crossing the country of Bormio, arrive at St^e. Marie, and on the banks of the Adige. It must be acknowledged, that if it had been done quickly, General Loudon with that part of his corps which had retreated from Zernetz to St^e. Marie, would have been surrounded. But General Dessolles having been retarded by the snow, or some other obstacle, and the Austrians having had time to provide for the defence of the country of Bormio, General Loudon resolved to take advantage of the circumstance of Lecourbe's line being weak
and

and too extended, to beat the enemy in his turn, on the same spot where he had been defeated three days before. Having therefore procured reinforcements, partly of regular troops, and partly of Tyrolese Volunteers, and after having sent a detachment to Zernetz, and concerted measures with the officer who commanded the post of St. Martinsbruck, on the 15th in the morning, he unexpectedly marched down the mountains, and fell upon some companies of grenadiers and light infantry, who occupied the village of Schulz. Thus surprised, they were able to do very little for their defence, and were driven from the village and put to flight, General Mainoni and a great part of them being taken prisoners. This corps would probably have been destroyed, and the French expelled from the Engadine, if Lecourbe had not at that moment been accidentally on his way to Schulz, and very near it. He rallied the fugitives, and having supported them with a fresh battalion, he again made himself master of the village; but could not retake Mainoni and the horses which had fallen into the hands of the Austrians, who had time to carry them off into the mountains. The attack made at St. Martinsbruck had no effect; but that against
Zernetz

Zernetz was more successful, and the French were driven from that village with loss. Having however returned to the charge they retook it, and at the end of the day, they possessed nearly the same posts in the valley of the Inn, as they had held the day before.—Whether General Loudon really meant to drive them from the valley, is at least, a matter of doubt; for he would in that case most probably have attacked the villages of Shulz and Zernetz with more troops; and would have defended them more obstinately after having got possession of them. It is probable that his intention was only to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, to know their force and to alarm them, in order to retard their attempts upon the Tyrol. In this he succeeded for one day, as according to Lecourbe's dispatches, had it not been for this affair, he would have attacked on the 16th the post of St. Martinsbruck with all his forces.

Excepting the capture of a few hundred men, which was almost compensated by the prisoners taken by Lecourbe, that little advantage was all that General Loudon obtained from the attack of the 15th.—It in no degree disturbed the operations of the French; or Desolles, who had begun on the 13th, his march in
the

the Valteline, vigorously attacked the Austrians in the morning of the 16th, near Bormio, without being able however, even after repeated efforts, to dislodge them from their position.* The next day the French returned to the charge, and having better concerted their attack, and employed more forces, they succeeded in driving the Austrians from the important valley of Bormio, the possession of which opened to the conquerors the road to that of the Adige. On the same day Lecourbe again renewed the attack of St. Martinsbruck, while another column, by descending the mountains between Finster-Munster, and Nauders, endeavoured to turn it. None of these attacks succeeded, and General Alcamì, who commanded in those parts, made so good a use of his position, of the small number of regular troops which he had, and of the Tyrolese Peasants who had joined him, that he made a successful resistance on every side; and after a desperate engagement of several

* This is the same post, near the baths of Bormio, which was so often taken and retaken by the French and the Imperialists, in 1635.—It commands, at once, the opening of the two valleys of Pedenos and of Freel, which form the communication between the two Engadines and the Valteline.

ral hours, the French were obliged to abandon the attack, leaving a great number of dead on the field, and 400 prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

This check, which however was ballanced by the success that Dessolles had obtained on the same day, retarded the operations of Lecourbe, forced him to take new measures, and delayed for some days the invasion of the Tyrol.

We now come to the events which took place, during that interval, on another theatre, if not more instructive or more interesting to military men, at least more extensive, and at that moment of greater importance. Before we proceed to this new scene, it may be proper to make some observations on what has been before related.—The campaign of 1799, in the country of the Grisons, of which we have just given an account of the commencement, will, without doubt, be an object of admiration with posterity.—It will with difficulty be believed, that in the middle of one of the most severe winters in the memory of man, on the summits of the highest mountains,* or in valleys covered with snow and ice,

* The country of the Grisons, and the part of Switzerland which borders on it, are the highest countries in Europe.

ice, war was carried on with as much activity as it could have been in the plains of Flanders or of Italy. The events which follow, will show in all their force, the prodigious difficulties of that war, which may be truly called a war of Giants.

It cannot be denied, that Lecourbe give numerous proofs of his being well acquainted with the art of war in a mountainous country; a species of warfare, which, of all others, demands the greatest skill and judgment, and which peculiarly requires in a General, the most unwearied activity, the keenest foresight, and the readiest command of stratagem.— The plan of invasion which he put in execution, succeeded in a great measure, and would probably have been more rapidly and more completely successful, if General Dessolles had begun his march sooner, and had arrived at the valley of St. Marie, at the same time that Lecourbe entered that of the Inn, in which case, probably not a man of the Austrian

Europe. It is there, and at short distances from one another, that the Rhine, the Rhone, the Tesino, the Inn, the Adige, and the Adda, take their rise; and thus does this mass of mountains send down its waters to the North, the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and the Black Seas.

Austrian corps, posted in the Upper Engadine, would have escaped.

It appears that General Loudon should have pushed on his posts to the source of the Inn, or have been in greater force at the double *debouché*,* of Sylva Plana. In the first place, he could only have been attacked on one side of Mount Jule, and in the second he would have been able to make so long a resistance at the village of Pont, that the advanced posts, stationed at the mouth of the valley of Engadine, would have had time to fall back and join him. The attack which he made on the 15th did him credit, and proved that he was not inferior to his opponent Lecourbe, in boldness and in activity ; for the mountains of Scharl, by which he descended, had been judged unpassable by the French. —What occasioned the disasters of the Austrians in the country of the Grisons, was the great fault they had been guilty of before the beginning of the war, in not possessing themselves of the Valteline, which they might have done, and could have justified on
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* *N. B.* This word is *French*, and means the principal issue from a *valley* or *defile*. As it has no direct correspondent word in the English Language, it has been adopted here.

the same grounds as the occupation of the Grison country. This would not only have rendered their position, in this last mentioned country more secure, but it would have given them a very great advantage over the French army in Italy, which they could then have taken completely in flank.—The French were very sensible of the local importance of the Valteline, and lost no time in securing the possession of it. An opportunity will occur in the sequel of this work, of showing still more evidently, the advantage which this country might have been of to the Austrians, and the great use which the French derived from it.

CHAP. IV.

The army of the Archduke Charles passes the Lech, and advances in Suabia—Order addressed by that Prince to his Generals—Movements made and positions taken by the Austrian and French armies—Jourdan apprises the Archduke of the declaration of war made by the Legislative Body—He, at the same time attacks the Prince's van-guard, and is repulsed—Both sides prepare for a battle on the 21st—The Archduke attacks first, and beats the French—Fault committed by Jourdan, who falls back to Stockach and Engen—Defeat of the French at the former of these two places on the 25th—They attack again on the 26th, but without success—They retire towards the Black Forest—General Sztaray forces them to repass the Rhine a few days after—The Austrians occupy almost all Suabia—Reflections upon these events.

WE have seen, that on the 6th of March, the right wing of the army of Jourdan had got as high up as Schaffhausen, the centre being on the Danube,

and the left on the Necker. This army thus occupied the space lying between that river and the Rhine, and formed a line which passed through Rothweil, and ended at Schaffhausen.

It was in the night between the 2d and 3d of March that the Archduke, at his head-quarters at Friedberg, received the news of the passage of the Rhine by the French. He immediately gave orders to the whole of his army cantoned on the Lech, to prepare to pass that river.—On the very day after, 6000 men, forming a part of the van-guard, pushed forward by forced marches to Ulm, a point, which it was of the utmost consequence for the Imperial troops to reach, before the arrival of the French. This van-guard proceeded with such rapidity, that as early as the morning of the 5th, it arrived on the heights that command the town of Ulm, which heights the Imperialists had already fortified two years before, and the entrenchments of which they now hastened to complete. This was a strong point, of support which the Archduke wished to secure upon the Danube, and from which, as from an extensive fortress, he meant to cover all the approaches to the hereditary States.

On

On the 4th and 5th, the whole of the Imperial army passed the Lech, advanced towards Ulm, and the right bank of the Iller.

At the moment when it was putting itself in motion to recommence a war, upon the issue of which depended the fate of the Austrian Monarchy, the Archduke addressed the following order to the Generals of his army :

“ The movement of the French army, which has
 “ left its positions, and which marched forward on
 “ the 1st of March, has determined me to lay before
 “ the Generals of the army of His Imperial Majesty,
 “ and of the Empire*, a brief exposure of all the
 “ events which have succeeded each other for a year
 “ past, and have brought us into the situation where
 “ we now stand. Scarce had the most solemn con-
 “ ventions between the Emperor and the Empire on
 “ one side, and France on the other, been con-
 “ cluded, when the latter power sought in the most
 “ audacious, and unjustifiable manner, to take
 “ advantage of the retreat of our armies, which
 “ confided on the public faith. The pacific inha-
 bitants

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* The Emperor had, at the conclusion of the peace, taken some troops of the Empire into his pay, and united them to his army.

“ bitants of Helvetia have been subjugated, and means
 “ the most violent have been used to compel them
 “ to become obedient and submissive allies, thus
 “ to gain one of the flanks of Germany.—Not-
 “ withstanding the suspension of arms, the French
 “ have refused to allow the fortress of Ehrenbreit-
 “ stein to be revictualled, according to the most
 “ solemn conventions ; they blockaded it closely ; and
 “ regardless of the right of nations, and insensible to
 “ the indignation of Europe, they devoted to distress
 “ and famine the inoffensive inhabitants of the Thal,
 “ as well as the brave garrison of Ehrenbreitstein.

At the very moment that the French were com-
 “ mitting acts, which are unexampled in history—
 “ at the moment when contributions and requisitions
 “ are continued upon the right bank of the Rhine—
 “ when their language becomes daily more and more
 “ imperious, at the Congress of Rastadt—when they
 “ are accumulating new demands, to the dishonour
 “ and contempt of the German name—they do not
 “ hesitate to put the question, whether we are dis-
 “ posed to oppose farther operations ? that is to
 “ say, whether we are prepared for war ? To the
 “ question put in return by us, whether hostilities
 “ shall cease ? Whether the blockade of Ehren-
 “ breitstein,

" breitstein shall be raised? Whether the army on
 " the right bank of the Rhine shall withdraw?
 " Whether the French troops that menace Germany,
 " shall retire from Switzerland? And whether a
 " reasonable treaty, founded upon the rights of the
 " Empire, and not upon its enslavement, shall be
 " concluded at Rastadt? To all these demands the
 " French as yet have made no other answer than,
 " that they hope the Diet will come to such a
 " resolution as they expected. This implies, that they
 " hope that they shall not be hindered from carrying
 " on farther hostilities; and yet they still pretend to
 " give these proceedings the appearance of friendly
 " and pacific dispositions, in the eyes of the people
 " of Germany."

" To this short ministerial answer, has just been
 " added the declaration of the Commander of the
 " French army:—" *that it is now found proper to*
 " *improve their situation, by occupying strong military*
 " *positions.*" In all probability with a view, when they
 " think themselves sufficiently prepared, suddenly
 " to fall on the Germans with the troops they have
 " assembled; then, on the first opportunity, to extend
 " the Helvetic Republic to the Danube; to give
 " that river and the Lech for its boundaries, and

“ thus to follow up, with greater effect, their plan
 “ of aggrandizement.

“ The first military measure of precaution must
 “ be, to avail ourselves of every means which the
 “ safety and tranquillity of Germany imperiously
 “ require. I am convinced that the army under my
 “ orders will execute every measure, which may
 “ secure the honour and the safety of the nation,
 “ and that it will pass the Lech this day, with the
 “ same confidence and attachment, of which it has
 “ given me so many proofs on occasions critical for
 “ the fate of Germany, and will immortalize in the
 “ page of history, its unshaken loyalty, and its con-
 “ stant bravery.—I have so disposed every thing,
 “ that the necessary supplies for my brave army
 “ shall not be wanting.—On the other hand, I hope,
 “ indeed, I rely upon it, that each of you will have
 “ all that regard for the inhabitants of the towns and
 “ countries friendly to us, which justice and the
 “ principles of morality command. But, never-
 “ theless, if any individuals should so far forget
 “ their duty, as to tarnish the honour and glory of
 “ the army to which they belong, by excesses, I
 “ hereby most solemnly declare, that they shall
 “ suffer the utmost rigour of military law. As I
 “ am

“ am also very well assured, that it is in the
 “ power of each different commander, to prevent
 “ all kinds of excesses by maintaining good order
 “ and discipline, I make the commanders of re-
 “ giments and corps personally responsible for
 “ every excess that may be committed.”

This military proclamation which was intended as an answer to that of Jourdan, had all the effect that could have been expected by the Archduke. It inspired but one sentiment, that of indignation against the French, and but one desire, that of fighting them.—The interval which had elapsed since the peace, had produced an advantageous change in the spirit of the Austrian army. A great number of officers whose conduct and opinions coincided but little with their duty, had been removed. Others, who had acted rather unwillingly during the preceding campaign, because they had looked upon the war (wrongfully indeed) as a quarrel foreign to the interests of the house of Austria and of Germany, and carried on merely to restore the house of Bourbon and the French nobility, had been enlightened by the irruption of Bonaparte into Styria, and by the revolution effected in Switzerland, and in the kingdom of Na-

ples and Sardinia. They saw on this occasion, that, upon the issue of this new contest depended the liberty of Germany, the power of their Sovereign, and the existence of their families and friends. The sentiments and the example of the Archduke Charles, had given that energetic impulse to the minds of the generals and officers of that army, which the circumstances required. The soldier was the same, as he had invariably shewn himself for ten years ; brave, patient, incorruptible, as incapable of discouragement as of disobedience, but still susceptible of enthusiasm. The regiments were complete, the cavalry numerous and fine, the artillery formidable, and the organization of every part of the army more solid than ever. Such a concurrence of military means was a sure pledge of victory.

The imperial army which was altogether in Suabia on the 6th, advanced rapidly between the Tyrol and the Danube.—The head quarters of the Archduke, which had been removed to Augsburg on the 6th, were fixed at Memmingen on the 9th. His vanguard, about 15,000 strong, commanded by General Nauendorf, pushed very far on, and on the 11th, had posts near Ravensberg ;

berg; while the corps which had occupied Ulm, was sending detachments along the two banks of the Danube. It is seen, that the Austrians by possessing the line of Bregentz, Lindau, Ravensberg, Biberach, and Ulm, had already frustrated the first part of Jourdan's plan, and that he was no longer in time to gain the flank of the Tyrol by mere marches.

This General, it is not known why, had remained almost stationary from the 6th. He had only advanced part of his left along the left bank of the Danube, and had pushed his van-guard as far as Tutlingen on the other side. Informed, however, of the rapidity with which the Austrians advanced, he at length put his whole army in motion on the 13th, marched it to the right, and on the same day established his left at Tutlingen, and his right at the little fortress of Hohentwiel. The head quarters were fixed at Engen. On the 15th they were removed to Stockach, the army having again marched on the same day, and established its right on the lake of Constance, its centre before Stockach, its left upon the Danube, and the van-guard at Mœskirch. The motives for making these movements, and taking those positions, were, to
concentrate

concentrate the force of the armies of Helvetia and the Danube, and to give more concert to their operations, of which the common object was to drive the Austrians from the Tyrol. It was with this same view that Jourdan again caused his army to advance on the 17th, and placed its right upon the Lake, near Marchdorf, the centre and head quarters at Pfullendorf, and the left at Mengen.

While the French army was performing these motions, the Archduke with all possible haste, brought up the main body of his army, which had remained considerably behind the van-guard. The latter had advanced with great rapidity to cover the Tyrol, and to support General Hotze. It had already, on the 16th, pushed some parties as far as Stockach; which having met with the French out-posts, withdrew without committing any hostility. The main body of the army was not far distant from the van-guard at that period: it occupied the space between the Federsee and the Lake of Constance, and like the French, had placed the greatest part of its force upon the latter point. This part of southern Suabia, was the ground which the French were most interested in taking possession of

of, and the Austrians in defending. Jourdan's desire was to get between the Archduke and General Hotze: The Prince's aim was to separate Jourdan from Massena. Neither the French nor the Austrian commander however, could attain his end without beating his adversary. The space occupied by the two armies, between the Danube and the Lake, was too much confined to give room for great manœuvres; the advanced posts almost touched each other. It was hardly possible therefore to avoid coming to a battle: Both sides prepared for it. Jourdan concerted a plan of attack with Massena: The Archduke sent reinforcements to General Hotze, went in person to inspect his position, and strengthened his communication with him.

Not a single shot had yet been fired in Suabia, and the French acting conformably to Jourdan's proclamation, but in direct opposition to the attacks, which they had already made in the country of the Grisons, continued to aver, that they had no other view than to take *positions of safety*. Their General, even carried impudence so far as to address the following letter to the Archduke on the 17th.

"I have

“ I have received orders from the French Government to enter into Suabia with the army under my command.”

“ Since I have been employed in executing the movements which that order rendered necessary, I have continually met with posts of Austrian troops.”

“ As it was not my intention to exercise any act of hostility against them, I have summoned these posts to retire, which they at first consented to.”

“ But, as they seem to day to intend some resistance, I have the honour to apprise your General, that I am resolved to make use of force against such of the troops under your command, as shall refuse to evacuate the positions, which I am to occupy in compliance with the orders I have received from my Government.”

The Directory, however, seeing that there no longer remained any hopes of reaping fresh advantages from its gross artifices, had thrown off the mask, and on the 13th of the same month, had caused war to be declared by the Legislative Body against the Emperor, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany.

General

General Jourdan was informed of this on the 19th, and resolved not to lose a moment in attacking. He disposed his army in order of battle the very day after, and posted it upon the two small rivers of Asch and Ostrach; thus occupying all that space which lies between the Lake and the Danube, from Buchorn to Mengen. The flying corps (from 5000 to 6000 men) which was upon the left bank of the river, under General Vandamme, had orders to put itself on the line of Mengen, but being too far removed to the left, it could not reach its destination that day, or the day following, so that General St. Cyr was obliged to occupy the position with a part of his division. The Austrian advanced posts, which had positive orders not to commit the first hostilities, offered no opposition to these movements of the French, and were compelled to retire.

After having taken these measures, Jourdan sent an officer to General Prince Schwartzberg, who commanded a part of the Austrian van-guard, to ask, whether the answer expected from the Court of Vienna was arrived (an answer relative to the sending back of the Russians). Having been told, that no answer had been sent, that officer announced that the armistice was at an end, and declared war, on the
part

part of the Directory, against the King of Bohemia and Hungary.

No sooner was he returned, than Jourdan caused an attack to be made upon the Austrian van-guard, which was obliged to fall back beyond Holzkirchen, and Closterchuss, but which, meeting with reinforcements, repulsed the French in its turn, and regained the ground it had lost.—On the same day, the main body of the Archduke's army had arrived near to Sulgau and Altzhausen, being then distant only one day's march from the French army. This consideration induced the Archduke to concentrate his force, and he encamped his army upon the heights adjacent to the two places mentioned above, at a very short distance from the principal posts of the van-guard. The head-quarters were fixed at Schussenried.—On the same day, Prince Charles addressed an order to his Generals, in which, after having reminded them of all the acts of hostility committed by the French, both in Suabia and in the country of the Grisons, where they had not been ashamed to detain prisoner, an Austrian Major, who had been sent to them, preceded by a trumpet, he declared, that General Jourdan's letter should have no other answer but *from the mouth of the cannon*, and that

the French alone would be responsible to the universe, for all the evils which might arise from this new war.—Wishing to take advantage of the enthusiasm of his troops, and not to give Jourdan time to reinforce himself with the corps on the other side of the Danube, and being naturally little disposed to temporize, the Archduke resolved to attack the French army the very next day.

As to Jourdan, anxious to open the campaign in as brilliant a manner as Massena had done in Switzerland, encouraged by the slight success his vanguard had already met with, and by the nature of the ground which was favourable to him, he had also determined to come to action on the 21st. He considered, that if he should obtain the victory, it would immediately enable him to separate the Archduke from General Hotze, and to fulfil the object of the campaign; while, in case of a defeat, he had only to fall back under the mountains of Suabia, no ways thereby losing his communication with Massena, or, at worst, he could only be obliged to re-pass the Rhine. In a word, he conceived that he might gain a great deal more than he exposed himself to lose.

The

The Archduke was quicker than Jourdan, and before break of day, began to move forward, in the order of battle he had previously resolved upon.* He had divided his army into three columns.—That of the right, commanded by the Prince of Furstemberg, was to march along the Danube, towards Mengen, and to dislodge the left wing of the French from that place, or at least to keep it in check.—This column was preceded by the van-guard, under the orders of General Nauendorf.—General Wallis, with that of the left, followed the road to Altzhausen, and directed his march upon Ostrach, while the Arch-
duke

* To colour over the surprise and the defeat which the French suffered that day, they published, that in the night between the 20th and 21st, a deserter from their army had informed the Austrians of their watch-word. It is not possible positively to affirm that this is false; but granting it to be true, only the vedettes, or the first piquet-guard, could have been surprised, and this could not have much influence upon the result of the day. The knowledge of the enemy's watch-word, may be of great use whenever a sudden attack is to be made on a single post, but cannot occasion the defeat of armies, now that they are almost all equally well guarded, and have, at a considerable distance round them, a double and treble curtain of light troops, both foot and horse, whose resistance and fire must give an army that is well posted, time to prepare for battle.

duke advanced upon the same point with the centre, along the causeway of Sulgau. The union of the two columns against Ostrach, shews that the object which Prince Charles had in view, was to force that point, which being the centre of the position of the French army, when once seized, must occasion the defeat, or at least the retreat, of the two wings. The Austrians overthrew the advanced posts of the enemy in their march, but the Republican army being advantageously posted upon the heights, and the batteries it had erected upon them, commanding the roads by which the Austrians were obliged to advance, on account of the marshes which border the Ostrach, they suffered a considerable loss. But neither this consideration, nor the difficulties of the ground, could hinder them from coming upon the enemy, and attacking the bridge of Ostrach in front, which was forced at length, after it had been long and bravely defended by the French. The centre of the French army having thus lost its principal point of support, was obliged to fall back to Pfullendorf, where it took up a position on the heights in the front of that place: it was charged, during its retreat, by the Austrian cavalry, from whom it suffered much.—The right wing, which had not been attacked, followed

the motion of the centre, and fell back to Salmensweiler.—The left wing, which from the very beginning of the day had been hotly engaged with the Austrians, and had defended itself well, also in the end retreated along the Danube, placing itself in a line with the rest of the army.—The Archduke wished to attack the French in their new position, and for that purpose brought the greatest part of his troops upon their left; but night coming on, he was obliged to give up this project, and to delay its execution till the following day.—The Austrians calculated the loss of the French on that day, as amounting to 5000 killed, wounded, or prisoners. The latter estimated the loss of the victors at 4000 men. By reducing the first estimate to three-fifths, and the second to one-half, we shall come nearer the truth. General Lefebvre, who commanded the French van-guard, was wounded, and General Jourdan had a horse killed under him.

This affair, to which the name of battle can scarcely be given, because the whole of the French army was not engaged, the van-guards of its centre and left having almost entirely sustained the weight of the day, was very honourable to the Archduke, who again displayed the bravery and military talents
of

of which he had given such repeated proofs three years before. It need not be said how advantageous this engagement proved to him. Every one knows the importance of a first success in all campaigns, and it must have been of still greater consequence, in a war, which more than any other, depended upon public opinion, and which, in its turn, powerfully influenced it; in short, on the issue of which hung the destiny, not of the inhabitants of a single province, but of the whole population of Europe. The battle of the 21st stopped, in the very outset, the execution of the plan for the campaign, adopted by the French—repaired the bad effects which the misfortunes in the country of the Grisons had produced upon the minds of the people—increased the confidence of the Austrian army in its Chief, and was to Europe a presage of events yet more fortunate.

The principal military remark suggested by what has been just related, is the great fault committed by Jourdan, in leaving his left wing on the other side of the Danube, and at so great a distance from that river, that it was entirely useless to him. He had given it that direction, to have the appearance of threatening Ulm, thereby to induce the Archduke, also, to move a great part of his force to the

left bank of the river, which would have obliged him to leave the environs of the lake of Constance undefended. But the Prince did not fall into this snare ; and knowing well that the last mentioned point was that through which the French intended to penetrate, he took care not to weaken it, and contented himself with leaving some battalions in Ulm, and some posts before it.—Finding that he had not deceived the Archduke, and having determined, as he himself wrote, to give battle on the 21st, Jourdan ought to have caused his left wing to rejoin him the day before. This would have brought his force nearer to equality, and might, perhaps, have prevented his defeat. The Archduke took advantage of Jourdan's fault, with no less ability than promptitude, and made him repent before he had time to repair it. Jourdan, indeed, seems to have been sensible of this himself, for in the memoir which he published a few months after, in justification of his own conduct, he laboured to palliate his error, and to lay the blame upon other persons, and unforeseen events.

This General, well assured from the position the Austrians had taken upon his right, that it was their intention to attack him on the morrow, found that his post was not so secure as to warrant him waiting
for

for them in it, and therefore retiring in the night between the 21st and 22d towards Stockach, he there fixed his head-quarters; the right of his army being upon the lake of Constance, near Bodman, and his left upon the Danube, near Fridingen. Although this position was the narrowest he could take to command at once the shores of the lake, and the banks of the river, yet Jourdan did not think it advantageous for a battle; therefore, quitting it the day after, and again retiring, he established his right at Hohen-Tweil, his centre in front of Engen, where he had his head-quarters, and his left upon the heights of Tuttlingen, near the Danube. The corps which was on the other side of that river, had at length drawn nearer to the main body, and lay upon its flank near Fridingen. It may be seen that in this position the French army was now concentrated, and that henceforward it could at once make use of all its force.

The Archduke's van-guard had pursued Jourdan; that Prince followed it in person with the whole of his army, and took up his head-quarters at Pfullendorf, on the 22d. The day after, he expelled the Republicans from the villages of Schwandorf and Steizlingen, and drove their advanced posts back

within a short distance of their principal position.— On the 24th, the Prince pushed his van-guard on to the very line of the enemy, who were forced, with loss, from several posts upon their right and centre. Their left was vigorously attacked at the same time, by General Meerfeld, who dislodged it from Neuhausen and Lyptingen, taking 3 pieces of cannon and about 100 men. This General was unable, however, to push on farther, and to carry the principal position at Tuttlingen, as he had designed; in it the French obstinately defended and maintained themselves. This contest was attended with the loss of some hundreds of men on both sides.—On the same day (the 24th) the whole of the Austrian army had taken up a position in the rear of Stockach. Its right occupied the heights of Malsbiren, and extended towards Nellenberg. The left was posted below the latter place, and spread itself almost to Wallenwies. However well chosen this position might be, yet it was not without its disadvantages, and was far from being secure, as the Danube, being nearer to the lake of Constance towards its source, than in the rest of its course, Jourdan could more easily occupy the space lying between that river and the lake, than the Archduke, who, although obliged
to

to have a more extended front, was yet unable to turn his adversary, whilst the latter could easily turn the position of the Austrians. To remedy this defect, the Archduke placed two battalions and a regiment of cavalry upon the heights of Erperingen. These troops having before them an open country, confined by mountains and marshes, were able to cover the left against the attempts of the French corps stationed in the vicinity of Bodman and Radopzell. The Prince, whose interest it was not to remove to any distance from the lake of Constance, but to retain the major part of his force near to that point, was not able to extend his right as far as the Danube. Placed as this wing was, there was danger of its being turned by the left of the French. To obviate this inconvenience, the Archduke, who had now no time to change his own position, wished to compel the enemy to quit theirs, and therefore ordered General Meerfeld to attack General St. Cyr, on the 25th, and to endeavour to dislodge him from Lyptingen, and to force him to repass the Danube.

Whilst the Archduke was employed in correcting the unavoidable defects of his position, Jourdan was considering how he might take advantage of them.—All the efforts which that General and Massena had

successively made, to effect a junction of their forces beyond the lake of Constance, had miscarried.—The ill success of the battle of the 21st, had much lessened Jourdan's means of attaining that common object.—Massena had unsuccessfully attempted to penetrate through the Voralberg on the 11th and 12th, and had not been more fortunate in the last and great attack he had made on the 23d. There remained then, no other means of realizing the plan adopted for the campaign by the French, than to gain a decisive victory over the Archduke, and Jourdan determined to hazard a battle. The plan which he formed, was to bring his left against the right flank of the Austrians, in hopes, that they, seeing themselves in danger of being turned, might weaken their centre, and thus enable him to break through it, and separate the Archduke from the lake of Constance.

On this occasion Jourdan was the first in motion, and his army formed into three principal columns, directed upon Steizlingen, Aach and Lyptingen, arrived upon these three points of attack at break of day.—The latter column, commanded by St. Cyr, and which had been reinforced by all the troops upon the left, began the action, overthrew General Meerfeld's

Meerfeld's van-guard, and pressed it so closely, that unable to resist, it was obliged to retire during several hours, and fall back as far the woods in front of Stockach. Whilst these things were passing upon their left, the French columns of the centre, and of the right, had attacked the van-guards of General Nauendorf and Prince Schautzenberg, the first column in the direction of Aach, and the second in that of Steizlingen.

The Archduke who had proceeded to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, and was then in the village of Aach, seeing that the attack became general, instantly made the best dispositions that the circumstances would admit. He ordered Generals Nauendorf and Schwartzemberg to retire slowly towards the left wing, still keeping up the engagement ; caused some battalions and artillery to be placed upon the heights of Nellenberg, a central point, which he intended to make the principal support of his whole position ; and set out himself with reinforcements drawn from that wing to assist the right, which the enemy were attacking on two sides with more than 20,000 men, while another column was endeavouring to turn it by by Moeskirch, and to cut off its communication with Pfullendorf.

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On that side fortune had decidedly favoured the French since the beginning of the day, and victory seemed already within their grasp. They had penetrated to the extremity of the wood, and nothing farther remained to be done, but to dislodge the Austrians from some heights which they still occupied. The Archduke lost not a moment in extricating himself from so critical a situation. He caused the enemy to be attacked on the right and left sides of the road of Tuttlingen at the same time. The Prince of Furstemberg, whilst bravely conducting the second attack, in the midst of a most deadly fire, was killed by a grape shot, and Colonel Prince Anhalt Bernburg was mortally wounded.—The Commanders were replaced by General Stupschütz*, who was also wounded, and by Prince Anhalt Coethen, who, dismounting

* This General is one among the few officers who have made rapid fortunes in the Austrian service. Not 15 years ago he was a Serjeant—he served on the staff of the army during the campaigns of 1793 and 1794, and was very actively employed in the latter. He was then made Colonel of the famous regiment of light horse of Kinsky, which has served so brilliantly during the whole course of the war. It is well known, that two squadrons alone of this regiment, almost entirely destroyed a regiment of French Carabineers, at the battle of Arlon.

dismounting from his horse, offered to lead the infantry to the charge. The excellence of the new dispositions made by the Archduke, and the heroism of some regiments, stopped for a while the progress of the French, who retreated occasionally, only however, to return with additional fury to the charge. The infantry, of the two armies, struggled a long time with unspeakable obstinacy, and the carnage was great on both sides : still, however, did victory remain undecided. The Archduke resolving to secure it, caused some battalions of grenadiers, which had just arrived from the left wing, to make a last attack upon the left of the Tuttlingen road. These battalions advancing through a shower of grape-shot, to the point of the wood occupied by the French, took them in flank, and made a demi-brigade prisoner.— This well-timed movement, executed with vigour, and supported by the co-operation of the other columns already engaged with the enemy, decided the fortune of the day in favour of the Imperialists. In vain did several regiments of the enemy's cavalry make a tardy charge ; they were received with intrepidity by the grenadiers, and charged in their turn by two regiments of Imperial Cuirassiers, which put them to the rout. The French driven from the
wood,

wood, soon gave way on all sides, and were pursued upon the road to Lyptingen till night-fall.

While thus victory was snatched, though with difficulty, from the centre of the Republican army, the column under the orders of General Vandamme, (detached on the left) which had advanced to Mœskirk, with the design of turning the right of the Austrians, and of seizing their reserve of artillery, had been vigorously repulsed by the Prince of Wirtemberg, after having possessed itself of the villages of Millingen and Dentwangen, and only escaped certain destruction by crossing the Danube, over the bridge of Sigmaringen.

The right of the Republican army was not ultimately more successful.—It had begun by taking possession of the villages of Steizlingen and Lentzingen, but in spite of several vigorous attacks, made first upon Nellemberg, and again upon the village of Wallenwies, it could make no impression upon the Austrian position, and was held in check the whole day, by General Staader, who commanded that wing of the Imperialists.—Night also put an end upon this point, to the battle which had lasted along the whole line from break of day, with unexampled obstinacy, and great loss to each of the armies.—The night was passed

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on both sides nearly upon the same ground which had been occupied before the battle.—Upon this circumstance Jourdan founded the pretention, not only, that he had not been defeated, but that he had in fact gained the battle.—With the same effrontery, he asserted that the Austrians had lost 4000 men, taken prisoners, and that, according to their own account, their loss in killed or wounded, amounted to 7000. The Austrians did not, nor could not make any such avowal. They estimated their loss at 3000 killed, wounded, or made prisoners. If it should be thought more considerable than this, it cannot however be supposed to have exceeded 4500. That of the French, which Jourdan stated at no more than 3000 killed, wounded, and missing, certainly amounted to double that number.

Whether it was, that Jourdan still retained a hope of being able to force the Archduke's position, or, (as is more probable) that he wished to disguise his defeat, by continuing to act on the offensive, he again attacked before break of day, the right of the Imperialists on the 26th, near Wallenwies, and on the side of Radopzell; his efforts to make himself master of the first of these places

places were reiterated, but constantly proved unsuccessful.

Seeing all his projects frustrated, having been twice beaten in the space of five days, and finding himself unable to resist the attacks which might be expected from the Archduke, Jourdan commenced his retreat in the night, between the 26th and 27th. He retired upon his right, by Singen, Engen, and Hitzingen; upon his left to the other side of the Danube by Tuttlingen; and on the 27th, placed his head quarters at Villingen. The brigade which had been drawn from the army of Massena, repassed the Rhine at Schaffhausen, leaving however, a small corps of observation in front of that town. The advanced posts it had pushed upon the eastern shore of the lake of Constance, had not time to rejoin it, and were cut off by the Austrians. The right went to occupy the valley of Hell, the centre that of Kinche. The left marched back from the Danube to the Necker, and took post first at Rothweil and Oberndorf, and then at Dornheim and Freydenstadt. The head quarters were fixed at Hornberg; the artillery and baggage had already been sent to the rear of the army; part returned

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on the other side of the Rhine, the rest went to Gengembach and Offenburg.

The Archduke occupied the places abandoned by the French army, and after having had his headquarters during the march at Lyptingen and at Engen, he fixed them at Stockach. That Prince caused the French army to be followed and observed by his troops, but did not attempt to dislodge it immediately from the position it had taken in the defiles of the Black Forest, hoping that he might be able to compel it to retire without the hazard of fresh battles. The situation of the French in Switzerland, forbade him to withdraw from the Rhine and the lake of Constance, and he besides expected to receive the assistance of a fresh corps of Austrians. General Sztaray who had quitted the frontiers of Franconia about the middle of March, with nearly 15,000 men, had advanced upon the left bank of the Danube, to make head against the French troops in those parts, and oppose the army of observation in case it should advance either into Franconia or Suabia. The promptitude with which the Archduke Charles and Jourdan, had come to action as soon as they found themselves
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in presence of each other, prevented General Sztaray from arriving in time to participate in the successes of the Prince; but, having rapidly traversed the country of Aichstadt and Donauwert, and that part of Suabia which lies between the Necker and the Danube; he arrived upon the frontiers of the Duchy of Wirtemberg by the end of March, and joined the troops detached on his right by the Archduke. This reinforcement enabled the Prince to operate against the French army, without drawing his troops from the banks of the Rhine, and he arranged a plan of attack or rather of manœuvre, to force it to abandon the defiles of the Black Forest.—Whilst General Sztaray was making dispositions in the Duchy of Wirtemberg against the left of the enemy; strong advanced guards were pushed forward into the vallies of Hell and Kintzing. The French finding themselves closely pressed by the enemies posts, advanced on the 30th, and attacked with vigour near Alpiersbach, Treyberg, and Turwangen. To prevent them from extending beyond the *debouches* of the Black Forest, the Archduke sent reinforcements to all the points most exposed; and the day after, the French were attacked and beaten in the val-
lies

lies of the Necker, of the Kintzing, and of Heil. They were at the same time driven into the town of Schaffhausen, near which the Austrians established their out posts. The French burnt the bridges of Stein and Dissenhoffen, and retired to the other side of the Rhine.

The discouragement produced in the army of Jourdan by two successive defeats, the approaching departure of that General for Paris, which was now announced, and the misunderstanding that existed between him and the inferior Generals, had occasioned such disorder and negligence in the defensive arrangements of the Republicans, that the Austrians surprised their camp near Friedberg in broad day on the 3d of April, and would have possessed themselves of the French head quarters, had not Ernoul chief of the Staff, hastily assembled some troops.* This alarm

VOL. III.

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* Jourdan had set out the same day for Strasberg, from whence he proceeded to Paris *for the re-establishment of his health*. There he attributed his defeats to the Generals serving under him. But, it was so generally thought, that they were to be imputed to himself, that he was stript of the command of the army. For this he took his revenge, by devoting himself more and more to the Jacobins, the common resource of the Republican Malcontents.

and the movements made by the Austrians upon several points, determined General Ernouf to give orders for the retreat of the centre of the army, which marched towards the Rhine on the 4th, and began to pass that river on the following day, leaving only a corps of observation in front of Kehl. The right retired by Freyburg upon Old-Brisach, where it crossed the Rhine and burnt the bridge. On the 7th, the left also abandoned Freydenstadt and Kniebis, retiring by Oberkirch towards Kehl. In consequence of this, the Austrians advanced beyond the mountains into the valley of the Rhine, and pushed their left as far as Weill and Richen, before Basle, and their right nearly to Rastadt.—Suabia was thus almost entirely freed from the French, who after having remained six weeks in that part of Germany, again saw themselves very nearly in the same position, which they had occupied before their invasion.

If the relation of what passed in the interval between Jourdan's defeat at Stockach, and the retreat of his army beyond the Rhine, has not been more particularly detailed, it is because during that time only a few affairs of little consequence took place among the out posts, and be-
cause

cause it was not wished to draw the attention of the reader from the battle of the 25th, which calls for some observations.

However, disadvantageous its result was to the French, it does not appear that any blame can be thrown upon their General. His dispositions for that day, were more ably planned than those for the 21st. He repaired the fault he had committed in the former engagement, and made an able use of that part of his left, which had been sent on the other side of the Danube. His position behind Stockach was well chosen; his plan of attack judicious and vigourously executed. Victory leaned to his side, from 5 o'clock in the morning till 2 in the afternoon; and had not the Archduke been possessed of so much firmness and intrepidity, and had not his exalted rank allowed him to take so much upon himself, he probably would have ordered a retreat. Indeed, if private information is to be relied on, the Prince received such an advice; but to his immortal honour, and to the great advantage of Europe, he rejected it. The fate of this day was undoubtedly determined by the hope of victory, which he constantly re-

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tained, by the able dispositions he made towards the end of the battle, and by the admirable steadiness and perseverance of his troops. The French attributed it to the inferiority of their force, and Jourdan did not scruple to print, that he had only 34,000, and that the Archduke had 80,000: While it is well known, that the Republican army was about 40,000 strong, and that the Imperial troops which had any share in engagement, amounted at most to 45,000.

In his apologetick memoir entitled, *Abstract to the operations of the army of the Danube*, Jourdan complained bitterly of the directory, of the minister at war, and of several of his Generals. He certainly proved what every one was already convinced of, namely, that the military means of the directory, were far from being adequate to its projects, and that it was in the height of folly, that it renewed the war. But, why did not the General rest satisfied with having announced these truths, which justified him as far as he could be justified? And why did he commit the credit which these deserved, by mixing with them assertions, which could find none? How could he assert in the face of Europe, that Austria had 320,000 soldiers

soldiers bearing arms against France? that General Sztaray's corps consisted of between 25 and 30,000 men? that each Austrian battalion in the field was 12,00 strong, and each squadron 200? that at the battle of Maubeuge, Prince Coburg had 96,000 men—and a hundred other similar absurdities. The General seems to have been ignorant, that to obtain belief, there must be truth or plausibility at least, and that to attempt to prove too much, is to prove nothing. His conduct would perhaps have been considered with some degree of indulgence, and even esteem, had he contented himself with establishing these two facts: First, that the force entrusted to him was totally insufficient, and Secondly, that he was by no means well seconded. Every one indeed would have agreed with him, that if, instead of the whole army of observation being left unemployed in the Palatinate, it had been advanced to the Danube so as to form his left, he might then have concentrated his entire force between that river and the lake of Constance, and affairs might have taken a different turn. He could not with a good grace however, attribute the issue of the battle of Stockach, to the distance at which that army was removed,

or to any preceding cause, since it was himself who gave the battle; since he might have avoided it by retiring to the Black Mountains; and since when he attacked, it certainly was, in the persuasion, that his force was such as to enable him to beat the Austrians. In a short account which he published of that affair, a few days after it had taken place, he seemed to attribute his defeat to General Hautpoult, commander of his cavalry, who did not make a charge at the time, and upon the point, he was ordered.* We are ignorant how far this allegation may be founded upon truth, but it appears specious; and the moment talked of by Jourdan, must be that in which the Austrian Grenadiers came out into the plain to go and dislodge the Republicans from the extremity of the wood. It cannot be denied, that if the French cavalry had prevented this attack, by breaking the column of infantry, which was the

* This General was stript of his command by Jourdan, a few days after the battle of Stockach. He was reinstated during the course of the campaign, by the party which brought about a revolution in the Directory on the 18th of June:—He was born of a noble family, and served before the revolution in a regiment of horse Chasseurs.

last resource of the Archduke, he would infallibly have lost the battle.

The subsequent conduct of the French General is not so free from blame, as that on the 25th. His army had not been so completely routed, nor had it suffered so considerable a loss, as to prevent him from posting it strongly at the mouths of the defiles of the Black Forest, where with skill and prudence, he could have defended himself till joined by the army of Bernadotte, and the reinforcements coming from the interior. He might the more easily have maintained himself, during some time at least, in this position, as Switzerland being in the power of the French, he could have firmly secured his right on that side, kept up a close communication with Massena, and have occasionally been assisted by him. In this case the Archduke could not have attempted to dislodge Jourdan from the southern part of the Black Forest, without laying open his flank to Massena, nor could he have dared to invade Switzerland, for fear of immediately having the French army of the Rhine in his rear. Jourdan in his pamphlet stated, that such were his projects after the battle of Stockach. But, the facility with which the Aust-

plans penetrated on the day of his departure, even beyond his head quarters, proves that his defensive arrangements were not such as circumstances demanded.—Pichegru is said to look upon Jourdan as better acquainted with tactics than any other Republican General. If one could be induced to believe this, it must be more from the opinion of Pichegru, than from the campaigns made by Jourdan. Military merit, there undoubtedly is, in not having lost the battle of Maubeuge, and in having won that of Fleurus, but the honour it reflects upon him is almost entirely done away by his shameful retreats in 1795, 96, and 99. He is very far from having shewn that unshaken firmness, that presence of mind, and that sagacity and prudence which are so highly necessary to make head against an enemy either victorious or superior in number. Dismayed by defeat, he thinks every thing lost, when all is not gained.—The art of retreating, and of carrying on a defensive war, is the most difficult and the most useful part in tactics.

“ The retreats of armies, (says Folard,) are the most
 “ difficult operations in war. This part of the
 “ science includes all the rest. To make a good
 “ retreat, marches, tactics, the passage of rivers,

“ and ambuscades must be thoroughly understood.

“ The commander must be very skilful and fertile in “ devices.” It follows, from these maxims, laid down by one of the greatest masters of the art, that a man, who has shewn so much awkwardness in three retreats, cannot be very deeply skilled in tactics, as it also follows, that those Generals are above mediocrity who have shewn ability in this part of war, which is the real touchstone of military skill. Without seeking for examples antierior to the present war, it is well known that Marshal Clerfayt is indebted to his incomparable retreat in 1792, for the high rank allowed him amongst the best Generals of the second order. The retreat made by General Wartensleben also, in 1796, procured him a certain degree of military reputation; and it is chiefly by operations of this nature, that Moreau has attained that estimation in which he is now held in France.

The Archduke who knew how to conquer at Stockach, also knew what is, perhaps, more difficult and more honourable, how to set proper bounds to the desire of profiting by his victory. He did not endeavour immediately to drive the French army to the other side of the Rhine, but remained with the greater part of his force near the lake of Constance,

rightly

rightly judging, that if he abandoned that point, and advanced into the Brisgau, his left and rear would be exposed to the incursions of Massena. He sacrificed the little glory of driving a vanquished enemy beyond his frontiers, to considerations more weighty, as well as more worthy of him.—All his thoughts were now bent upon the invasion of Switzerland. The French had made that country a kind of strong hold, from whence they intended to fall upon Germany. It was necessary to drive them from it, to be able in turn to menace their own country. Switzerland was a two-edged sword, which could be made use of either against France or Germany.—Prince Charles resolved to seize it, and commenced his preparations for that great enterprize.

The time that elapsed before he could execute it, permits us to look back upon the central war, which was carried on in the country of the Grisons, and upon the frontiers of the Tyrol.

CHAP. V.

Massena on the 23d makes a general attack upon the position of the Austrians, in the Voralberg—He is repulsed with great loss—Lecourbe attacks on the 26th the Austrians in the vallies of the Inn and of Munster, makes himself master of them, and takes a great many prisoners: the inhabitants of the Tyrol take up arms against the French, who are obliged to evacuate the country after being defeated—Excesses of which they were guilty—General Bellegarde detaches a part of his army to favour the operations of the Allies in Italy—He reconnoitres the passage of the Grison country—An Austrian column experiences a check in the valley of the Inn.

IN a preceding chapter an account has been given of the successes which the French had obtained in the country of the Grisons. It had been shown, that on the 17th of March, they were almost entirely masters of it, and that their plan was to advance along the three vallies of the Rhine, the Inn, and the Adige,

Adige, of which they already possessed the upper parts. Their operations were in concert with those of Jourdan, and while he attempted to penetrate into the Tyrol through Suabia, they were to attempt to enter it from the country of the Grisons.—That this plan might be compleatly executed, it was absolutely necessary that Massena should drive the Austrians from the Voralberg, and therefore notwithstanding the bad success which had attended his former attacks, he determined to renew them.—The moment was favourable; for the progress of Jourdan's right wing, on the lake of Constance, having threatened the communication betwixt the armies of the Archduke and General Hotze, the latter had marched on the 21st with 10,000 men towards Brengentz and Lindau, and had left at Feldkirch only about 6000 regulars, supported, however, by some companies of Tyrolese Volunteers, and Peasants from the general levy.—The French hastened to take advantage of the weakness of the enemy, and on the 22d, General Oudinot seized upon a height, which flanked the left of the position of Feldkirch, and endeavoured to establish a battery upon it.—The Austrian artillery rendered that impossible, and General Jellachich, who commanded there, having attacked

attacked him sword in hand, drove him from the heights which he had occupied. Determined to risk every thing to make himself master of Feldkirch, which may be considered as the key of the Tyrol, Massena renewed the attack in person, next day, with the brigade of General Oudinot, reinforced with 6000 grenadiers, the flower of the army. This superiority of force enabled him to attack, at the same time, and on every side, the position of Feldkirch, but was insufficient for putting him in possession of it. After a very bloody and obstinate battle, which lasted all the day, he was not only obliged to relinquish the attempt, but to repass the Rhine with the loss of 3000 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Austrians, who had not lost above one-third of that number, advanced to the Rhine after this affair, upon which the success of the campaign had in a great measure depended; while General Oudinot took post at Rheineck, and Massena entrenched himself on the other side of the river, having his head-quarters at Chur.*

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* In a short history of his campaign, which Massena caused to be published last year, he passed over in silence this engagement, as well as those of the 11th and 12th, which

This General having in vain, and for the last time, made every effort to penetrate into the north of the Tyrol, it became so much the more necessary that his right wing should be able to force its way into the west of that province. In consequence of this, Des-solles and Lecourbe, to whom some days of inaction had given time to concert their offensive measures, marched, the former on the 25th, towards Munster and Taufers, and the latter on the 26th, against the post of St. Martinsbruck. Both of them were completely successful; for, the Austrians attacked on the right from the Innthal, and upon the left from the Munsterthal, by superior forces, and turned at the same time by a French column, which had got upon their rear, after having crossed over mountains covered with snow, full of precipices, and considered impassable, could not, by the most vigorous resistance, maintain any part of their line, or even effect their retreat. The greatest part of them fell into the hands

which had hardly been less disastrous to him. His panegyrist probably had them in view, when he said, that Massena had *appreciated the value of the post of Feldkirch*. It must be acknowledged that he had taken some pains to *appreciate it*, for his *knowledge* cost him between 4 and 5000 men, in the three attacks which he made upon it.

hands of the enemy; the rest escaped across the mountains. On the 26th, Lecourbe was master of Nauders, and Dessolles of Glurens, which last place was reduced to ashes.—According to the report of Massena, the result of these different affairs was 1000 men killed and wounded, and 7000 prisoners, with 25 pieces of cannon. Though the truth of this account cannot be admitted, yet the loss of the Austrians must be stated upon the whole, to have been at least 3500 men. It was with much difficulty that General Loudon, who commanded in those parts, could force his way back to Burgeiss.—Thus it is seen, that on the same day that the French were beaten in Suabia, they were taking their revenge in the Tyrol.

These successes, which rendered the French masters of two of the principal entrances of the Tyrol, occasioned great alarm in that province, the south of which was threatened at the same time by the French army, in Italy. General Bellegarde, who had with him a body of reserve ready to act wherever it might be most wanted, immediately marched into the Winstchgau, which was the point most threatened. But this reinforcement not being sufficient to secure the safety of the Tyrol, the faithful inhabitants of that

Austrian province, were called upon to rise in a mass, and the companies of volunteer rangers already raised, were immediately sent to the frontier. The brave Tyrolese shewed themselves no less zealous in the defence of their country and Sovereign, than they had done two years before. They took up arms on all sides, and repaired to the different places where they had been desired to assemble.

The difficulties of the season, and of the country, prevented the French from making a very rapid progress in the two vallies, by which they had penetrated. They, however, pushed on one side as far as Landek, and on the other, a little beyond Glurenz. These were the limits of their conquests. The reinforcements which were marching against them, the arming of the inhabitants of the Tyrol, the scarcity of provisions, and above all, the defeats experienced at the same time by Jourdan, in Suabia, and Scherer, in Italy, did not permit the army of Massena, which formed the centre of the vast line occupied by the French, to push forwards, while the two wings were falling back.—Already the Austrians had threatened to penetrate into the valley of Munster, upon the rear of General Dessolles, and thus entirely to cut off his retreat. This induced him to abandon, in the night

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between

between the 30th and 31st, the posts of Mals and Glurenz, and to fall back on Taufers and St. Maria.

General Bellegarde having learned that Desolles was entrenching himself in the valley of Munster, did not chuse to give him time to establish himself in a position, from which he could at any time penetrate into Tyrol. Having, therefore, got together a body of troops superior to that of the enemy, he marched against them on the 4th, at break of day. The column on the left, took post upon a height which commanded the right flank of the French, and kept its ground, notwithstanding a very heavy fire of artillery and small arms to which they were exposed. The Austrians met with more resistance upon the right, the enemy being advantageously entrenched behind two old castles which protected their batteries. —The reserve and the artillery of General Bellegarde having arrived in the interval, he multiplied his attacks, turned the right flank of the French, and forced them to fall back, first upon Taufers, and then towards Munster, where they again made a stand for a long time; but they were at last dislodged from it, and retired, some towards Bormio, but the greatest number towards Zernetz. —Having received some reinforcements in this last place, they not only

stopped the Austrians, but attacking them in their turn, they vigorously repulsed them. This success was, however, of short duration: for, all the troops of General Bellegarde having joined the van-guard, which had followed the French, they charged them anew, and put them finally to the rout.

The French lost 3 pieces of cannon, and 500 men taken prisoners, besides a great number of killed and wounded.—The loss of the Austrians in the two last respects, were not less than that of their enemies.—This combat was sustained with great obstinacy on both sides.—There were few officers, either Austrians or French, who were not killed or wounded.—Among the latter, was the Republican General Petriconi, chief of Lecourbe's staff, who was taken prisoner, and afterwards died of his wounds.

The result of this day's action, which did much honour to the talents of General Bellegarde, and endeared him to the inhabitants of the Tyrol, did not permit General Lecourbe, who had suffered on the 30th a small check near Lendek, to keep his position in the valley of the Inn.—He therefore fell back towards St. Martinsbruck, but the Tyrolese Volunteers having, on the 5th, attacked his outposts, near that place, he was obliged to retire still further

further, and entirely to evacuate the Tyrol.—The short stay of the French in that country, was marked by the most horrid excesses.—They profaned the churches, insulted the women, distressed the inhabitants in general, by every kind of bad treatment, wasted the fields, pillaged the houses, and even reduced several villages to ashes. They meant to punish, but only augmented the attachment of the Tyrolese, for their lawful sovereign, and the hatred which they had sworn to the French name.

The retreat of Generals Lecourbe and Desolles, the bad season, and above all the defeats which the French had met in Germany and in Italy, left no longer any fears for the Tyrol, and therefore General Bellegarde thought less of regaining the country of the Grisons by force of arms, than of promoting the success of operations which would force the French to evacuate it, or at least would render an attack on it much easier. The Austrian army, in Italy, had already begun that brilliant career of victory, which has rendered the campaign of 1799 so famous.—The formidable line of the French on the Mincio, had just been broken, and the superiority of the Austrians, which was soon to be augmented by the Russian auxiliaries, put it in their power to attempt

every thing in the plains of Lombardy.—Nothing could stop their progress, but the French continuing in possession of the Valteline, and that part of the Upper Alps, which commands the Bressan and the Bergamasc.—So long as they were masters of the passages of these mountains, they could send reinforcements to their army in Italy, or attack in flank, and with advantage, that of the Austrians.—The position of the corps of General Bellegarde, naturally made it fall to his share to remove these obstacles and he destined for that purpose a part of his troops which, from the state of things, could not be employed elsewhere.—He therefore detached three columns, which under the orders of Generals Vukassowich and Alcaini, and of Colonel Strauch, were commissioned to dislodge the French from the upper parts of the Bressan and of the Bergamasc;—in a word, from all the country which lies between the lakes of Garda, Idro and Iseo.—Their operations being concerted with those of the army of Italy, belong more properly to the history of the campaign in that country, and therefore they shall not be detailed here, and will be subsequently considered, only under the relation which they bore to the military events which took place in Switzerland.

After

After fifteen days of an inaction, which had been imitated by Lecourbe, and which was rendered necessary by the snows which covered all the valley and passages of the Julian Alps, General Bellegarde resolved to attempt the attack of the country of the Grisons, in order more and more to facilitate and secure the progress of the Allies in Italy, and at the same time pave the way for the execution of the designs which they had formed against Switzerland. He therefore, on the 22d of April, sent several small columns to reconnoitre the passages on the frontiers of the Engadine and of the Brettigau.—Their movements were combined in such a manner as to enable them to unite and act offensively in case they could penetrate across the mountains.—But all the passages having been found impracticable, these different columns, which had already alarmed the enemy on every side, were obliged to return to their former positions.—One of them, composed of a single battalion, which had been sent on the 21st, in the evening, towards the Finba-joch, (the same mountain which had been climbed over about a month before by the column of the French General, Dessolles), not having received counter order in time, continued to advance in spite of the incredible difficulty of

the country.—On the 22d, in the morning, its advanced guard fell in with the out-posts of the enemy, overpowered them, and imprudently followed them into the village of Manus.—The French being there in force, repulsed, in their turn, the Austrians piquets. Major Schmidt, who commanded it, having come up with the rest of the battalion, there was for some time a very obstinate engagement in the village, which, however, terminated entirely in favour of the French, from the arrival of one of their fresh battalions.—The Austrians, worn out with fatigue, and opposed to thrice their number, were almost all made prisoners, among whom was Major Schmidt himself.—This affair proves the extreme difficulty of any partial operation in a mountainous country, and how dangerous it is to undertake it, when no succour is at hand, or no retreat secured.


This small check, but much more the impassable state of the vallies, obliged General Bellegarde to delay the attack of the country of the Grisons. At first sight it appears surprising, that that General should not think it possible to carry on operations in the end of March, in the same country which Lecourbe had over-run a month before. This reflection, which, if just, would argue a greater degree
of

of activity on the part of the French, vanishes when it is known, that though the season is more rigorous in February than in March, yet the passages of the Alps are more practicable in that month than in the following ; for the more intense cold renders the snow more compact, and much more easy to be traversed. Whereas, when the cold decreases, and a kind of thaw commences, the snows heaped on the sides of the mountains, no longer forming a solid mass, tumble into the vallies and fill them up.—The unfortunate travellers, who at such a time are in the paths of the Alps, run a risk of losing their way, or of even being buried under the snow.—The least movement, or even the smallest noise, is sufficient to detach these enormous masses of snow, called Avalanches, which in an instant cover over the vallies to an immense depth.—This danger is so real, and so well known to the Muleteers, who carry on the trade between Switzerland and Germany, that they never neglect to take off the bells which their mules commonly carry, on the first appearance of thaw, their noise being sufficient to occasion these disasters.

CHAP. VI.

Proclamation of the Archduke Charles to the People of Switzerland—Object of that Proclamation—Unfortunate situation of the inhabitants of that country—Insurrections occasioned by the Law, for forced enrolments. Capture of the town of Schaffhausen, and of Petershausen by the Austrians—Massena is named Commander in Chief of the armies of Switzerland, of the Danube, and of Observation—Situation and force of his army, and of that of the Archduke at the end of April—Breaking up of the congress at Rastadt.


AFTER having frustrated the offensive projects of the directory, and disconcerted the plan for the campaign of the French Generals, the Archduke Charles gave his first attentions, to secure Suabia from a new invasion, by a well chosen chain of posts all along the valley of the Rhine to near the Necker; to form magazines for the subsistence of his troops during the rest of the campaign, a measure







A MAP
of
the SEAT OF WAR.
in
SWITZERLAND.
in the Campaign of
1799



measure which the season, and the stay of the French in Suabia had rendered very difficult, and finally to direct all his military powers towards the invasion of Switzerland, an object, which his own successes in Germany, and those of General Kray in Italy, allowed him to attempt. He had already taken measures to prepare the minds of the inhabitants, and scarcely were his troops arrived upon the frontiers of the canton of Schaffhausen, when he addressed on the 30th of March, the following Proclamation to the Swiss.

“ After two complete victories obtained over
 “ the French Army, which, without a declaration
 “ of war, had advanced from its positions, and
 “ committed hostilities on all sides; the troops
 “ under my command are about to enter the Swiss
 “ territory, not to make war upon the people of
 “ Switzerland, whose dispositions towards us are
 “ friendly, but to pursue the common enemy,
 “ against whom, you yourselves have fought with
 “ so much bravery to defend your liberty, and
 “ your independence; and whose superiority of
 “ numbers alone, could have reduced you to that
 “ unhappy situation, which you feel so deeply, and
 “ which

“ which has already so strongly called forth your
“ resentment.

“ Among the means which have been used to
“ keep you in subjection and dependence, they
“ have endeavoured to make you believe, that
“ the Imperial and Royal Court had formed some
“ project of dismemberment, or had some other
“ views upon Switzerland. They endeavour also
“ to alarm you by spreading reports, that you
“ would be subject to be harrassed and pillaged
“ by the Imperial troops. I therefore think it
“ right to declare solemnly to all the people of
“ Switzerland, that his Imperial Majesty in con-
“ formity to the assurances he has always given to
“ the Helvetic League, of his dispositions of con-
“ stancy and good neighbourhood, is firmly
“ determined to preserve with them those ancient
“ friendly connections, and also, that his Imperial
“ Majesty has no other object, but to contribute
“ as a good neighbour, to preserving to Switzerland
“ her independence, her privileges, and her pos-
“ sessions.

“ On my part I expect with confidence, that
“ the troops under my orders, whose entry into
“ Switzerland is occasioned by known events, will
“ be

“ be treated in a friendly manner, and assisted by
 “ all those members of the Helvetic League, who
 “ have the good of their country at heart ; and
 “ that the people of Switzerland will carefully
 “ avoid every thing which might augment the ca-
 “ lamities of war. Among the good effects which
 “ such a conduct will ensure to Switzerland, may
 “ be reckoned the suppression of those measures,
 “ which have been extorted by hostile views and
 “ by violence, and the restoration of the relations
 “ of commerce, and of communication between
 “ Germany and Switzerland.”

This proclamation it will be observed, was pru-
 dent, frank, and sufficiently explicit, such in one
 word as the circumstances required. It is to be be-
 lieved, that it was to be dictated by Prince Charles,
 and that the transgressions made on it afterwards,
 were owing to others and not to him. The osten-
 sible object of this address, was to destroy the ef-
 fect of the absurd views, which the French had
 never ceased to attribute to the Austrians, and by
 which they endeavoured, and in some degree suc-
 ceeded to revive the former hatred of the Swiss
 against them ; but it had likewise the more secret
 object of exciting insurrections among the inhabi-
 tants

tants of Switzerland, and of preventing their arming in favour of the French. These unfortunate mountaineers, had only these two lines of conduct in their choice. Subjected to the will of the French Government, and to the Bayonets of Massena, the Helvetic directory, and their two councils had decreed an immediate levy of a corps of 18,000 men.* It was not to be expected, that the majority of a people who not above a year before, had fought to oppose the entry of the French into their country, would now exert themselves to enable them to keep possession of it; that men from whom they had wrested their liberty, whose properties they had wasted, whose habitations they had burnt, would arm to confirm their slavery, and defend their oppressors; that these men should be

* It never amounted to 6000 who were commanded by General Keller. Part of the Swiss regiments in the service of Sardinia, were after the expulsion of the King, taken into the pay of the Helvetic Government, which has pretended to have furnished in one way or other 30,000 auxiliary troops to the French, but these latter have alledged, that they never amounted to 10,000, and it is doubtful if even that number appeared in the ranks of the French army.

be ready to shed their blood for those who had massacred so many of their countrymen, their relations, and friends. None could form such an expectation but the French Government, accustomed as it had been since the time of Robespierre to make its despotism be supported by those who detested it, and to oblige the victims to become the defenders of their tyrants. Twelve months of servitude, had not yet extinguished the love of liberty in the hearts of the Swiss. The French had not yet had time to substitute in the room of the strong passions of hatred and vengeance, the indifference and cowardice which follow corruption.— Scarcely had the law for forced enrolments been proclaimed, when insurrections broke out in several cantons, and particularly in the smaller ones, in which the French had not been able to establish their dominion, so firmly as in those which lie nearer France. The opposition to that self-destructive measure manifested itself with more violence in the Valais than in any other part of Switzerland.

This state of things, with the consequences that might ensue, did not however discourage the French despots. They proposed to the Helvetic Directory to declare war against the Emperor, but the councils had

sufficient

sufficient courage and wisdom to reject their proposal, though it was several times pressed upon them. They, however, consented to decree the arming, without distinction, of all the unmarried men from the age of 20 to that of 45, and of all the married under 30. The punishment of death was enacted against whoever should refuse to enroll themselves, or who should oppose the measures of government, either by words or actions; and the national troops, which were at the disposal of the Helvetic Directory, were sent to force the execution of these laws upon a people who had enjoyed liberty for ages. A vast number of persons were arrested in the principal towns, and that of Berne was put in a state of siege.— It was thus that the French, after having carried fire and sword through Switzerland, left to the miserable inhabitants no other alternative than that of fighting against their countrymen, or against those who came as their deliverers.

Such was the state of things when the Archduke announced his intention of entering Switzerland. He flattered himself that a people, forced into arms, rather than defend their tyrants, would rise to shake off their yoke; and that the great difficulties which the conquest of Switzerland presented would in
part

part be removed by the union of the good wishes and efforts of its inhabitants.—The season, the positions which the French still occupied in the country of the Grisons, the intrigues of the Court of Vienna, and the disordered state of the Archduke's health did not yet permit that prince to begin the invasion of Switzerland; but to give more effect to his declaration, and likewise to improve his military situation, he resolved to get possession of the town of Schaffhausen, and to force the French, in these parts, to retire entirely to the left bank of the Rhine.

On the 13th, a part of the advanced guard, which was commanded by General Nauendorf, forced back into Schaffhausen the piquets which the French had before that town, and summoned the Commander to evacuate it.—He having refused to comply, within the half hour which had been allowed him, and seeming to wish to gain time, General Bâillet, (brother to General Latour) to whom this expedition was entrusted, broke open the gates with his cannon, and at the same time directed a cannonade against the bridge and posts occupied by the enemy on the left bank.—The French, attacked by superior forces, were driven from street to street, and were forced to

repass the Rhine after a resistance, which cost them some hundred men, in killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, besides 17 pieces of cannon.—On their retreat they burned the famous bridge of Schaffhausen*, a monument of untaught genius and human industry, respected by the Swiss, admired by all travellers, and the loss of which is much to be lamented. Though the laws of war warranted the French, and though their safety required, that they should deprive the Austrians of any means of passing to the left bank, it must be remarked, that they might have contented themselves with breaking down the bridge in such a manner that the Austrians could not make use of it, and that it might have been afterwards repaired.—In burning it, they acted like barbarians, and gave a fresh proof of the little regard which they pay to every thing that is either honourable, useful, or dear, to the nations of which they call themselves the friends and protectors.—The town of Schaffhausen did not suffer in any way from

* It is generally known that it was built by a common carpenter, of the Canton of Appenzel, called Ulric Grubenman.—It was entirely of wood, and had but two arches, though the Rhine in that part is near 400 feet broad.

from the attack, or from the arrival of the Austrians,—they acted like deliverers, and had proposed to the French a capitulation, by which the bridge would have been spared, but which was refused.—This affair occasioned an action, which with many others, less known, proves that the Austrian soldier, of all others perhaps, the most fit for every kind of war, notwithstanding the national phlegm, and the severity of the discipline, is as susceptible as any other, of that enthusiastic bravery which French Generals so loudly proclaim to be the exclusive merit of their soldiers.

A private, of the regiment of Lascy, swam across the Rhine, under a dreadful fire from both banks, and disengaged two large boats from the left side, which he brought into the middle of the river, where the current forced them down against the bridge with which they were burned. Obligated to return from whence he set out, the same soldier followed this time by another, crossed again to the left side and brought over safe several vessels. The example of these two men was followed by eighteen others of the same regiment, who brought off from the enemy all the boats which were on the

left side, a service of some importance, which procured to the first soldier the golden medal, and the silver one to his first assistants. This fact leads us to remark the good effects which the institution of these medals has had in the Austrian army. They are the objects of the ambition of the soldiers, as the cross of Maria Theresa is that of the officers. There is no engagement in which the double desire of honour and of profit, does not produce some brilliant action, (for every soldier who has the medal receives double pay, and every officer who obtains the cross, has a pension settled on him,) and there is no doubt that this powerful motive of emulation, which is wanting in most of the other armies of Europe, is one of the most effective causes of the constant valour and inalterable fidelity of the Austrian soldiery.

The day after that in which the town of Schaffhausen fell into the hands of the Austrians, they drove the French from the small town of Petershausen, situated opposite to Constance, upon the narrowest part of the Lake of that name. Some entrenchments which they had made there, were forced by General Piaseck; while the flotilla of gun-boats fitted

fitted out at Bregentz, and commanded by Colonel Williams, aided his attack by their fire*.—Petershausen being taken, the French were summoned to evacuate Constance, but this post was too important, and they occupied it in too great a force to be induced by a mere summons to abandon it.—Their refusal was followed by a cannonade, which lasted some days, yet with no other effect than to injure the town, and to sink part of the boats which the French had assembled on the left bank of the lake.—The Austrians, having about the same time, got possession of the posts of Stein and of Eglisau, the Rhine, from Bregentz to Basle, became the line of division between the two armies.

These events, with some skirmishes, of no importance whatever, which took place in Suabia and on the banks of the Necker and of the Mein, where the inhabitants, to the number of some thousands,

I 2

took

* Colonel Williams, a native of England, and first employed in the naval service of his country, entered into that of Austria, at the beginning of this war. He has been charged with setting up all the Flotillas which the different operations of the war, have rendered necessary either upon the Rhine or upon the lakes of Garda, and of Constance.—This able and active officer, is at the head of the new Imperial marine, in the Adriatic Gulf.

took up arms against the French, about the middle of April, were the only military occurrences which took place in that month between the French armies of Germany and Switzerland, and that of the Archduke. It may be, and was greatly at the time, a matter of wonder, to see Prince Charles allow so many weeks to pass in complete inactivity; thus losing the advantage he might have derived from the favourable impressions his last victories had made on the minds of the soldiers and the people at large; damping the hopes the Swiss had indulged of their speedy deliverance, and the desire they felt to hasten it by their own efforts; and giving time to the French to strengthen themselves in their positions, to increase the number, and revive the spirits of their soldiers, to repress and punish the insurrections that had broke out in Switzerland, and would probably have become general; an inactivity in short, which prevented the result of the campaign from being what it was wished to be, and what it might certainly have been.

Though the principal causes which so long, and at so critical a period too, interrupted the operations of the grand Imperial Army, were more of a political than of a military nature, and rather private than

than public ; though they originated more in the jealousy of some Generals, occasioned by the brilliant success of the Archduke, and in the contrast which existed between the frank and open views of that prince, and the mistaken, narrow, and crooked politics, (to give them no worse appellations) of some members of the Austrian cabinet ; although, in a word, the young prince had more formidable enemies at Vienna than at Paris, enemies so active, and, to the disgrace of the Imperial Court, so powerful, that it was at one time resolved to take from him the command of the army, and to put one of his brothers in his place : yet some military reasons justified, in part, the delay of the invasion of Switzerland.

In order that the Archduke might attempt it with advantage, it was necessary that Generals Hotze and Bellegarde should again attack at the same time the southern part of that country ; and it has been seen that till the end of April the season had made such a diversion totally impossible.—The conquest of Switzerland, already so difficult, owing to the very nature of the ground, and to the great number of French troops that covered it, was made still more arduous by the exhausted state of the country, and

the excessive scarcity of provisions ; so that, contrary to what commonly happens, the more numerous the attacking troops were to be, the more would be the obstacles which they would have to encounter.

It is generally known that the inhabitants of Switzerland depend in a great measure upon Germany for their grain and flour. The war had cut them off from that source of supply, which indeed they were deprived of even before hostilities began. France and Italy had not made up to them that loss ; and the residence of the French army, with the magazines formed on their account, had rendered every article of subsistence so scarce, that there hardly remained enough for the consumption of the inhabitants. It was besides to be expected that the French would completely forestall all the remaining provisions in the countries more immediately exposed, and that the Austrians would not be able to find in them the least quantity either of grain or forage. The Archduke therefore could not safely enter a country where he not only would find no means of subsistence, but the inhabitants of which he would even be obliged to feed, until he had procured supplies proportioned to extraordinary wants, and had

secured

secured constant and easy means of transporting them. During their stay, the French had consumed upon the spot, or carried off, the provisions ; and all that the Archduke could do, in the first moments, would have been to subsist his army. It became necessary to bring from Bavaria, and even from a greater distance, supplies for forming magazines.— Upon the other side of the lake of Constance the difficulties were still greater. Numerous bodies of troops had long been assembled in the Tyrol, and the heavy demands made upon it to provision the army of Italy had nearly exhausted all resources in those parts. Had they even been more abundant, the season and nature of the country rendered every mode of transporting them extremely slow and difficult.—It will not be denied that these obstacles were sufficient to prevent the Archduke from attempting the invasion of Switzerland so soon as was hoped and expected by the public, which attends in war only to battles, and seems to forget that armies cannot move just with the same expedition as single travellers : but it will likewise be remarked, that with activity, union, and zeal, and with proper pecuniary sacrifices, these obstacles might have been removed much sooner than they really were.

Massena remained as long and as completely inactive as the Austrians, but his motives were different. The defeats of the French in Germany and in Italy, had entirely destroyed their plan for the campaign. The vast chain of operations which they had concerted from the Necker to the Po, was broken, and the army of Massena, which was to be the central Pivot, had now enough to do to maintain itself in its position. Out-flanked on both sides, that army would have even been obliged to fall back, if the Rhine and the Alps which may be considered, the former as a ditch, and the latter as a rampart to Switzerland, had not rendered that country a sort of fortress, in which a siege might be sustained with great hopes of success. Massena neglected nothing to put himself in a proper state of defence. After the fruitless attack which he had made on the 23d of March upon Feldkirch; he removed his head quarters from Chur to Rhineck, from that to Constance, and so successively to all the principal towns on the banks of the Rhine. He carefully fortified all the advantageous ports which that River presents from its source to Basle, and connected the defence of them with that of the position occupied

occupied by Lecourbe in the country of the Grisons.

Jourdan having, in consequence of his defeat at Stockach, lost the command of the army of the Danube, Massena was appointed first, *ad interim*, and then finally, to the chief command of that army, which united with those of observation and of Switzerland, formed altogether but one under the name of the army of the Danube. Being thus invested with the full power of Generalissimo over all the French forces from the frontiers of the Tyrol and Italy, to the Palatinate, Massena repaired to Strasburg early in April, to regulate the organization and the movements of that great machine. He left about 3000 men at Manheim, placed two divisions in front of Kehl, lined the left bank of the river from Strasburg to Basle with some light troops, and marched two other divisions into Switzerland to encrease his force there, and to replace some troops which he had sent into Italy by the St. Gothard. On the 12th of April, he fixed his head quarters at Basle, as the central point of that long line which he had to defend.—Such was the situation of military affairs in Germany and in Switzerland at the end of the month of April ;

at which time, a new campaign, if we may call it so, opened upon the whole theatre of the war. Massena had then from Manheim to the source of the Adige, about 100,000 men, and the Archduke upon the same, but a less regular line, above 110,000.

It was from this time that the war took a more decided character, and that all the hopes which the French Directory and some Princes of Germany, had founded upon the congress at Rastadt vanished. The victories of the Archduke, had confirmed the deputation to the Empire in their wise resolution to refer to the Diet of Ratisbon, for an answer to the imperative notes of the French deputies. On the 7th of April, Count Metternich, the Imperial Commissioner announced officially to the congress, that he had orders to quit it, to revoke all the concessions which had till that time been made by the Empire, but with the reserve, that they should not be valid till after being ratified by the Emperor, and to declare, that in consequence things should be considered as being in the same state they were before the opening of the congress. This declaration which was soon followed by the departure of the Imperial commission, and of the greatest part of the

the deputies of the Empire, gave a mortal blow to that ridiculous and fatal congress, the disgrace of Germany, and the sport of France.—The Catastrophe of the 28th of April, which happened upon the French deputies leaving Radstat, is known to all the world. This event is of a nature too foreign to the object of this work, to be entered upon in detail, which, unless very long, would be incomplete. It will be sufficient to observe, that it did not make that impression upon the minds of the French, which the directory hoped for; nor did it render more effective or more popular the decrees which they had passed eleven days before, to make the military conscription general, and ensure the levy of 200,000 men, which had been decreed about the end of 1798.

C H A P. VII.

General situation of the Allies—Generals Hotze and Bellegarde combine a plan for a general attack upon the country of the Grisons—The latter of these Generals takes possession of the Upper and Lower Engadine, after several engagements—The former fails in an attack upon Luciensteig—He renews it thirteen days after, and is completely successful—The French are entirely driven out of the country of the Grisons, and the Austrians take post upon the left bank of the Rhine—General Bellegarde goes to co-operate with the army of Italy.

THE French had not contented themselves in the beginning of this campaign, with tracing out a particular plan for each of their three armies; they had combined every partial operation, so as to make them conspire to the attainment of one common object. The case was now the same with the Austrians, who, after victory had suddenly enabled them to assume the offensive in Germany, and in Italy, found themselves obliged

obliged to regulate each operation according to the whole of their position, giving the idea of a military manœuvre, in which the different corps advancing dependently on each other, would regulate, by their left, their march and direction. This is the foundation for what was said in a former chapter, that the Archduke ought not to have entered Switzerland before General Bellegarde had taken possession of the country of the Grisons, and that this General ought not to have commenced the attack before the Austrian army of Italy, and the corps detached from the Tyrol to act upon his right, had passed the Oglio, and out-flanked the Valteline. This progress had now been made by Marshal Swarow's army in Italy; and towards the end of April, his right wing already had posts upon the lake of Como. The operations of General Bellegarde were, therefore, as much facilitated as was requisite on that side. It has been seen that he had wished to commence them upon the 21st of the same month, but had met with insurmountable local impediments. His inaction necessarily occasioning that of the Archduke, and the advantages which might be drawn from the campaign being in great measure lost, it was of the utmost importance not to delay an instant in compelling the
French

French to evacuate the valley of the Engadine, and the heights which it separates. Although great obstacles were yet opposed by the season, Generals Hotze and Bellegarde, judging them to be now surmountable, combined a plan of a general attack upon all the positions occupied by the French in the valleys of the Rhine, the Langwart, and the Inn. Colonel Strauch, who co-operated with the army of Italy, had already forced them to abandon a part of that, of the Adda. General Loison, who commanded it, had retired to Tirano.

In the night between the 29th and 30th of April, the army of General Bellegarde, supported by several companies of volunteer Tyrolese chasseurs, began to move, chiefly in two columns, one commanded by the General in person, which was to attack the valley of the Inn in front; the other, commanded by General Haddick, who was to pass over the mountains of the Scharl, and to descend into the valley of the Inn, upon the rear of the French corps, which was there entrenched. Each of these columns had detachments on its flanks, to secure its march, and to explore the windings of the mountains. The most considerable of these detachments was to penetrate through

through the valley of Chieffers, and to endeavour to reach Zernets.

General Bellegarde, who had set out from Nauders, where his head quarters had long been established, successively overthrew the small advanced posts of the enemy ; and after a difficult march, during which his troops were several times obliged to ford the Inn, he arrived, after constant fighting, at Ramiss, (or Remus) and took possession of that village, as well as of the heights which command it. At some little distance, in the rear of this village, the French had a kind of entrenched camp, very difficult of access. General Bellegarde caused it to be attacked upon the right and left of the front which it presented. The latter of these attacks was made by a column which had come by Schlins and Manus, which was so much fatigued by a march of several hours through snow, and over very high mountains, that it could not attack with the vigour necessary to ensure success ; it carried, however, two of the three ranks of works which defended the left of the position. The attack on the right was made with nearly the same degree of success. The entrenchments of the French were in so complete a state of defence upon this point, that after having climbed the mountain on

which the entrenchments were placed, all the time exposed to a heavy fire, the Austrians were unable, in spite of every effort, to cross the ditch, which was lined with thick palisades, and defended by a well-supported fire of musquetry. Night overtook them at the foot of the entrenchments, and compelled them to delay the attack till the next day.

Success might have been as uncertain as the day before, had General Bellegarde's force been left entirely to itself; but, in his able plan of attack, he had so directed General Haddick's march, that the French were compelled to evacuate their position, lest they should be shut up in it. After a march of ten hours upon the tops of mountains covered with snow, after three obstinate engagements, and carrying several entrenchments, General Haddick, in spite of every obstacle that the ground, the cold, and the enemy had opposed, arrived at Trasp, in the valley of Inn. Seeing the Austrians posted in his front, on his right, and even in his rear, and having reason to expect a double attack the day after, General Lecourbe abandoned his position near Remus in the night, and took up another in the rear of Garda.—Thus, in one day, the Austrians found themselves masters of a great part of the lower Engadine.

They

They had flattered themselves, however, with the hope of still greater success. They expected that the column which had been directed through the valley of Chieffers upon Zernets, would be able to drive the French from that place; and that, by this means, Lecourbe would be shut up in the valley of the lower Engadine, to escape from which would cost him a great part of his troops. But this General, who had fully considered the designs which might be formed against him, had felt all the importance of the point of Zernets, and had left a larger force there than the Imperialists expected to find. Indeed so warmly were they received, that, being compelled to fall back, they left a part of the regiment of Ligne, with the young prince, of that name, in the hands of the enemy.

On the day after (1st of May) the two columns of Generals Bellegarde and Haddick, effected a junction near Schulz. The fatigue of the troops was such, that they were only enabled to push the advanced posts of the enemy a little way beyond Vettau, towards Lavin.

On the 2d, the Austrians advanced upon the last mentioned village. The attack was retarded by the necessity of restoring the bridge of Garda,

which the enemy had destroyed; but as soon as that was done, the French were driven from the village. Having taken up a good position at a short distance, they were again attacked and beaten with loss. Some prisoners were taken from them, and amongst others General Démont. Though constantly attacked in front and flank, and compelled to give way, yet the French defended every inch of ground with obstinacy, and their retreat upon Zernets was a continued fighting, in which they were sometimes assailants. Darkness prevented the attack of the Village. The French evacuated it in the night, and left all the lower Engadine in the possession of the Austrians. They indeed paid rather dear for this acquisition. That it could not be otherwise, is easily perceived when we consider, that they had many perilous and sometimes unsuccessful attacks to make over mountains, and in narrow vallies, defended by good entrenchments in every approach. Massena estimated their loss at 4,000 men; it amounted in all to about 1500; and that of the French was not less; their General in Chief himself was wounded.

These three days form one of the most interesting and instructive parts of the campaign. The Generals gave

gave proofs of considerable abilities on both sides. We see that Lecourbe's defensive operations were well planned, and conducted with obstinate valour; and that in spite of all the obstacles peculiar to a mountainous country, he would have maintained his ground, had General Bellegarde's plan of attack been less ably arranged, and less vigourously executed. The marches of the Austrians on this occasion, display as much boldness and activity, as those made by the French six weeks before.

It has been said, that General Bellegarde was to act in concert with General Hotze. The latter, to whom the Archduke had sent reinforcements, and whose corps consisted of more than 20,000 men, contented himself on the 30th of April, with attracting by a cannonade, the attention of the enemy in the valley of the Rhine, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent into the Engadine. On the 1st of May, General Hotze advanced through the valley of the Grisons against the fort of Luciensteig, whilst another column marched towards the same point by the defiles of Langwart, and other detachments penetrated by corresponding vallies, to keep the French in check upon all points. Thus we see, that General Hotze's plan was to

attack the Luciensteig on two sides at once; and by that means prevent it from being relieved. This plan nearly similar to that which Massena had successfully executed about two months before, would probably have been equally fortunate in its issue, had it been made with concert; but the column coming by the Langwart, did not come out from the defiles at Flaisch and Mayenfeld, till several hours after General Hotze had appeared before the Luciensteig, which he could not carry, being deprived of the co-operation on which he had relied.—The French General Menard, who commanded in these parts, had already resisted General Hotze with success, when he saw the second column coming upon him. At first he retired, but being speedily reinforced by some troops which had set out from Chur on hearing the firing, he found himself stronger than the Austrians, attacked them at the moment in which they were issuing out of the defile, beat them, and killed or took prisoners the greatest part of the corps.

The bad success of this attack, was the more to be regretted by the Austrians, as, if it had succeeded, they would not only have been masters of the vallies of Mayenfeld and of the Luciensteig,

but

but might at once have gained possession of the whole of the Grison League, and even of part of the lesser cantons; besides almost all the French troops which defended these countries, must have fallen into their hands. General Hotze, a native of Switzerland, had collected the emigrants from that country, and had formed them into a corps of infantry about 1000 strong. The confidence with which his countrymen had in his talents, and the attachment they still bore to several of the heads of the ancient Government, and among others to the venerable Avoyer Stéiger,* who made to them an address replete with energy and patriotism, enabled General Hotze to promote the disposition to insurrection, manifested by the inhabitants of the lesser cantons, of the Grison country, and of the Valais; who, being informed of the general attack projected by the Austrians, took up arms, and occupied at once the vallies of the higher Rhine, of the Ticino, of the Reufs, of the Mutton, and of the Rhone; forming a chain of insurrection upon the line of the great Alps in the rear of the two

K 3 French

* That courageous justly celebrated Senator died at the end of the year (1799).

French corps, which were posted in the valley of Chur, and at the head of that of the Inn. Being thus placed between the Austrians, and the Swiss thirsting for revenge, few of the French could have escaped, and in a short time the obstacles which afterwards opposed the invasion of Switzerland, would have been in great part removed. The failure of General Hotze's expedition, enabled the French to unite their whole force against the insurgents. A part laid down their arms in the Canton of Schwitz; the rest to the number of several thousands were cut to pieces in two battles which they fought in the valley of the Rhine and near Altdorf. These cruel executions effectually stifled in its birth the general insurrection, by which the Austrians had, with reason hoped to be supported.

The attempt made by General Hotze to drive the French from the country of the Grisons, and to effect a junction with General Bellegarde having failed, it became the more necessary, that the last mentioned General should make farther progress.

The severe checks which Lecourbe had received on the 30th of April and 2d of May, joined to the events that were then passing in the Valteline and
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in the Italian Bailiwicks, left him but little hope of being able to maintain himself in the Upper Engadine.—On the morning of the 3d, he continued his retreat by Brail, Pout-autá Zutz, and Pont. His corps divided itself at this latter place; part entered the valley of the Albula, the rest retired towards Chiavenna, from whence, in the fear of being taken in flank by the Austrians, who were in the Valteline, and wishing to secure the possession of St. Gothard, they very soon after fell back to Bellinzona.

General Bellegarde then found himself master of the whole course of the Inn, and able to act upon the flank of all the French corps which defended the different valleys of the Rhine. This was what, in existing circumstances was most useful to be done, General Vukassovich and Colonel Strauch's troops, which had been originally detached from his army, occupying already a great part of the Valteline, the county of Chiavenna, and the Italian Bailiwicks, and being sufficiently strong to drive the French entirely out of those countries. General Bellegarde therefore contented himself with pushing a van-guard by Sylva Plana, towards the Valteline, and the county of Chiavenna, to open his communication with the troops which had penetrated into those

quarters. He divided the rest of his own corps into four columns, the first of which marched from Suss upon Davos, the second from Pont upon the Albula, the third upon Mount Jule, and the fourth with General Bellegarde, in person, directed itself upon Lintz.—The French were weak upon all these points, and defended the approaches but feebly.

The position taken by General Bellegarde, upon the chain of the Alps which covers the principal valley of the Grisons, greatly favoured the attack of it, and if it may be said, had ripened it.—General Hotze therefore, prepared to make a second effort, and arranged his measures with General Bellegarde in such a manner, and with such a force, as to render success almost infallible. The better to secure, and afterwards to improve it, the Archduke had sent to General Hotze fresh reinforcements, and among the rest, the fine regiment of light horse of Kinsky.

In the night of the 13th and 14th of May, all General Hotze's army, except a small corps, which he had left between Bregentz and Feldkirch, put itself in motion in four columns.—The first, commanded by that General in person, marched straight along the valley of the Rhine, towards the Sieig, which it was to attack in front.—The second, under
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the orders of General Jellachich, was to make its way across that thick chain of mountains which flank the vallies of the Steig and of Mayenfeld, and to take post between these two places.—The third, conducted by General Hiller, marched up the valley of Montafune, and passed over Mount Scevis.—The fourth, led by Colonel Plunket of the staff, filed through the pass of Gurgellen, and directed its march by Mount Slapina, towards Kieblis and Kloster.—The two last columns, it may be seen, were not so much intended immediately to favour the operations of the former ones, as to dislodge the French from their posts upon the Langwart, to surround them even, if possible, and if not, to drive them back to the Rhine.—The success of their march depended in great measure upon the assistance of the inhabitants of the mountains, who really were of great help to them, in transporting their artillery and provisions.—The Peasants of the valley of Montafune, particularly distinguished themselves, by their efforts in favour of the Imperialists.

Generals Hotze and Jellachich arrived much about the same time, but the latter after a very hard march, before the fort of Steig, the strength of which lay

lay principally in the difficulty of approaching it.* The two Austrian Generals assailed it on both sides, thus cutting it off from all outward communication, and at length made themselves masters of it, in spite of the fire of the garrison, consisting of a demi-brigade, which was almost entirely taken prisoners. After storming the Steig, General Hotze rapidly over-ran the valley of the Rhine, at the head of his cavalry, passed the Langwart, and pushed on to the important post of Zitzers. The possession of this place cut off the retreat of the French troops, which were yet in the Brettigau, and which were also driven before the two last columns of the Austrians, which after storming several entrenchments, descended into the valley of the Rhine, by Marschlins and Zitzers, —Surprized upon several points, which they had thought secure, and disconcerted by a rapid, well concerted and general attack, the French no longer endeavoured to defend Chur, and retired upon one side to Reichenau, where they took post at the confluence

* This famous passage of the Steig has already been adverted to.—The French had thrown up entrenchments in the narrowest part of it, and had also strengthened the works, which bore the name of *the Fort of Steig*.

fluence of the two branches of the Rhine, which unite at that place.—The rest passed the river at Ragats, and directed themselves partly towards Sargans, and partly upon Vettis, thus leaving the Imperialists masters of the whole line of the *Ten jurisdictions*.—This was not the only fruit of that day; for, near 4000 men, and more than 20 pieces of cannon, fell into the hands of the victors.

On the 15th, General Hotze reconnoitred towards Reichenau, with his cavalry, but finding the enemy well posted, he made no attempt against them.—On the same day the French were attacked and driven from Ragatzs, with the loss of some prisoners and 3 pieces of cannon.

On the 16th they retired from Reichenau towards Disentis.—They had also quitted Sargans during the preceding night, part marching to Wallenstadt, and part to Werdenberg, from whence they were dislodged on the 18th, with the loss of 3 pieces of cannon; two other pieces were taken by the Austrians on the same day at Disentis, from which the French were driven, and compelled to retire into the valley of Urseren.—In the mean time the French detachments which had retired out of the Valteline into the Rhetick Alps,

afraid of being shut in by the different Austrian corps, that already occupied the passes of Splügen and Gunkels, endeavoured to traverse the mountains, and reach St. Gothard. They were pursued by the corps of General Bellegarde, who went himself to Chiavenna, his co-operation being no longer of use to General Hotze, with whom, however, he left some troops, and his presence being on the contrary, daily, more and more necessary to the army of the Allies in Italy.

Thus it appears that the Imperialists had almost entirely reconquered the Grison country; that they had become masters of the sources of the Rhine; that they had even posts beyond that river, that the successes that were to open the way to the invasion of Switzerland had been obtained: in short, that properly speaking, that great military operation was, in fact, already begun.—Every preparation was, on all sides, made to accomplish it, and a military scene was then opened equally new and interesting, which shall be presented in the following chapter. This, however, must not be concluded, without the high credit being adverted to, which the

above

above described events, reflect on General Hotze and Bellegarde.

Though greatly favoured by the rapid triumphs of the Allies in Italy, their operations were still opposed by difficulties which could only be overcome by extraordinary and well directed efforts. The country of the Grisons was retaken in less time than Massena and Lecourbe had employed in getting possession of it, though circumstances were much the same in both cases. General Hotze's last attack was combined with such admirable exactness, that it induces a belief, that the bad success of the first was not imputable to any fault of his.—General Bellegarde had shewn no less skill fifteen days before, and had, preserved in a kind of war quite new to him, the reputation which he had so justly acquired at a former period. His attack on the Engadine would have been frustrated by the able and active Lecourbe, had it not been planned and disposed in such a manner, that, provided any one of the three columns sent against the enemy was successful, his object was attained. It has been a current report, and a prevalent opinion, that the political and private conduct of Count Bellegarde, during the course of this campaign,

paign, did not correspond with his military conduct. He is accused of having behaved ungratefully to the Archduke Charles, and by his intrigues and influence at the court of Vienna, crossed the generous views of that Prince, to the essential detriment of Europe. It is a matter of regret to be unable to contradict these rumours, and be obliged to confine our praise to the military talents of Count Bellegarde.

C H A P. VIII.

The French endeavour to force the Austrians to repass the Rhine at Wallenstadt, but are repulsed—Massena evacuates the eastern part of Switzerland—All the army of Hotze passes the Rhine—The advanced guard of the Archduke, and almost all his army, also pass that river—Massena makes a successful attack on the 25th, notwithstanding which, the armies of the Archduke and of Hotze effect a junction the next day.—They attack, in their turn, on the 27th, and force Massena to retire behind the Toss—He falls back to the Glatt two days afterwards, and retreats still further, to occupy the entrenched position of Zurich—Progress made by the left of the army of Hotze—General Bellegarde, after having made himself master of the Valteline, embarks, with the greatest part of his army, on the Lake Como, and passes into Italy.—The rest, under the orders of General Haddick, continues to act in the lesser Cantons—He defeats the enemy on the 28th, and drives them from St. Gothard, and from the greatest part

part of the valley of the Reuss—Generals Lecourbe and Loison make a successful attack a few days afterwards, but in consequence of manœuvres of the Austrians are obliged to retire behind the lakes of the four Cantons—Advantageous situation of the Allies at that time.

THE surprise, defeat, and losses, which the division of General Menard had suffered in the country of the Grisons, on the 14th of May, had prevented him from opposing any effectual resistance to the progress of the Austrians on the left bank of the Rhine on the following days; and, it may be remembered, that they had made themselves masters of Ragatz, Sargans, Werdenberg, and Mayenfeld. The possession of this last post putting it in their power to advance either upon the Thur or upon the Linth, and threatening the rear of the positions occupied by the French in the Toggenburg, and in the canton of Appenzel, they could not maintain themselves in those countries, or even beyond the Thur, without recovering the post of Wallenstadt. This they attempted to do on the 19th, a few hours after the advanced guard of the Austrians had taken possession of it. Colonel Cavacini, who commanded

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it, was attacked with the greatest vigour, and had much difficulty in keeping his ground against the superior, and often recruited, forces of the French, who endeavoured to turn his left flank. Far from suffering them to do so, Colonel Cavacini detached a part of his force upon the right flank of the French; and after a bloody contest, in which he gave proofs of military talents, he succeeded, towards the end of the day, in repulsing them as far as Murg, on the south bank of the lake of Wallenstadt. The loss of the Republicans was considerable; that of the Austrians was less; it amounted, however, to 300 men in killed and wounded, a great part of whom belonged to the Swiss legion already noticed, commanded by Colonel Roverea. It was engaged on that day for the first time, and shewed much bravery. It had been placed, at its own repeated request, at the outposts, to give the inhabitants of the country an opportunity of joining them, and to excite, by their example, a general insurrection. This, however, was far from being the result; and so fresh was in every one's memory, the fate of the armed inhabitants who had been barbarously slaughtered by the French, but a fortnight before, that the Imperial

standards were then joined by a very inconsiderable number of the Swiss.

The issue of this attempt to drive the Austrians over the Rhine, and the expectation that in a very short time they would pass it on all points, left it no longer in Massena's power to keep possession of the eastern part of Switzerland. Generals Hotze and Bellegarde had gained his right flank, and even his rear, and therefore, without much danger, he could no longer delay strengthening his centre, and shortening his line.—He in consequence ordered the Toggenburg, the canton of Appenzel, the country of St. Gall, and the Turgaw, to be evacuated on the 20th; and withdrew all his forces behind the Thur.

As soon as the retreat of the French was known, the advanced posts of the Austrians, which guarded the Rhine from Feldkirch to Reineck, passed that river; and the flotilla of Colonel Williams landed some troops upon the west side of the lake, who took some prisoners, and some pieces of cannon which had been left behind by the enemy. The success obtained by General Hotze, would not have been sufficient to induce Massena to evacuate so great an extent of country, had he not been certain that the Archduke Charles would also very soon pass the Rhine. That

Prince

Prince had even made a feint of doing it some days before, in order to alarm Massena, and to prevent his sending any troops into the country of the Grisons. The French General had for six weeks endeavoured to retard the invasion of Switzerland, by hostile movements before Kehl, and on the Mein, and the Necker, which brought on several trifling engagements, to which no greater attention shall here be paid, than was done by the Archduke. He had also carefully entrenched all the weak points of the left bank of the Rhine, from Schaffhausen to Basle, and had fortified the Suburb opposite to that town on the other side of the river. The hostile appearances in Suabia, had not induced the Archduke to change the concentrated position, which he had taken between Stockach and Schaffhausen, and as little did the entrenchments made along the river, hinder him from passing it. That Prince had resolved not to enter Switzerland, till the south and east of that country should previously have been invaded, and that being now the case, he lost not a moment in executing an enterprise too long delayed, and anxiously waited for by all Europe.

As soon as General Nauendorf who commanded the advanced guard of the Archduke's army, knew that the French had quitted the neighbourhood of Schaffhausen, on the 21st, he sent some light troops across the river, with orders to reconnoitre the roads of Zurich and Constance. They pushed on as far as Frauenfeld and Winterthur, which were already abandoned by the enemy, who had retired to the other side of the Toss. At the same time the crews of the flotilla of Colonel Williams overran the bank of the lake, seized upon the warlike stores precipitately abandoned by the enemy, and endeavoured to form a junction with the advanced guard of General Nauendorf, all of which had passed the Rhine, and was posted at Andelsingen, from which parties had been sent into the Turgaw and the Canton of Zurich. One of the first cares of that General, was to establish a bridge of boats at Schaffhausen and at Dissenhoven. On the 21st, the main body of the Archduke's army marched from Stockach to Singen, and on the 23d, from that place to Schaffhausen, where it began the same day to pass the Rhine, and to occupy a camp marked out near Paradis. At the same time the Archduke attempted a small landing on his right,

right, between Coblenz and Kaiserstul, less with a view of really effecting it, than to attract the forces of Massena to that side; in which he succeeded, for the French remained there in such numbers, as not only to defend it, but to give the Austrians a slight check. The head quarters of the Archduke, which had been on the 21st at Singen, were transferred on the 23d to Schaffhausen.—On the preceding evening the rest of the army under General Hotze, had passed the Rhine at different places, and advanced into the Toggenburg, and the country of St. Gall, his head quarters being established in the town of that name.

The armies of the Archduke and of General Hotze, having each a firm footing in Switzerland, and having already communication by their advanced posts, their next object was to effect a union. For this purpose the right of the latter commanded by General Petrarsch, which had hitherto guarded the Rhine from Feldkich to Reineck, began to move in the night of the 24th, from St. Gall towards Frauenfeld. To support this movement, General Hotze encamped on the 25th at Schwarzenbach, and pushed on his advanced posts beyond the Thur, to within two leagues of Elgg,

Although Massena did nothing to hinder the Archdukes army, and the right wing of General Hotze from entering Switzerland; yet it was not his intention to let them establish themselves in it. He had perceived, that his line of defence upon the Rhine being already broken by the left of General Hotze, and in danger of being attacked every moment by superior forces, the whole of its centre would infallibly be either cut off or destroyed, were he to persist in keeping it so extended. By concentrating his forces, and allowing the enemy to spread themselves on his front in the canton of Schaffhausen and in the Turgaw, he gave himself the facility of attacking them on any one point with superior forces, and quickly profiting by any fault they might commit, in a word, he kept it in his own power to act offensively or defensively, as circumstances might require.

Having been very exactly informed of the movements which the Austrians were making to effectuate their junction; he resolved to prevent it, and hoped to attack them with advantage in their march. He advanced again upon the 25th, reoccupied Winterthur, and sent a strong body of troops, principally composed of cavalry, against the advanced guard

guard of General Nauendorf, which was driven from Nefelbach, and forced to repass the Thur at Andelsingen.

At the same time another division went to keep the Austrians in check on the side of Adlikon, and General Oudinot, with the advanced guard considerably reinforced, marched to meet General Petrasch, whom he found upon the heights between Frauenfeld and the Thur, and whom he attacked immediately. Not expecting to have so soon to contend with the enemy, General Petrasch, did not shew the requisite activity and judgment. The bravery of the regiments which he had with him, opposed however a strong resistance to the enemy, and the engagement was continued obstinately the greatest part of the day; but the arrival of a reinforcement of 3000 men, gave Oudinot so decided a superiority, that the unlucky, if not unskillful Austrian commander, was obliged to retreat towards Wyll, leaving a great number of dead on the field of battle, and of prisoners in the hands of the enemy. This day cost the Austrians about 2000 men, which Massena exaggerated to double that number in his report; Generals Piaseck and Kienmayer were wounded at the head of the cavalry. On the part

of the French, Weber Chief of the auxiliary Swiss Legion, was killed.

The result of this affair retarded a little the operations of the Austrians, and made them lose ground on every side: for the main army of General Hotze, which had likewise been attacked, but unsuccessfully, was obliged to imitate the retrograde movement of General Petrarsch.—The check however, was not so considerable as to delay the junction. In order to facilitate it, the Archduke on the 26th, sent a column of his left, under the Prince Reuss towards Pfin and Frauenfeld, at which last place it was joined in the course of the day by General Petrarsch. On the same evening, it was determined to take advantage of that junction, for attacking the position of the enemy at Winterthur. This was executed with vigour and complete success on the 27th, in the morning. The French forced to abandon their situation, retired behind the Toss in good order and with little loss, their retreat being greatly favoured by the woody and mountainous nature of the country. It would have cost them much dearer, and the day would probably have been decisive.

decisive in its consequences, had the Austrians made a general attack according to their plan; but the right wing could not take any share in the action, a bridge which General Nauendorf ordered to be thrown over the Thur, in the night betwixt the 26th and 27th, having been constructed so slowly as to occasion a loss of several hours. This affair gave the Austrians the advantage of resuming the offensive which had for a moment been wrested from them, and of being firmly established in Switzerland with about 55,000 men, while on account of the length of his line, and of his having been obliged to send 10,000 men into the Valais, Massena could not oppose to them, quite that number.

Though the country bordering on the Toss presents many advantageous positions for opposing the passage of that river; yet, Massena fearing to be outflanked, resolved to draw nearer to the central position of Zurick, where alone he could hope to stop the Austrians. He decamped therefore in the night, betwixt the 28th and 29th, and retired to the Glatt. The Archduke having in consequence pushed on his advanced guard, on the right to
Bulach,

Bulach, and on the left to Basserdorf, the French on the following day fell back still further, put the Glatt between them and the enemy, and occupied the position before Zurich, which they had during two months been entrenching with care.—Their right at the same time evacuated Rapperschwill and burnt the bridge, having been induced to do so, less by any apprehensions in their front, than on account of the progress already made on their rear by the Swiss Legion of Roveara, and by the corps of Colonel Cavacini which supported it. These troops were not only masters of the canton of Glarus, but had entered into that of Schwitz, and occupied the important post of our lady of Ensiden. They had met with little opposition, Generals Lecourbe and Loison, having been obliged to unite their forces in the valley of the Ticino, to secure the St. Gothard and the already much threatened right of the defensive line of Massena.

It will be remembered that after the taking of Chur, and the entry of General Hotze into Switzerland, General Bellegarde ceased to co-operate with him, and went on the 18th of May, in pursuit of the
different

different corps of the enemy, which had defended the sources of the Rhine, and which had found means to effect their retreat, some of them by the Canton of Uri, and the others by the Italian Bailiwicks. The junction of Generals Loison and Lecourbe had been effected near Bellinzona, and they were then much superior in force to the small corps of Prince Victor of Rohan, who had been obliged to retire to Como*. Colonel Strauch had marched to support him, and with the same intention General Bellegarde, had on the 16th pushed on a column to Chiavenna.—Two days afterwards the rest of his army advanced in three columns, one by the Splugen, another above Mount Septimer, towards Cassaccio, and the third on Mount Jule, towards the valley of the Adda.—

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* This corps, which as well as that of Col. Strauch, has been so useful in this campaign, belonged likewise to the army of Tyrol, from which it had been detached in the beginning of April. They have been, as it were, the common scouts of the armies of Switzerland and of Italy, between which they did not cease to act on the summit of the Alps, and keep up the communication. Their operations having been at one time directed against the Republican army of Italy, and at another, against that of Switzerland, the mention of them could not be avoided in both parts of the history of this campaign, but more notice will be taken of them in that of Italy.

These two last, it will be observed, did not direct themselves against the enemy, but towards the lake Como, on which they embarked for the town of that name; whence they were conducted by General Bellegarde, across the Milanese, to the siege of Tortona.—The rest of that army, consisting principally of the brigades of Prince Victor of Rohan, of Colonel Strauch, and of Colonel St. Julien, who had been left in the valley of the Rhine, remained under the command of General Haddick, who assembled the greatest part of it at Bellinzona. These forces were judged sufficient for the common services yet required in those parts, by the allied armies in Switzerland and Italy.—Nothing remained but to drive the French from the Italian Bailiwicks, from the upper valley of the Ticino, and from the important passage of the St. Gothard: General Haddick lost no time in undertaking the task.

Having ascended the valley of the Ticino, as far as Airolo, he attacked on the 28th, upon three points, the position of General Loison, which was upon mountains so steep, that the approach to its centre was extremely difficult, and in which he maintained himself for several hours. At last, Prince Victor of Rohan, having passed the Ticino, and climbed a
very

very high mountain which flanked the right of the enemy, at the same time that another Austrian column turned them on the left, General Loison was obliged to abandon the St. Gothard, and to retire into the valley of Urseren. They did not allow him a long rest; for Colonel St. Julien having marched the day after from the Upper Rheinthal, and passed over Mount Ursule, descended quickly towards the Devil's bridge and Urseren, where he attacked the enemy so briskly, that they were forced to retire in disorder to Gerstina and Wasen, and still further behind the Reuss, of which they destroyed the bridge.—On this affair it is to be remarked, that if Colonel St. Julien had made his attack the night before, he would have entirely cut off the retreat of the French.—The burning of the bridge, alone, stopt the Austrians, who, in spite of the fatigues of a long march, had pursued the fugitives above fifteen miles, and made some hundreds of prisoners. The whole of this French corps would have been taken, had a column, which was sent to intercept them, been able to penetrate into the valley of the Reuss.

The loss of the St. Gothard was too important, and the progress made by the Imperialists in the cantons of Glarus, Schwitz and Uri, threatened too seriously
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the whole position of the French in Switzerland, for them not to attempt to regain a part of the territory they had lost. General Lecourbe having both brought and received reinforcements, and knowing that General Bellegarde had separated himself from the army of Switzerland, prepared to attack in his turn, and on the 30th he succeeded, in forcing the Austrians to yield a little ground in the vallies of Reuss and Schagen.—On the 2d of June he attacked them again, and a very obstinate battle ensued, which ended in his favour, and in which he killed, wounded, or took about 1000 men, but was himself wounded in the arm. This affair obliged the Austrians to fall back to Urseren.

The possession of the St. Gothard, was so important to the allied armies, that they neglected nothing which could contribute to its defence. General Jellachich, who commanded the left of the Archduke's army, in the cantons of Schwitz and Glarus, sent several columns into that of Uri, in different directions.—General Haddick, reinforced by troops, sent him by General Bellegarde, detached at the same time into the Valais, the corps of Prince Victor of Rohan, which advanced as far as Brieg.—These different

different movements, and principally the last, joined to the fatigues and losses experienced by the division of General Lecourbe, and also to the difficulty of procuring subsistence in a country laid waste, obliged him to give up every hope of recovering the St. Gothard.

He, in consequence, fell back with the whole of his force, and evacuated not only the canton of Glarus, but also almost entirely those of Uri and Schwitz.—His troops embarked part on the lake of the four cantons, and part on that of Zug, and took a position behind these lakes, to cover the lake and town of Lucerne. The Austrians occupied the valley of the Reuss to the lake of the four cantons, and Altorf, Fluelen, Brunnen, and Schwitz, from which they communicated with the rest of the army, across the Sihl and the lake of Zurich.

Thus was for the first time taken by force of arms, the upper *Plateau* * of the Alps so often disputed in the course of this campaign. † It is
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* *Plateau*, a word originally French, which means a ground at once high and flat.

† The St. Gothard, at the foot of which, is the passage of that name, in the canton of Uri, is one of
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unnecessary to point out its importance in a military point of view. Every one knows that the passage of the St. Gothard is the principal, and notwithstanding its elevation, the best road between Switzerland and Italy. By taking possession of it and of Urseren, the Austrians completed the communication between their two grand armies, and formed the central link of their vast military chain, extending from the banks of the Mein to those of the Bormida, across the mountains of Suabia, the Rhine, Switzerland, the Alps, Lombardy, and the Appenines. It was from this time, that their system of operations became more simple and better combined: it was at this time too, that they showed greater force, a more active spirit, and a more decided superiority, than at any other period in the whole campaign. They kept the French in check upon the Mein, the Necker, and the Kintzing; drove

the most elevated points in the Alps, being the centre of mountains, heaped as it were upon one another. Near the St. Gothard are the charming vallies of Urseren and L'Hopital; at the issue from which appear in a frightful country, the famous *Devils bridge*, so called from its construction, which is so extraordinary that it can hardly be thought the work of man.

drove them from the half of Switzerland, seized or shut up the passages from that country into Italy, occupied the town of Turin, besieged its citadel, and blockaded at the same time the fortresses of Alexandria, Tortona and Mantua. It was at this time and for three weeks afterwards, that the allies were at the highest point of force, of glory, and of hope, that they attained during the whole campaign. Their success had been more constant and more rapid than could have been expected, and it was generally believed, that their progress would be more and more accelerated. The public did not reflect upon a truth made still more obvious by many occurrences in the campaign of Italy, that a victory may give to an army in a few days the possession of a great tract of the country, beyond which local circumstances stop its triumphs, and bound its progress. But the judgment to be formed upon this campaign, of which we have as yet only related a small part, must not be here anticipated, and we must now return to the banks of the Glatt, where we left the Archduke Charles in the last days of the month of May.

CHAP. IX.

Strong Position taken by Massena in front of Zurich

—The Archduke resolves to drive him from it—

Bloody battle of the 4th of June—Massena leaves his position the day after, and goes to take up a better one between the Reuss and the Limmat—

On the 9th, the Austrians attempt to extend themselves between those two rivers—They succeed, but

partially—Situation of the Archduke, and causes

of his inaction—Massena attacks with success on

the 15th, but in the end is repulsed—That General

and the Archduke reinforce themselves, and mu-

tually threaten each other on the right bank of

the Rhine—Their motives for doing so—Engage-

ments of the 26th of June, the 4th and the 6th

of July in the valleys of Kintzing, Renchen,

Ettenbach and Acheren—Petty warfare carried

on upon the Rhine and the Nidda—Engagement

of the 29th of July, upon the latter of these rivers.

WHEN the Austrians successfully commenced their operations in the country of the Grisons, in

in the beginning of the month of May, Massena having reason to fear that they would very soon invade Switzerland on all sides, and foreseeing that in that case, it would be impossible for him to preserve the semi-circle formed by the Rhine, from the source of the Linth to the mouth of the Glatt, wished at least to defend its diameter, or rather the middle only of the diameter. He therefore caused that chain of mountains to be fortified, which lies in front of Zurich, between the Limmat and the Glatt, a position, which is properly speaking, the first that presents itself on the east of Switzerland. Thrown back behind the Glatt by the affair of Winterthur, he went to occupy that position, and completed its intrenchments.—His right, entirely composed of infantry, was posted upon the Zurichberg the most elevated part of all that chain of mountains. Access to it was rendered almost impossible by a thick wood, by several ranks of abattis and redoubts, and by a formidable artillery, which crowned the circumference of the heights. Between his right and the lake of Zurich, there was no point, through which it was possible to penetrate. The town of Zurich was also covered by the position.—The left was placed upon the same chain of mountains, and the approaches to it

had the same means of defence as those to the right. Between these two wings the ground sloping gradually, was open, and cut by the roads from Schaffhausen and Constance, to Zurich.—It need scarcely be mentioned, that here Massena placed his cavalry; but as it might be beaten, and as the two wings would then be separated and irrecoverably lost, he linked them together by a chain of thick redoubts, which defended the centre in front, while at the same time, it was protected by the fire of the two wings.—This strong and concentrated position, represented, if it may be so said, a curtain with its two bastions. Fearing that the Imperialists might endeavour to gain the left flank of his position, and that after having passed the Glatt, they would also pass the Limmat, and thus, fall upon his rear, Massena placed a small corps of flankers between Regensberg and the Glatt, intended to cover the lower part of the Limmat.

This position was so well chosen, that the Archduke could make no effectual progress, until he had dislodged the French from it, and this could only be done by attacking them in front, or by turning their flank upon the left bank of the Limmat, which would have been arduous, long, and

and even dangerous. The Prince adopted the first expedient therefore, and resolved to attack the Zurichberg, which when once forced, must cause the loss of the rest of the position. After having marched his right to Bulach, his centre to Kloten, his left to Basserstorf, and reconnoitred the French position, that he might judge of the degree of interest they would have in defending it, Prince Charles caused their right to be attacked on the 3d of June by his vanguard, which drove them from the villages of Vittikon, Zulicon, and Riespach. These villages were taken and retaken several times during the course of the day. This engagement which cost a considerable number of men on both parties, and in which the French General Cherin,*

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chief

* General Cherin was a genealogist before the revolution, and with his father at the head of a commission named by the King, to receive and examine the proofs of nobility. Though he had been particularly well treated by the court, he was eager to shew his ingratitude, and was a violent democrat till his death, which happened the day after the battle of Zurich. He was the intimate friend of Hoche, and *Citizen Rousselin*, who has written the life of that General in a manner worthy of his subject, has also become the biographer of Cherin.

chief of the staff was mortally wounded, was but the prelude to a general attack. On the morrow, (the 4th) the Austrians advanced in several columns against the Zurichberg, and attacked it upon several points at the same time; chiefly however upon those of Seebach and Schwammendingen. The approaches to the Zurichberg were so formidably entrenched, and the fire of the batteries so commanding, that Generals Hotze and Rosenberg, who conducted the two principal attacks, were unable for a long time to make any progress, although two columns acting upon their flank had already penetrated to the foot of the abattis. The Austrians were even repulsed a little on the side of Seebach. Prince Charles sent successively reinforcements thither drawn from his centre, and wishing to put an end to the doubtful and already very bloody combat, he ordered four battalions conducted by General Wallis to advance by Schwammendingen, and to assault the Zurichberg with fixed bayonets. The Austrian grenadiers marched forward under a dreadful fire, and attacked with so much valour, that they made their way through the abattis, and carried the first line of the entrenchments; but they could

could not advance a step farther, the redoubts and abattis still before them being rendered impenetrable by the number and fire of the battalions and batteries which lined them. Nevertheless, the Austrians did not give ground, but kept the French within their entrenchments, and gave time to the other attacking columns to reach the foot of the entrenchments. Night overtook them there, and put an end to a contest which had raged with deadly obstinacy during the whole day. Each party lost 2,500 men at least. On the side of the Imperialists, General Hotze, Wallis, and Hiller, and on that of the French Generals, Oudinot and Humbert* were wounded. On either side some hundreds of prisoners were made : The armies passed the night in presence of each other.

On the 5th, the Archduke took an exact view of the position of the enemy, and resolved to assault it ; but the fatigue of the preceding day rendering it necessary that the soldiers should take some rest, he put off the execution of his project till the 6th.—It did not however take place, for whether

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* This General Humbert is the same who landed and was made prisoner in the north of Ireland.

the boldness with which the Austrians passed the day of the 5th, at the foot of the Zurichberg, had shaken the courage of Massena, or that he did not think his position tenable, as he wrote to the Directory, he abandoned it with precipitation, in the night between the 5th and 6th, and retired to the other side of the Limmat. The Austrians took possession of the French entrenchments, in which more than 30 pieces of cannon had been left, and saw themselves masters of the town of Zurich, which was purchased with so much bloodshed, and which might have produced much more, had not Massena retreated.

The capture of Zurich, and of the formidable position that defended its approach, is one of the events most honourable to Prince Charles in this campaign.—The ability with which he combined the difficult attack of the Zurichberg, the vigour with which he directed the execution of it, and the unshaken firmness of his troops, when in presence of the enemy on the day of the 5th, shews the energy he would have given to the campaign in Switzerland, and the rapidity and decision with which he would most probably have completed the conquest of that country, had not his arm been tied by a timid and mistaken policy.

General

General Massena is very far from having acquired the same right to the praises of military men on this occasion.—Without examining how far he might reasonably flatter himself with being able to withstand the attack projected against him; he certainly was guilty, either of not having awaited a fresh one, in the position which had not been materially changed by the action of the 4th, or of having exposed his army to total destruction, by engaging in the first contest. That such would have been the case, had the Zurichberg been forced, is certain; as on the whole line there was not another point of retreat, except Zurich, or another bridge over the Limmat, except in that town.—Whether it was the rapidity of the river, or the fear of losing his pontoons in case of a defeat, or (what, one could scarcely suppose) a want of fore-thought, which prevented Massena from throwing one or two bridges over the river below Zurich, that circumstance, at the same time that it furnishes an excuse for abandoning the entrenched camp, is a motive for blaming the French General for having waited the first attack.

After having evacuated Zurich and the right bank of the Limmat, the Republican army took up a position upon the chain of mountains called *Albis*,
which

which lies between the lake, the Limmat, and the Reuss. Its left reached the Rhine near Zurzach, and extended to Baden and the Limmat. Its centre was upon the Albis, in front of Zurich, and its right stretched to the lake of Zug.—The head-quarters were at Bremgarten.—This central position was the nearest Massena could have possibly taken; it was safe and strong, and was the second of the three great defensive positions, which Switzerland presents, those of the Limmat, of the Reuss, and of the Aar.

After taking possession of Zurich, the Archduke distributed his troops along the right banks of the lake of that name, of the Limmat, and of the Aar.—Between Baden and Zurich he placed the greatest part of his force.—He pushed strong piquets in front of the latter of these towns, and established posts within sight of the enemy. This neighbourhood, and the desire of the Austrians to try the strength of the position of the Republicans, and to extend themselves upon the western shore of the lake, were productive of several skirmishes in the van-guards. There was also a brisk cannonade near Baden, on the 7th, and General Nauendorf, who commanded the right of the Imperial army, compelled the French to destroy the bridge belonging to that place. On the 8th.

8th, their advanced posts, only half a league from Zurich, were attacked by Prince Rosemberg, and driven from the village of Albisrieden, and from some heights, upon which the Austrians posted themselves. It was to extend his right upon the Limmat, and to remove a little the centre of the enemy, that the Archduke confined himself on these two points, on the first days after the capture of Zurich, where he placed his head-quarters, which he soon after removed to Kloten. His army, which from the 21st, and part of it from the 14th of the preceding month had been continually under march and fighting, required some repose.

Besides, the new position taken by Massena was too strong to admit of a chance of success in attempting to force it, until necessary measures had been previously taken. It could hardly be carried in front; even in order to turn it, great obstacles were previously to be surmounted. It was necessary either that the right of the Archduke should pass the Rhine, between Basle and Huningen, and entirely out-flank Switzerland, or that his left should take possession of the cantons of Underwald and Zug, and penetrate into the Oberland, and the Valais.— In a word, Prince Charles had to conquer almost
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the whole of Switzerland before Massena could be compelled to abandon his position, and retire upon the Aar.—The Archduke was not sufficiently in force to attempt either of the two enterprises. Upon the right bank of the Rhine, he had only a sufficient number of troops to keep in check the French at little Basle, to guard from that place the whole valley of the Rhine to the Neckar, and to keep up a flying corps between that river and the Mein, in order to cover the right of his long line. An attack by the lesser cantons would have been at once more easy, and more immediately useful to the whole operations of the Allies, and there is reason to think that Prince Charles would have attempted it, if General Bellegarde's army had remained under his orders. But whether, as it has been said, Marshal Swarow had demanded this great reinforcement, to be enabled to besiege the fortified places of Piedmont, or, (as is very probable) the court of Vienna was more inclined to make great efforts in Italy, than in Switzerland, General Bellegarde conducted 10,000 men into Italy, who performed signal services in that country, it is true, but at the same time paralyzed the Archduke by their departure; or, at least, afforded a specious pretence to the cabinet of Vienna,

for

for the inaction to which it condemned the army in Switzerland.

Matters were not the same, however, upon all the points of the line occupied opposite to each other, by the armies of the Archduke and of Massena.—The latter having reason to fear, after the taking of Zurich, that the Austrians would push the conquest of Switzerland with vigour, and attack him upon his two flanks, turned his endeavours towards securing them, and as he had already reinforced General Lecourbe upon his right, and retained 10,000 men in the Valais, who had been destined to go into Italy, he applied himself also to fortifying the left of his line, from Basle to the Mein.—His object was not only to secure himself against all attacks upon that side, but to shew such a force on it, as should oblige the Archduke to fix a great part of his troops there, and thus prevent him from augmenting the number of his soldiers in Switzerland.—Besides, the Directory had already perceived that the best means of preserving the latter country, was to make a great diversion upon one of the flanks. The affairs of the Republicans in Italy, became every day so bad, as to put it out of their power effectually to defend Switzerland, on that side,

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It was towards Germany, therefore, that it was advisable to attract the attention and force of the allied army, which had just established itself in Switzerland, and was in expectation of large reinforcements, as well Russians as Germans. The Directory, in which the Jacobins had gained a majority by the revolution of the 18th of June, caused a decree to be passed, in the course of this month, for the creation of a new army of the Rhine. It was to be formed, by the levy which had just been resolved upon of all the classes of the conscription, by which they were in hope to bring the force of the Republic to 570,000 men.

On his side the Archduke was determined not to attempt any thing important in Switzerland for the following reasons:—the strength of the position occupied by the French; the little assistance which he received, and could expect, from the inhabitants of that country; the weak state in which his army had been left by the departure of General Bellegarde for Italy, whither it was already resolved that General Haddick should follow him; the expected arrival of 35,000 Russian auxiliaries, who were in march to join him; above all, the secret orders of the Cabinet of Vienna. He had then no longer any
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object but to prevent Massena from profiting by his inaction. He could not effect this better than by giving the French General employment in the Brisgau, in the Margraviate of Baden, and in the Palatinate, where nothing worthy of notice had passed during the month of May, except the capture of Heidelberg by the Austrians on the 19th.

These respective considerations occasioned several actions in the countries just mentioned. The positions occupied by the two parties were nearly the same as after the retreat of Jourdan's army beyond the Rhine. General Sztaray commanded on the side of the Austrians, his van-guard being under the orders of General Meerfeldt.—The latter, on the morning of the 26th, sent three columns to reconnoitre into the valleys of the Renchen, the Kintzing, and the Ettenbach, towards Oberkirch, Offenburg, and Ettenheim. They surprised and overthrew the small out-posts of the French, who, nevertheless, having been reinforced by the piquets of reserve, sharply disputed the ground for several hours. In the valley of Kintzing the fight was hottest. The French were worsted in the end, driven from Offenburg, and compelled to fall back upon Wilstett and Kehl. Their loss amounted to about 500 men,

men, of whom one half were made prisoners. In estimating it at 200 men Massena was not more correct than in stating that of the Austrians to be 1000, while it did not exceed 150. They were indebted for this advantage to the superiority of their cavalry: That of the French suffered most in these actions; the result of which was, that the Austrians gained ground in all the three valleys, and General Meerfeldt advanced his head-quarters from Hasslach to Gengembach. At the same time the advanced posts of the French, between Old Brisach and Freyburg, were also repulsed as far as to the former of these places.

Having received some reinforcements, and being unwilling to let himself be shut up in Kehl, General Legrand, who commanded the French division before that place, on the 4th, attacked, with vigour, all the posts of the enemy in the valleys of the Renchen, and of the Acheren; succeeded in piercing the centre of the line, and threw it back to the neighbourhood of Oberkirch. General Gœrger*, who commanded

* This General was Colonel of the regiment of Berry-hussars, in the service of the King of France; a
regiment

manded in that quarter, came with some squadrons of light-horse to the assistance of the out-posts, and having drawn the French upon ground where his cavalry could act, he charged with advantage, cut to pieces some companies of French grenadiers, and retook Renchen, which, however, the fear of being attacked by a superior force, induced him to evacuate during the night.

In this engagement, which lasted the whole day, the Peasants of Ober Capel fought by the side of the Imperialists. The French lost 400 men, the Austrians more than half of that number, and both remained in the same positions which they had occupied before. The Republicans, however, lost some little ground upon their left on this day; for, having attacked the posts of the enemy in front of Lichtenau, upon the road from Kehl to Rastadt, they were vigorously repulsed, and driven back beyond Bischoffsheim, by the 13th regiment of hussars.

VOL. III.

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regiment which emigrated almost entirely at the beginning of the war, and was taken into the service of the Emperor, as well as the regiment of Hussars of Saxe. They were afterwards united and formed into one regiment, under the name of the 13th Hussars, and have served actively and faithfully during the whole course of this war.

On the 6th General Legrand advanced from Willdstet with all his troops, amounting to about 6,000 men, and marched upon Offenburg. This place being but a bad post, was occupied by only half a squadron of light cavalry, which did not resist, but fell back upon the advanced posts between that town and Ortenburg. They were followed by the French to the neighbourhood of the latter place, and there meeting with General Meerfeldt, and the main body of the troops under his command, they fought till night came on with equality, and some hundreds of men were killed and taken on either side. The French retained the ground they had acquired, but were unable to penetrate to Ortenburg, which they were desirous of seizing. General Meerfeldt having made serious dispositions for an attack the day after, the French evacuated Offenburg in the night, after having laid it under contribution. The Austrians retook possession of it on the 8th.—Thus it was that the fine valley of the Rhine and the Ortenau were uselessly sprinkled with blood.

In the mean time the hussars of Szeckler, rendered famous by the part falsely attributed to them in the murder of the French ministers at Rastadt, carried on, assisted by the armed peasants of the Odenwald,

a petty warfare against the light troops of the enemy, in front of Mentz; made incursions beyond the Mein and the Nidda; even pushed parties to the Lahn, and carried off forage and provisions. Several engagements, in consequence of these excursions, took place during the month of July, of which the most serious happened on the 29th. On that day 500 or 600 hussars of Szeckler attacked the posts of the French upon the Lower Nidda, drove them from Hoechst, and killed or took 200 or 300 of them. These light Imperial troops did not however establish themselves in the places from which they had driven the French, but returned upon the Mein. Their principal rendezvous was at Offembach.

On the same day (the 29th) the French pushed a strong advanced guard along the right bank of the Rhine towards the forest towns. It attacked the Austrian out-posts, but without success, and afterwards retreated to Basle. Some skirmishing also took place that same day in the environs of Old Brisach. It was occasioned by a foraging incursion attempted by the French, which did not however succeed.

In any other war, and even in any other campaign of this war, the engagements and movements just described would have fixed the attention of the public and of the historian. But the interest which they might have inspired, is in a manner absorbed by that which Italy and Switzerland, the two great theatres of the war, have constantly commanded; it is lost in the unexampled multiplicity of the operations, movements, and actions of this astonishing campaign.—The war carried on upon the right bank of the Rhine, from the month of May, to the month of September, may indeed be looked upon as merely *episodical*.

CHAP. X.

Massena causes an attack to be made on the 3d of July, on the left wing of the Archduke in the cantons of Schweitz and Zug—He gains some posts, but loses them again the same or following day—Positions of the opposite armies in Switzerland—Reconnoitering made on the 16th by the Austrians in the Valais, which produces a trifling skirmish—Plans and military preparations made by the French—They form two new armies, one called that of the Rhine, and the other that of the Alps—Political measures of the Allies—Imperial decree presented to the Diet of Ratisbon—The elector of Bavaria, and the Duke of Wurtemberg enter into the coalition—The Emperor of Russia sends a fresh army into Germany—Projects of the Allies.

IT has been seen that nothing important passed in Switzerland during the month of June, since the attack made by Massena, opposite Zurich on

the 15th of that month. This General, who had at first expected that the Austrians would make a vigorous attack upon Switzerland, seeing that they remained on the contrary stationary in the points which they had gained, and knowing that the number of troops with which they had entered into the little cantons, had been considerably diminished by the departure of General Bellegarde, and by the sending a part of General Haddick's corps into the Valais, wished to ascertain what might be the strength of the Archdukes left wing, a point of which it was most important to him to be informed, in order that he might regulate his defensive operations.

In consequences of this, on the 3d of July at break of day, the right wing of the French army attacked in two columns the line occupied by General Jellachich from the Sihl to Schweitz and Brunnen. The first column which came out from the environs of Zug, and moved along by the lake of Egery, got possession of some posts on that side of the lake, but was quickly repulsed from the other side. The second headed by General Lecourbe, and which had advanced, part between the lakes of Zug and Lucerne, and part in armed boats over the last mentioned lake, surprised some
advanced

advanced posts of the Austrians, and having acted with celerity, took possession of the post of Brunnen and of a battery of 6 pieces of cannon, which the Austrians had erected there to command the navigation of the lake of Lucerne;* but their progress was suddenly checked by the reserve of General Jellachich, that drove them back before the close of the day, from all the posts which they had forced between the lakes of Zug of Lucerne, and of Egery, except that of Brunnen, where General Lecourbe kept his ground. He was nevertheless compelled to abandon it the next morning, the remainder of his division not having been able to maintain its ground before the lakes. The engagement of the 3d did not cost much to either of the contending parties. The volunteer troops furnished as a contingent by the canton of Schwitz distinguished themselves by their bravery.

The issue of this affair having satisfied Massena, that the Archduke had already repaired the loss, which he had suffered the month before in his left wing, and that it was sufficiently

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strong

* It is well known that Brunnen was the place, where the cantons of Schwitz, Uri, and Unterwald, concluded in the Year 1315, a lasting alliance which was the foundation of the Helvetic Union.

strong to maintain its ground, he renounced for the time, all idea of undertaking any thing against it. The same event having also given the Archduke confidence in the stability of his left wing, he made no change in its position, and both sides remained quiet upon their line till towards the middle of the month.

That of the Austrians setting out from St. Gothard, proceeded along the valley of the Reuss, and the lake of Lucerne, crossed the canton of Schweiz, and joined, near Rapperschwill, the body of the army which occupied the left bank of the Limmat and the Aar, as far as the Rhine. The head quarters were still at Kloten.—The line of the French army beginning at Brieg in the Valais, crossed the mountains of the Oberland and the Underwald, passed by Stanz, Lucerne, Bremgarten, Mellingen, and Baden; and extended from thence as far as the mouth of the Aar. The head quarters were fixed at Lenzburg, to which place they had been removed, from Bremgarten the preceding month.

There was not at the beginning of July, any great disparity between the effecting forces of the two contending Generals. Massena had, it is true, a greater number of troops in Switzerland than the

Archduke ;

Archduke; but then he could not make use of them all in the field, as he could not dispense with leaving strong garrisons in the principal towns for insuring the obedience of the country, and as he was obliged to reinforce the division which he had sent into the Valais. A great part of this country was still in a state of insurrection, in spite of the presence of the French, and the severities which they had exercised. Massena being displeased with General Xaintrailles, who commanded in this quarter, replaced him at first by General Lorge, and afterwards by General Turrean. The insurrection in the Valais, which had employed for near two months many thousands of Republicans, who were before intended to reinforce the army of Italy, would still have been much greater utility to the Allies, if their plan had been to make the conquest of Italy go hand in hand with that of Switzerland. Although determined to effect that of the former before they should in good earnest attempt that of the latter; they found nevertheless, the necessity of making some *demonstrations* * in the Valais, which might

* This French military expression, of which the word *feint* is but an imperfect translation, means a threat of an attack, either by a movement made, or a position taken.

might keep up the insurrection, and detain in that country the body of French who occupied it. General Haddick, who since the taking of St. Gothard, had successively received orders, sometimes to enter into the Valais, sometimes to remain in Switzerland, sometimes to repair into Italy, which he finally did, on the 16th of July, caused a small advanced guard to enter into the valley of the Rhone, where it was joined by some companies of Insurgents. This troop having advanced towards Brieg, in order to reconnoitre, fell in with the French, and kept up with them a fire of musquetry, which continued a part of the evening. The next morning the Austrians made an attack upon the French, who proved to be in greater force than was expected, and who compelled the Austrians to recede, after a skirmish, in which General Turreau pretended to have killed 200 men, and to have taken 150. He did not take a proper method to have credit given to this assertion, by adding, that he himself had lost only 6 men: A circumstance so unlikely of itself, is made still more so, by the Austrians taking from him 2 pieces of cannon.

The left of the Archduke's army, had been more than once reinforced during the course of July, and

and General Hotze had taken the command of it towards the middle of the month. This General wishing in his turn, to try the right wing of the French, and to ascertain the degree of resistance it might oppose, in case of an attempt to turn it, pushed forward a strong advanced guard on the 29th, beyond the Reuss in the Isserthal, a valley situated on the left side of the lake of the four Cantons. This body of men drove in the advanced posts of the enemy, and penetrated as far as Bauen, but it was stopped there by a half brigade of the enemy, who successfully renewed the battle, and forced the Austrians to fall back to the spot from whence they came. Some prisoners were made on both sides; the Austrian General De Bey, was of the number. After this each party resumed its position, nor did General Hotze farther pursue this expedition, the only object of which was to reconnoitre the force, and the posts of the enemy on the lake of Lucerne.

Although the month of July, and the half of August, were not marked by any great enterprize, it was on the other hand, during this lapse of time, that most projects and preparations were made, and that most political and military measures were taken for future operations. The French pressed the levy of their

conscripts

conscripits, composed battalions of them, and formed two new armies. One of them, the creation of which has been already mentioned, was destined to act upon the Rhine, and invade Franconia and Suabia. The other, under the name of the army of the Alps, was to cover France on the side of Dauphiné and Provence, even to act offensively in Piedmont, and also to co-operate with the army which occupied the Genoese. They likewise marked out a camp near Geneva, to defend the entrance of France by the way of the Valais and Savoy. They were at once taken up at Paris in concerting defensive measures, as well as offensive projects; and the active and sanguine Bernadotte, then minister at war, did not despair of seeing before the end of the campaign, victory brought back under the colours of the four Republican armies of Italy, of the Alps, the Danube, and the Rhine.

On the opposite side there were still more projects and hopes. They had experienced unlooked for success, and with forces which they had at first calculated for the defensive, they had already made during four months, the most brilliant of all campaigns. These forces, which till then had been sufficient to conquer, but part of whom had fallen a sacrifice to victory, were now

no longer adequate to effect that which remained to be done, whether to keep what had already been acquired, or to pursue the career of conquests which had been begun. The court of Vienna inclined to the first of these alternatives, but those of London and Petersburg, more courageous, more enlightened, and more taken up with the general interests of Europe, wished to seize this great opportunity of rescuing it from the arms and principles of the French Revolution, and push the fortune of this campaign as far as it would go. To accomplish this, money and troops were necessary; London offered the one, and Petersburg the other: but when so generous a line of conduct was pursued by two powers, to whom the seat of the war offered nothing either to conquer or to save, it was natural and necessary, that the powers which were in a situation to do either the one or the other, should also make efforts and sacrifices, for a cause which was more immediately their own. The German empire was the most interested in the war, the issue of which might double or repair the losses which it had suffered in the preceding war. The dissolution of the Congress of Radstadt having left the Empire and France, in a situation

situation, with respect to each other, which was neither peace nor war. The allies wished to give a decisive character, and to add the weight of the empire to their scale.

The Emperor accordingly, on the 12th of July, addressed an Imperial Aulic Decree to the Diet of Ratisbon, which on account of its length must be here omitted. It recapitulated all the political injuries received by the Emperor from the French; expressed more hatred of the revolution, and a more intimate acquaintance with its effects, than the cabinet of Vienna had till then officially evinced, proved that the French were actually in a state of war against the Empire, and concluded with requesting the different States and Princes to pay the Roman months, and furnish the quintuple contingents, agreeably to the last *conclusums* of the Diet, in conformity to which, the King of Sweden had lately declared himself ready to act*. The characteristic slowness of all the

* Two months before, that Monarch, in his quality of Duke of Pomerania, made a declaration to the Diet of Ratisbon, in which he considered the Empire as actually in a state of war with France, exhorted its members to furnish their contingents, and announced himself ready
to

resolutions of the Diet of Ratisbon † not permitting the expectation of the effective formation of an army of the Empire, before a long time, the Allies sought for auxiliaries among the Princes who had troops to dispose of.

The King of Prussia persisting in remaining neutral, and having won over to his own side all the northern Princes of Germany, except the King of Sweden, who, however, contented himself with making the declaration already mentioned, the allied courts addressed themselves, and with more success, to the Elector of Bavaria and the Duke of Würtemberg. The former, who before his succeeding to the

to set the example. This declaration contained these remarkable words. "*We Sovereigns, who exact from our people fidelity and obedience, should deem it our duty to shew them the example, by fulfilling our obligations.*"

† This was experienced upon this occasion, for the Imperial Decree, presented on the 12th of July, was not taken into consideration till the 22d of August, and was not adopted as a *conclusum* till the 16th of October. Thus it is seen, that the Empire took no part in that campaign, and should the French have reached the very walls of Vienna, it is more than probable that things would not have been carried on with more dispatch.

the Electoral dignity, had constantly shewn himself the partisan of France, and dependent on Prussia, changed all on a sudden his apparent system, and engaged not only to march his contingent of troops, but even to furnish besides, some thousands of men, whom England proposed to take into her pay. It may be believed, that the menaces of the court of Petersburg, to which the Elector of Bavaria had lately been obliged to yield in a dispute, relating to the order of Malta, and the fear that the House of Austria should profit of the opportunity to realize her old ambitious views on Bavaria, influenced the conduct of this Elector, as much as his own inclination. This was not the case with the Duke of Würtemberg, who more voluntarily broke his last treaty with France, and engaged to furnish 6000 men, including his contingent, which amounted to the half, on condition of being subsidised by England. No great expectations could be formed from these feeble succours, which, at most, could only be of use towards the end of the campaign; and the void which it had already produced in the allied armies, would have rendered them incapable of profiting by their victories, if the Emperor Paul had not thought of repairing

repairing it before it happened. By a treaty of subsidies concluded between this Monarch and the King of England, a treaty advantageous to both parties, but still more so to the Emperor of Germany, who had all the benefit of it without incurring any expence, the former had engaged to send to the banks of the Rhine, a new army of 45,000 men. More than 10,000 had already been sent to reinforce in Italy the 23,000 who had been there ever since the spring, with Marshal Suworow. The remaining 35,000 had been on their march many months, and were expected to join towards the middle of August, the Archduke in Switzerland. It was then during the month of September that it was intended to give to the operations of this campaign, that extensive scope which the two courts of London and Petersburg desired to give them, and to proceed to that great and liberal end which they had in view. It was expected that by that time the Allies would have reduced the fortresses, which were necessary to consolidate the conquest of the North of Italy, and that the Austrian troops who were stationed there, would then be sufficient to ensure the possession of them. Marshal Suworow, with his Russians, covered on both their flanks by Austrian corps, would then turn

Switzerland on the south side, where the French would be at the same time attacked in front by the new Austro-Russian army, and while the Archduke, at the head of part of his own troops, of those of the Empire, and of the armed Peasants, would attack with them the left flank of Massena, or attempt some important enterprize, according to circumstances, either upon the Upper or Lower Rhine. It was in this manner that they hoped, without encountering any great difficulties, to get possession of Switzerland, that vast and formidable advanced post of France; and they trusted that before the end of the year, the latter country would see 100,000 Russians, or Austrians, descend upon its frontiers, from the heights of the Alps. A great diversion was to be made at the same time in Holland, by 30,000 English, and 18,000 Russian troops. The insurrection which had been recommencing in the Low Countries, and which this latter enterprize could not but strengthen, promised also to increase the embarrassment of the French Republic, which was expected would be fully compleated by a fresh insurrection of the Royalists of Brittany, of Normandy, and even of the south of France.

Such

Such were, towards the middle of the year 1799, the projects, the measures, and the expectations of the French, and of their enemies : we see, that among the latter, the courts of London and Petersburg, spared neither efforts, trouble, nor sacrifices, in order to render this campaign decisive, and to compensate by the advantages which would result from it, for the torrents of blood which it cost Europe.

CHAP. XI.

Surprising inaction of the opposed armies in Switzerland—Plan of a general attack formed at Paris—Particular plan of Massena—The Austrians are attacked on the 14th of August along their whole line—They maintain themselves before the Limmat, but their left is broken on all points—Operations of General Lecourbe, and his attacks on the 14th, 15th, and 16th—The Austrians entirely driven from the Cantons of Schweiz and Uri—The praise due to General Lecourbe—Observations on the estimated loss of the Austrians—The first column of the Russian auxiliary army arrives at Schaffhausen on the same day that the French make their first attack—Measures taken by the Archduke to stop the progress of the Republicans—Causes which assisted him in this design—The invasion of Suabia determined on by the French—Their motives for it.

IN the beginning of August the Archduke and Massena found themselves in the same positions
which

which they respectively occupied in the month of June; and this was matter of great astonishment to all Europe. If the inactivity of the Archduke could be accounted for by his expectation of the Russian army, it was not equally easy to conceive why Massena, who had received during the month of July great reinforcements, and who, at the beginning of the following month had at least 20,000 men more than that Prince, did not make haste to attack him before that General Korsakow, who commanded the Russian army, had arrived sufficiently near to support the Austrians, or to enable them to repair any reverses. Not knowing to what this conduct of Massena was to be attributed, motives were ascribed to him, to which the dissatisfaction of the Directory with him, and the resolution which it had adopted, in the middle of July, of depriving him of his command, gave some colour. However this might be, he either acted only according to instructions received from Paris, or, which is more probable, he found means to procure an approbation there of his conduct; for he retained his command, and was trusted with the partial execution of a new plan formed by the Directory.

In the midst of all the embarrassments of the French government, political, military, and financial,

notwithstanding the successive disasters which its armies had experienced, and at a moment when it did not seem even capable of defending itself, it had the bold idea of resuming the offensive, and combined a plan of general attack along the whole line of the theatre of war, across the Alps, through Switzerland, Piedmont, and the States of Genoa, from the Mein to the Mediterranean. Though it did not possess sufficient means to ensure the success of this great design, circumstances were in some respects favourable to it. The epocha of the campaign was that in which the French would have the greatest degree of relative force; their armies, and particularly that of Switzerland, having been reinforced by a large number of Conscripts, while the Russian army was still at some distance from its destination; and while in Italy, the Allies were obliged to divide their force, to begin and to cover the siege of Tortona, and to guard all the outlets of the Alps. They flattered themselves also, at Paris, that Mantua would employ, much longer than in fact it did, a part of the combined armies.

Conformably to the projects of the Directory, General Joubert, who had just taken the command of 30 or 40,000 men in the State of Genoa, which they

they had contrived to assemble there, was to endeavour to raise the siege of Tortona, and to drive the Allies beyond the Po. About 15,000 men, which General Championnet had collected on the frontiers of Dauphiné and Piedmont, were to annoy the Allies, by penetrating through the vallies which connect these two countries, to support Joubert's left on the Maritime Alps, and to form a central army between the armies of Italy and Switzerland. The latter, which was at once the most numerous, and the most advantageously posted, was destined to drive the Archduke from the whole of Switzerland, if possible ; at any rate to confine him very much ; and above all, to force the positions which he had taken on the right flank of the French army, so as to interrupt, or at least to encrease the distance of his communications with Marshal Suworow.

These views guided Massena in forming his plan of attack : he resolved to make it along the whole line, but more weakly on his left, than on his centre and his right. The latter being to strike the principal blow, he reinforced it with several thousand men. It was commanded by General Lecourbe, and occupied the space situated between the mouths of the

Rhone and the Aar, the Canton of Underwald, and the western bank of the lake of Lucerne,

On the 14th of August, the whole French army put itself in motion, and marched on all sides against the enemy.—Massena, who, on the preceding days had made some movements on his left, directed himself against the position of the Austrians in front of Zurich, on the points of Wallishofen, Altstetten, and Wiedikon, and caused a strong detachment to pass to the other side of the Limmat. Excepting the latter circumstance, this attack almost perfectly resembled that made on the 1st of June, and had the same issue. The advanced posts, as usually happens in similar cases, fell back before the superior force of the assailants; but the corps of reserve encamped near the town, having flown to their arms and marched to their support, the French after a warm action, in which the Swiss on both sides shewed great animosity, were driven back to their former position. It has been already said, that it was not Massena's plan to make a serious attack on this point; he only wished to draw the attention of the Austrians thither, to prevent them from sending reinforcements to their left wing. It was

was there that the main blow was to be struck, and that was the chief object of concern.

While General Chabran, who commanded the division of the right of the corps which was immediately under Massena's orders, extended himself in front of the mountains of the Albis, and got possession without much difficulty of almost all the country, situated between these mountains and the western bank of the lake of Zurich, General Lecourbe, who had nearly 20,000 men under his command, divided into six columns, attacked all the positions of the Austrians from Mount St. Gothard, to the northern extremity of the Canton of Schweitz. The operations entrusted to this General, embracing a great extent of country were to be carried on, some upon mountains almost inaccessible, others in deep vallies; the different columns could therefore neither act in concert, nor communicate with each other; (inconveniencies inevitably attached to a war in a mountainous country, which render it so difficult and dangerous,) nor could they effect a junction till after each of them had penetrated by the point of attack assigned to it, and that the object of the expedition was accomplished in all its parts. This was no less, than

to drive the Austrians from the summits of the most elevated country in Europe, from the mountains of St. Gothard, the Furca, the Grimsel, and the Oberalb,* tops of the great Alps, reservoirs of their waters, and, if the expression may be used, trunks from which their different branches spring; in a word, to retake the Cantons of Uri and Schwetz, and even afterwards that of Glarus and the Grey League.

It would be difficult without rendering this narrative too long, and without incurring the risk of making it confused, to enter into all the details of the formation, of the march, and of the operations of the six columns, which composed the corps of General Lecourbe. It will be sufficiently explicit to say, that they went to meet the Austrians in the vallies of Mitten, of Schagen, of the Reufs, of Jelbayen, of the Aar, and of the Rhone; vallies which separate or cut, some parallelly, others perpendicularly, the immense mass of mountains which form the two southern chains of the Helvetic Alps, and which it may be said, are the only inhabitable parts of them.

Of

* The St. Gothard is 12,000 feet high, the Furca 13,000, and the Schreckhorn 15,000,

Of the six columns, that which was quite on the left, and under the command of General Boivin, advanced on the morning of the 14th, by Steinen and Seeven, against the different posts which the Austrians occupied in the Canton of Schweitz, and in front of its capital. Major Etwoes, who commanded their advanced guard, defended himself well, and was valiantly seconded by the inhabitants of this Canton, who, on this, as on many other occasions, shewed themselves worthy descendants of the ancient Cimbri; but having to contend with a superior force, and seeing himself turned by a hostile battalion, which had crossed Mount Muten, he was forced to retire into the Muttenthal, whither he was followed by General Boivin.*

The

* When the Austrians got possession of the cantons of Uri, Glarus, and Schweitz; the inhabitants of these cantons, armed their constitutional contingent, the expence of which was defrayed partly by the voluntary subscription of the inhabitants, and partly by England. These contingents have throughout the whole campaign uniformly made a common cause with the Austrians; and it may be said with truth, that every one capable of bearing arms in the smaller cantons, who remained after the terrible executions of the French in the month of May, acted as a soldier during the whole campaign, and

The destination of the second column, was to dislodge the Imperialists from this latter valley, and to deprive them of this means of retreat. The better to succeed in this, one part advanced by Gerisau, along the lake of the four Cantons, and on the right bank of the Muten, while another, which crossed the lake in boats, disembarked near Brunnen in spite of the fire of the enemies artillery, carried this post, and marched towards the left bank of the river. The first division met with a strong resistance, and could not force the bridge of Muten. But the Austrians being attacked by the second, and placed between two fires, were obliged to abandon their position, and retreated, after a fresh action which they sustained on the 15th, towards the Canton of Glarus by the Clontaleralthal.

The

and fought on all occasions with that enthusiasm and fury, which the love of liberty, a desire of vengeance, and despair could inspire.

It is to be regretted, that the great bulk of this work prevents a recital of all the miseries, to which the unfortunate inhabitants of Eastern Switzerland were exposed during this campaign, of the courageous love of their country, which they displayed, and of the advantages which might have been, but which either from ignorance or want of inclination, were not derived from it.

The column which was to make the third attack was also composed of two divisions, commanded by the chief of the staff, Porson. That of the left passed by Bauen, kept along the lake of the four Cantons, and drove the small Austrian posts as far as Seedorff. That on the right sat out from the Engelberg, marched upon Attighausen and Ertfeld, and joined the first on the left bank of the Reuss, in the valley of Altorf. At their approach the Imperialists retired behind the river, and broke down all the bridges. This latter circumstance would have stopped the French, and have disconcerted their plan of attack, if General Lecourbe had not foreseen it, and provided a remedy. That General had embarked in armed boats, a column of reserve, almost entirely composed of grenadiers, of which he took the command himself. It has been seen that he had disembarked a part of them to turn the Imperialists in the valley of Mitten. He did the same to dislodge them from that of Schagen. Towards the end of the day, (the 14th), while a violent fire of artillery and musquetry was kept up on both sides of the Reuss, he landed a strong detachment near
Fluelen,

Fluelen, * which turned Altorf, and advanced into the Shagenthal. † The Austrians, having at the same time to support the fire of this latter corps, of that which was on the other side of the Reuss, and of the armed boats, could not face it, and abandoned Altorf, and the lower part of the valley of the Reuss, and of Schagen.

General Loison, who had set out with the fifth column, from the canton of Underwald, traversed the mountains which separate it from that of Uri, and from the Oberland, and arrived on the 14th at night, at the entrance of the valley of Jelbayen, which leads to that of the Reuss. The Austrians had closed up this pass by entrenchments, advantageously situated, but defended by only two companies of infantry. This obstacle stopped General Loison, and prevented him from pushing on farther that day. The day following, (the 15th), he stormed these works, the possession of which he obtained by his great

* The chapel of William Tell, is not more than half a league from this place.

† Those of the readers who may not perhaps know that the German word *Thal*, means valley, will have probably supposed it, by seeing that the *valley of Muttten*, or of *Schagen*; the *Muttenthal*, or the *Schagenthal* are used indifferently.

great superiority, but for which however he paid dearly. It cannot but be a matter of astonishment, that General Lecourbe, who had usually shown himself in his reports, rather more reasonable than the other Republican Generals, should have flattered himself with obtaining belief, when he wrote that these works, acquired in so short a time, formed a *hexagon fortress, completely fortified and repaired.*

General Gudin, who commanded the right of Lecourbe's corps, traversed the Oberland with the sixth column, marching up the valley of the Aar, and directing himself towards Mount Grimsel and the Furca, which he had orders to carry. The importance of these posts which cover the road, by which there is a communication from the source of the Rhone, to that of the Reuss, * had determined the Imperialists to guard them with a greater force than they kept on the other before-mentioned points of attack, and they had near 1500 men there; but General Gudin, having three or four times that number, triumphed over the obstinate and bloody resistance that he experienced,

* An idea may be formed of the elevation of the mass of mountains called the Furca, when it is known, that from its base to its apex, is an ascent of 30 miles.

perienced, and dislodged the Austrians from the Grimsel and the Furca. They made another stand beyond the Oberwald, but were again obliged to retreat, which they did towards the canton of Uri. General Gudin pursued them the day following, (the 15th), and directed his course by the Furca, to St. Gothard. While he thus chased the Imperialists from the upper extremity of the valley, General Thurreau also forced General Haddick's advanced guard, which was then in the Duchy of Aost, to quit the Simplon, and the other posts which they occupied in the southern part of the Valais.

The day after the capture of Altorf, at which, as has been shewn he was present, Lecourbe had proceeded with his reserve, and marched up the valley of the Reuss, in order to form a junction with Generals Loison and Gudin, and to assist them in accomplishing the operations with which they were charged, in case they should have been unable to surmount all the obstacles which opposed them.—In his way he dislodged the Austrians from the post of Steig and from Maderanerthal, and joined General Loison at Wasen. Their united columns marched towards the Devil's Bridge, the last post which remained to the Imperialists in the valley of Urseren. The troops

which occupied it, were thus on the point of being attacked, front by Lecourbe, and in the rear by Gudin. The first met the advanced posts of the enemy in the afternoon, and drove them as far as the Devil's Bridge. The Austrians had added to the natural strength of this post by entrenchments, and by a cross ditch.* Lecourbe, accustomed for the last two days to surmount every obstacle, marched in close column to the attack of the Devil's Bridge and of Rocheperce. But he had reason to repent his confidence, when he saw before him a large and deep trench, and was assailed by a close, commanding, and well sustained fire. It was necessary to fall back; in vain did he attempt to force the position of the enemy by the Rocheperce; he was every where repulsed by the musquetry, and was obliged to renounce the attack on this extraordinary post, and to wait the success of the operations of General Gudin.—The latter had continued on the same day, his march towards the valley of Urseren,

VOL. III.

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* This bridge, of which mention has already been made, is 50 feet long, and 70 feet high above the bed of the Reuss. After having passed this bridge, you come to a path cut through the rock, about 300 feet long, and by which six men may pass in front. There is only a small aperture in the middle, which admits light.

by the Furca, and the St. Gothard, driving the Austrians before him, who retired, part into the valley of the Ticino, and part into that of the Rhine. At his approach the small Imperial corps which occupied the Devil's Bridge, finding itself exposed to be hemmed in, in a few hours after, between Generals Lecourbe and Loison, evacuated its post in the night, and retreated towards Dissentis, by the sources of the Rhine. The next day, (the 16th), the two French Generals formed a junction; and Lecourbe thus found himself in two days, master of the canton of Schweitz, of almost the whole of that of Uri, and of the most elevated points of the great chain of the Alps, which bounds Switzerland to the southward.

On impartially considering these events, it is impossible not to acknowledge the ability, the concert, and the activity which marked the arrangement and the execution of General Lecourbe's plan of attack. He left scarcely any thing to fortune in local circumstances, and in a species of operation where it is so difficult to command it. The direction of his six columns, as may have been observed, placed every position of the enemy between two fires. What crowned the success of this manœuvre, and removed the danger of
it

it was, that in setting out from the left, each column which had been successful, moved up successively on the right, and favoured the attack of the hindmost columns, which had the longest and most difficult part to act. Their means of victory thus increased, in proportion as the obstacles diminished. It is however just to say, that Lecourbe was full one third superior in number to the Austrians, and had also the great advantage of a premeditated offensive, calculated at leisure upon assumed data.

Generals Jellachich and Simbschen, who commanded in the cantons of Schweitz and of Uri, had retreated, the former as far as the extremity of the canton of Glarus, and behind the Linth, the latter into the Grey League, on the mountains of Crispalt, which cover the passes of the Grison country. This latter position, commanding the new line which the French had just acquired, and exposing them to be every moment attacked, with advantage, in the valley of Urseren, Lecourbe, after having joined to his corps of reserve almost all the troops which formed the columns of Generals Loison and Gudin, and sent the rest towards St. Gothard, to cover his right, advanced the same day, the 16th, on the road from Urseren to Dissentis. He fell in with the first

posts of the enemy near the lake of Oberlass, and found the principal corps well posted on the surrounding heights. They came soon to action on all sides, and fought a long time with dubious success. The Austrian infantry frequently charged the enemy with effect, and maintained its position for many hours. It was at length broken by the reserve of grenadiers, which had followed Lecourbe in the whole of this expedition, and forced to fall back as far as Tawetsch.

If credit was to be given to the French General, the three days of the 14th, 15th, and 16th, must have cost the Imperialists about 1500 men, killed or wounded, 3500 made prisoners, and 10 pieces of cannon. Although this estimate was much nearer the truth than the ridiculous reports which Massena and some other French officers made on this subject, there is still reason to believe, that it was exaggerated*: If it had been exact, the Austrians would have

* This occasion, amongst a thousand others, shows with how much mistrust future historians should consult the reports with which the French load their revolutionary annals. Massena said, that the Austrians had 8,400 men made prisoners: an Adjutant General, named Guyot, 15,000: the Directory, 15,000: and
Lecourbe

have lost nearly half of the troops which they had from the sources of the Rhine to the canton of Zug; and certainly that was not the case. It is evident, that attacked on all the points of their line, at the same time, by superior force, they were not obstinate in defending their ground, and opposed only as much resistance as was necessary, to secure their retreat successively into the vallies of the Linth, the Rhine, and the Ticino. This defensive conduct did not admit of their making so many prisoners from the French, as fell into the hands of the latter, but the loss in killed and wounded was greater on the part of the Republicans, as they had every where to attack strong and well chosen positions, for the acquisition of which they must necessarily have paid dear.

If the French had some days sooner met with this great success, which deprived the Austrians of the important possession of the small cantons, these events might have been attended with consequences of a most serious nature to the Archduke. Being

P 3

very

Lecourbe, who was the real actor, 3500. How can the French flatter themselves, that their military fables will be believed, when they not even take the trouble to make them accord with each other.

very inferior in number, and on the point of having other affairs on his hands, he would probably have been forced to evacuate almost the whole of Switzerland, or could not have maintained himself there but by great skill, and at the expence of much blood. But by a singularity, which what passed in the month following, renders worthy of remark, the day on which Massena began his general attack, the first division of the Russian Army of General Korsakow, followed at a small distance by five others, arrived by forced marches at Schaffhausen, from whence it marched two days afterwards, towards Zurich. The timely arrival of this reinforcement, allowed Prince Charles to diminish, without endangering it, the force of his principal position of Zurich, and to send General Hotze with several thousand men, to support the two Austrian corps which had retired into the cantons of Schweitz and Glarus, and which after having been pushed beyond Rapperschwill and the Linth, retook these two positions. This river, the lake of Zurich, and the Limmat, were, properly speaking, the limits of the two armies. The Archduke made also, at the same time, some demonstrations of a diversion on the Limmat and the Aar, and on the 17th threw some pontoons over the latter river,

ver, near Dettingen. The great fire of artillery made by the Austrians on this occasion, produced a belief that they had really the intention of forming their bridge, and drove the French thither in force. This was all that the Archduke desired; and this feint had no other consequence, than a cannonade kept up on both sides, with a good deal of vivacity, but with little loss.

On the following days the whole Russian army, with the exception of the cavalry which would have been useless in Switzerland, and which remained on the right bank of the Rhine, joined the Austrians near Zurich.* It was no longer the Archduke, but Massena, who had any thing to fear on this

P 4

point,

* This Army as has been mentioned, was originally to have been 45,000 men strong, 11,000 of it were detached and sent in Italy. The remainder, including the Army of Condé, which was some way behind, was computed at 34,000 men: but taking into account the habitual exaggeration with which armies are estimated, and deducting the numbers of men not soldiers who follow them, and which are greater among the Russians than any other nation, we may reckon that General Korsakow had not under his command more than 28,000 effective men. Minute researches have been made on this point, which it was necessary to ascertain, in order to be able to form a correct judgment on the events of the following month.

point, and it was expected, that the Prince would undertake some great enterprise to recover with interest what he had recently lost. Some circumstances which - will soon be related, prevented it from taking place. The French were in expectation of it; and this reason joined to the influence which the great defeat experienced by the Republican army of Italy on the 15th of the same month, had on the general state of affairs, hindered Massena from pursuing the advantages which had been gained by his right wing. Lecourbe, who had forced General Simbschen to retreat as far as Ilantz, fearing that if he advanced any farther, a corps detached from the allied army of Italy, might march on his rear, and carry St. Gothard, evacuated on the 23d the country of the Grisons, the inhabitants of which, as well as those of the Voralberg and the Tyrol, had received an order to rise in mass, and withdrew into the valley of Urseren. He acted the more wisely, that Colonel Strauch, who after the engagements of the Furca, and the Grimsel, had fallen back as far as Bellinzona, had again moved forward, and had pushed his advanced guard as far as Airolo.—The two French corps which had conquered the cantons of Schweitz and Glarus, having their flanks better supported,

supported, preserved the position which they had acquired, but did not seriously attempt to make any fresh progress, which would have been dangerous for them. There were however some affairs, the most considerable of which took place on the 30th, on the Upper and Lower Linth, but they had no other consequence than the capture and recapture of several posts, and amongst others of that of Glarus; and the month of August passed away without any other changes taking place in the respective positions of the Armies, than those which resulted from the actions of the 14th, 15th, and 16th. The line of the French extended from the Valais to the southern source of the Rhine, from thence on the Linth, traversed the canton of Schweitz, ran the whole length of the lake of Zurich, joined itself to the position of the Albis, and from thence followed the Limmat, the Aar, and the Rhine as far as Basle. Eight divisions of an unequal strength occupied this line: it is useless to particularize that of the Austrians; it is sufficient to say that it was opposite to that which has just been described.

The great battle which the French had lost at Novi in Italy, had entirely deranged their offensive plans. The part which was assigned to Massena,
was

was in a great measure depending on that which was at the same time to be acted in Germany and Italy, by the Republican armies, which might be considered as the two wings of his. It was necessary that both, or at least one of them should advance, in order that the centre might do so without danger, indeed, that it might with safety preserve its position. It wanted a point of support, and not being able since the battle of Novi to find it on its right, it was necessary to look for it on the left; and the army which the Directory had recently been busy in forming on the Rhine, received orders to advance on the Mein, and on the Necker.—The object of this expedition was, less to put Massena in condition to undertake new operations, than to prevent the Archduke by a powerful diversion, from turning against him the mass of force which he had at his disposal, since the arrival of the Russians. To preserve Switzerland by threatening Germany; to procure in this latter country money and provisions, which the Directory was not in a condition to furnish; to employ, for the benefit of the Republic, the rich granaries of the Palatinate, which the harvest had just filled; to derange the great plan of attack with which it was supposed the Archduke and Marshal Suworow would crown

crown the campaign, and to keep themselves prepared to take advantage of the faults which either the one or the other might commit; to these points probably the views of the French were confined at this moment. Considering all circumstances, no others were left to them. The favorable opportunity for a plan generally and decidedly offensive, had vanished on the arrival of the 28,000 Russians. The reason which suggests the latter reflections will appear in the course of this relation.

C H A P. XII.

The French army of the Rhine commanded, ad interim, by General Muller concentrates itself in the Palatinate, and the Electorate of Mentz—It passes the Rhine at many points, on the 25th of August, and gets possession of Manheim, and of Heidelberg, and invests Philipsburgh—The Generals Sztaray and Meerfeld, send reinforcements to the Necker and to the Enz—The French fall back—The different forces opposed to them—Object of the court of Vienna—Conduct of the Archduke—This Prince quits Switzerland with his army—A part of his troops march towards the Necker—The French make a vain attack in front of Kehl—The levy of troops in the Electorate of Mentz, detains the French upon the Mein—They raise the siege of Philipsburgh, and preserve on the right bank of the Rhine, only Manheim and Neckerau—They are driven thence sword in hand, and are also obliged to return into Mentz—State of affairs and expectations of the public, towards the end of September.

NOTHING important had passed upon the right bank of the Rhine, since the engagement of
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the 29th of July. There, as in Switzerland, the French had delayed attacking, till the other armies of the Republic should be in a state to do so likewise: the army of the Rhine had besides not yet obtained that number of troops, which was necessary to have sufficient weight in the balance. Having acquired them towards the middle of August, it prepared to enter upon the campaign, for the reasons, and with that object in view which have been already disclosed in the last chapter. Till this period, the war in Suabia, and in the countries which separated it from the Mein, had been on both sides merely a war of observation. It then began to assume in some respects, the principal part, and to have a direct influence upon the definitive result of the campaign.

The head quarters of the army of the Rhine, which was commanded *ad interim* by General Muller, had been for some days at Strasburgh, and it was believed, that in case it should undertake any thing, it would be as before, by the vallies of Kintzing and Renchen—But whether it was that the loss of the battle of Novi, and the derangement which it caused in the projects of the French, had made them give up the attack of the Black Forest: or whether

not

not being sufficient in point of number to penetrate at the same time by many points, they wished to assemble their forces in the places where it was most advantageous to shew themselves, they withdrew on the evening of the 19th of August, the troops which they had before Kehl; and while one part remained to guard the fort, the other marched on the left bank of the Rhine, towards the bishopric of Spire, and the Palatinate.

On the 25th, the Republicans, 10,000 in number, passed the Rhine at Mannheim, and near that town, whither they had just removed their head quarters. At the news of this event, the flying corps of the light Imperial troops, which were between the Mein and the Neckar, fell back towards the latter river, and the levy in mass of the Odenwald and Bergstrass, assembled on the Bergstrass, and took post there with some troops of Mentz and Wurtzburg, who composed the basis of this national armament. Such was their patriotic zeal, as well as their animosity to the French, that as early as on the 25th, more than 10,000 Peasants were under arms from the frontier of the country of Darmstadt, as far as the Neckar. If the advantage in point of numbers, was on the side of

of the Germans, their enemies enjoyed a far more enviable superiority in respect of the quality of their troops, for the Imperial regulars did not amount to 2000. The French therefore did not meet with any serious obstacle, and after some skirmishes, they proceeded along both banks of the Necker on the 26th, and got possession of Heidelberg, where they took some provisions. A part of them remained in the town to watch over the Bergstrass; another division directed its course to Bruchsal, and the remainder marched towards Heilbron, in pursuit of the Austrians, who defended but feebly the approach to this town, into which the French entered on the 29th, but too late to get possession of the Magazines, of which it was the depot. The enemy on the following days extended themselves into the country, lying between the Rhine and the Necker.

While this was passing, another division of the army of the Rhine, under the command of General Baraguay d' Hilliers, set out from Mentz, repulsed the small Mentzer posts which were upon the Mein, arrived at the gates of Franckfort, levied contributions on the town, notwithstanding its agreed neutrality, pushed an advanced guard towards Aschaffenburg, and then marched towards the Lower
Necker,

Necker, where it arrived on the 2nd of September, and where it joined itself to the centre of the army of the Rhine. This enabled General Muller to advance with considerable strength on his right and to invest Philipsburgh, which he hastened to bombard, on the 26th.

As soon as the news of this inroad had reached Donaueschingen, where General Sztaray commanded a corps of reserve, some thousands of men, followed by that General, set forward on their march towards the Necker and the Entz, some of them making for Lauffen, others for Pfortzheim, near to which places they were on the 30th. At their approach, the French who had pushed as far into the neighbourhood of Pfortzheim, and whom however the light Imperial troops which they had driven before them, still kept in check, evacuated the country of Baden Durlach, and concentrated themselves in the bishopric of Spire, and the Palatinate; they were in part forced to do this by some reinforcements which General Meerfeld sent from Offenburgh, upon the Murg and the Enz. Some hundreds of men from the Wurtemberg troops, had also joined the Austrians at Lauffen, upon the right bank of the Necker. They had at the same time sent off couriers to Munich, to ask for the assistance of the
Bavarian

Bavarian troops cantoned upon the Lech. With the armament of the Peasants of the Odenwald and Bergstrass, that of the inhabitants of the Spessart, connected itself: this guarded the Mein and the approaches of Aschaffenburg.

All these different measures, might therefore have been supposed sufficient to stop the progress of the French, to hinder them from penetrating into Suabia and Franconia, and even to make them raise the siege of Philipsburgh, to drive them, in short, down the whole course of the Necker and the Mein. It would have been very fortunate for the interests of the coalition, if the Archduke Charles had thought thus, or rather if the views of the court of Vienna had permitted him to act in conformity to this opinion. The contrary part which this Prince took, had such important and fatal consequences, both military and political, that it is necessary on this subject to enter into some detail.

It has been said in one of the preceding chapters, that it was generally expected, that after the conquest of Italy had been sufficiently secured, Marshal Suworow would, at the head of a part of the victorious army, invade, or even turn the southern part of Switzerland, while Prince Charles would

take it in flank by the north side, and that the army of Massena, should be attacked at the same time, or at least kept in check on the eastern side, by a body of troops, composed of Austrians, Russians, and Swiss Auxiliaries. This plan, the execution of which would have terminated the campaign in a manner worthy of its commencement, and would have given to the war a political direction, entirely new to it, had been originally formed by the courts of London and Petersburg; and all Europe looked forward to it with anxious hopes: but it is not perhaps saying too much to assert, that the court of Vienna, never intended to effectually assist this plan, although she ostensibly approved it. She might have greatly favoured the accomplishment of this project, have even rendered it unnecessary, and have reaped beforehand almost all the advantages which could have resulted from it, if she had left Prince Charles master of his own conduct, and at liberty to pursue, after the taking of Zurich, the conquest of Switzerland, a thing which at that time was, if not easy, at least very feasible. But there is reason to believe, that so far from her favouring the projects of the Archduke in this respect, she even found fault with that Prince for having pushed
offensive

offensive measures so far, and for having drawn her into a situation which she wished to avoid, that of a war made on the frontiers of France, a war which would have demanded explanations, plans, and professions of political faith, which might be adverse to the sentiments and designs of the house of Austria.

Although the inactivity of the Austrian army in Switzerland, from the middle of June, to that of August, was rather voluntary than the result of compulsion, it might be in some measure justified by cogent reasons, and the loss of 20,000 men which the Archduke had sustained in the departure of Generals Bellegarde and Haddick, had left him, if not at first, at least latterly, inferior to Massena. This consideration joined to local difficulties, furnished arguments in favour of a temporizing conduct. When however the army of General Korsakow, had arrived in Switzerland, when that General according to the orders of his Sovereign, and to the state of affairs, requested that an attack should be made, when in order to affect a compliance with his wishes, vain parade and demonstrations were made, it was from that time very evident, that Austria consulted neither the views nor the interests of her allies, and that they could not

any longer depend upon her co-operation in the grand work with which they were desirous of crowning the campaign. This difference in the councils was naturally attended with divisions in the camps. The almost unavoidable rivalry between the troops of the two Emperors, between soldiers who had a character for superior bravery, and others, who during ten years had given exemplary proofs of their valour, whether in good or bad fortune, was too soon converted into open jealousy, and was not, as in Italy, restrained by a vigorous authority, and diverted by active operations, and common success.

All this afforded no reason for supposing, that when Field Marshal Suworow, should, as had been agreed upon, repair into Switzerland, those advantages would be derived from this undertaking, which might have resulted from good understanding, and unity of views. When the incursion of the French upon the Mein, and their march towards Suabia, furnished Prince Charles with a pretext for avoiding a co-operation, which he had probably received orders to elude; this young Prince, the unwilling instrument of Austrian policy, alarmed, or pretending to be so, at the danger which threatened Germany, and that part of his army which was on the right bank of the Rhine;

Rhine ; and professing to feel the desire, as well as the obligation of rescuing from the ravages of the French, the states of the Elector Palatine, and of the Duke of Wurtemberg, who had just acceded to the coalition, (considerations which were far from being without weight, but which did not require such extreme measures), ordered his army to hold itself in readiness to quit Switzerland, and made part of it immediately march towards Schaffhausen. He entrusted General Hotze with the defence of the small cantons, and sent him some reinforcements, which made the force of the latter amount to about 20,000 men, including all the left: his head quarters were placed at Kaltsbrun.

During the last days of August, the Russians replaced the Austrians along the banks of the Limmat and the Aar, and in front of Zurich. General Korsakow, with whom the command rested, fixed his head quarters in the last-mentioned town. General Nauendorf was left with about 10,000 men upon the right bank of the Rhine, to form there a body of observation and of reserve. His head quarters were at Tengen, and he observed at the same time the defile of the Val d'Enfer, and that of the frontier towns. These were the arrangements which

Prince Charles, before his departure, made for the defence of the conquered part of Switzerland. He left behind him 55,000 men, of whom more than 40,000 were opposed to Massena from the Grison country, as far as the mouth of the Aar. The Archduke had on the 19th of August addressed to the Princes and States of the Empire, a pressing exhortation to make a common cause with the chief of the Empire, and to furnish their quintuple contingent.

One part of the Austrian troops, who to the number of about 30,000 quitted Switzerland on the two last days of August, marched towards the Duchy of Wurtemberg, and the other part towards the Brigau. The Archduke followed this last column, and his head quarters, which had been for more than two months at Kloten, and were transferred on the 31st to Schaffhausen, were placed two days afterwards at St. Blaise, in the Black Forest, where they remained till the 5th of September. The stay which this Prince made there, was intended to leave Massena in an uncertainty, respecting the destination of his troops, to prevent him from immediately taking advantages of their departure, and in this manner to hold him in check upon his flank, till the column which marched rapidly towards the
north

north of Suabia should have arrived there. The latter made such haste, that on the 11th it was already near Stuttgart, from whence it continued its march towards the Necker. The same day the Archduke passed also by this town, and reached Vahingen, where were the head quarters of General Sztarray.

It has been seen that the approach of the troops, which the latter commanded, had forced the French on the 30th of August, to evacuate Heilborn, and to concentrate themselves in the country of Baden Durlach, and the bishopric of Spire, in order to cover the Siege of Philipsburg, which place they hoped to have time to take. General Sztarray not being however strong enough to attack the enemy, who had near 20,000 men, upon the right bank of the Rhine, had contented himself with taking positions upon the Enz and the Necker, having his advanced posts some leagues in front of these two rivers. The light troops on both sides disputed, during the first days of September, the places which lie in the centre of that kind of circle, which is formed by the Enz, the Necker, and the Rhine, and many skirmishes passed between both parties, the detail of which is not worthy of being recorded. Some uninteresting facts may be sacrificed to the

object of unfolding more clearly the spirit, the aim, and the prominent features of the Campaign.

The march of the Archduke's army towards the Necker, proving that this prince was about to collect the majority of his forces against General Muller, the body of French which occupied Kehl, by way of diversion in his favor, on the 7th attacked the Austrian posts in the valley of Kintzing. They fought near Kork, Marlen and Bischoffsheim, and after having gained some ground, the French finding the Austrians more than able to resist them, returned again into Kehl. If this attempt did not afford General Muller any support upon his right, he was at the same time deprived of that which he had upon his left. The arrival of General Baraguay d'Hilliers, at the gates of Frankfort had, as has been already said, caused the subjects of the Elector of Mentz, and the inhabitants of the Spessart to take up arms. Almost all the population of the country on both banks of the Mein had been organised, in a military manner, by Baron Albini, who had borne a very active part at the congress of Rastadt, but chiefly by General Faber, known for the honorable firmness with which he defended Ehrenbreitstein to the last extremity. These men being regularly divided into
companies

companies, instructed in the use of arms and military service by the Mentzer and Imperial officers, serving by rotation only, receiving from the Elector provision and a small pay, and being assisted by the regular troops of this ecclesiastical Prince, formed a levy en mass, which was for the right wing of the Imperial Army, a support of greater use, and could be more depended upon, than is commonly the case with such armaments. Having established an immediate communication with the inhabitants of the Odenwald, and forming a total of more than 15,000 men constantly under arms, they marched with some artillery against a column of the French which had advanced upon the banks of the Mein, and after some slight skirmishes obliged it to retreat. Baraguay d'Hilliers himself, apprehensive, if not for the safety of Mentz, at least for his communication with this place, fell back towards it, and arrived there on the 9th of September. The Landsturm (the levy in mass) had already posts between this town and Frankfort.

The approach of the powerful body formed by the united troops of the Archduke and General Sztarray, threatened too certain a defeat to the French corps which was besieging Philipsburg, where the
brave

brave Rhingrave of Salm commanded, for it to persevere in the prosecution of the siege any longer, than its retreat could be effected with safety. The enemy therefore, on the evening of the 11th, raised the siege of this place with precipitation, after having in vain endeavoured to carry some of its works, and after having bombarded it ever since the 6th with an uninterrupted fury, occasioned by the small space of time which remained to reduce it. Neither the works nor the garrison which was sheltered under the casemates suffered much from this violent fire, but it was of terrible consequence to the inhabitants, many of whom perished under the ruins of their houses: there did not remain one standing; and the town, on the 12th, appeared nothing but a heap of cinders. No other town except that of Landrecies had, during the course of this war, so much reason to regret the substitution of battering by mortars, instead of battering in breach.

After the raising of the siege, the body of French who had been engaged in it, passed on the left bank of the Rhine, and went down towards Worms. General Muller who had successively withdrawn his head quarters from Wisloch to Schwetzingen, and

and from this last place to Mannheim, where he arrived on the 10th, caused his artillery and baggage to be carried over the same day to the other side of the river. Two days after, he also withdrew his troops from Heidelberg, which the Austrians entered as soon as they departed, and he himself then passed over to the other side of the Rhine, which he lined with his army from Spirebach as far as Mentz, the only part of the line which was not defended by any fortress, and where consequently, the presence of the troops was necessary.

- A division under the orders of General Laroche, was left in Mannheim and in the works which the French had raised during the summer, to make amends for the insufficient fortifications of this town. Being desirous that this place should be at once a strong post for themselves, and that it should not be so against them, they had with one hand destroyed that part of the fortifications which fronted the Rhine, and with the other they had repaired those which faced the plain; not contented with this, they had linked the works of the place to an island, which, although formed by the Rhine, is called Neckerau, (the isle of the Necker) and which they had likewise fortified with care. This chain

chain of works defended the approaches of Mannheim, and covered the bridge of boats, which was upon the Rhine, an advantage without which, the possession of this town would have been of more danger than service.

The Archduke, whose light troops had followed the French in their retreat, had marched with the bulk of his army consisting of about 20,000 men, towards Heidelberg and Mannheim. This Prince judging by the works which the French had, and still continued without ceasing to raise in front of this place, of the degree of interest, which they attached to its preservation; resolved not to give them time to establish themselves there, wishing no doubt also to give a lustre to his expedition into Germany, and thus to compensate for its detrimental effects in other respects.

On the 18th, at break of day, this Prince attacked the village of Neckerau, which was accessible only by two bridges defended by palisaded redoubts, and abattis. The Austrians experienced an obstinate resistance, and were exposed to a destructive fire; but their own fire becoming superior, and the soldiers being animated by the presence of the Archduke, in a second attack carried the village and
island

island of Neckerau: all the French which it contained were killed or taken. The success of this attack, which was a very brilliant one, enabled the Austrians to take in flank a fortified post, named Holtzof, situated upon the Rhine, and between Mannheim and Neckerau. It was more briskly attacked and defended than the latter place, was taken and retaken twice, but remained at last in the hands of the Imperialists. The French having also there no means of retreat, were entirely cut to pieces, or made prisoners. The Austrians being masters of all the works which flanked Mannheim along the Rhine, raised batteries on the Holtzoff to cannonade and bombard the bridge, and at the same time assaulted the chain of works raised in front of Mannheim on the land side. These were carried with such impetuosity that the Imperial troops entered the town intermingled with the French, and all the latter who had not passed the bridge fell into the hands of the Austrians. The sum total of those made prisoners in the course of this day amounted to more than 1500, among whom were two Generals. The number of killed and wounded was not much less: 18 pieces of cannon were also taken by the victors, who purchased the honour and advantage

of

of the day with the loss of some hundreds of men. Few affairs of posts have been more spirited, and more worthy of remark. It was in the face of the French army ranged on the opposite side of the river, that the Austrians in a few hours carried formidable intrenchments, and a fortified town. Some panegyric should here be bestowed upon the Archduke Charles, if the promptitude and vigor, with which he executed this enterprize, did not speak for themselves.

After having left a garrison in this place, the outward entrenchments of which he ordered to be destroyed, the Archduke stationed his headquarters at Schwetzingen, and assembled the main body of his army in the fine plain which surrounds that town. Having no more enemies on the right bank from Kehl to the Mein, he dispatched upon the latter river a body of light troops with flying artillery; this assistance enabled the Mentzer Landsturm, to recover from the French the two banks of the Mein, to drive them back into Mentz, and to send parties from one side as far as Rudesheim, on the extremity of Rhingau, and on the other, upon the Lahn and the line of demarcation guaranted neutral by the treaty of Prussia

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with

with France. These excursions, which gave occasion to many skirmishes, gained the Landsturm both prisoners and booty, inspired them with confidence, and inured them to the fatigues of war.

The position of the Imperial troops in the countries, of which the French had been in peaceable possession since the commencement of the campaign—the stay of the Archduke at Schwetzingen—the magazines which he caused to be formed upon the Mein, and upon the Necker—the equipage of Pontons which was on its way—the presence of more than 40,000 Austrians upon the right bank of the Rhine—the daily increasing armament of the inhabitants—the exhortations to an insurrection which General Sztarray had publicly made to the Brabanters—the pressing solicitations which were made to the Princes of the Empire to furnish their contingents—the grand attack which 45,000 English and Russians at that time were making on the north of Holland—the probability there was that they would deliver this part of the country as far as the line of the Wahal—the King of Prussia's sending a body of troops to Wesel, to guarantee, at all events, the possession of his provinces beyond the Rhine,

Rhine—the announced march of Suworow into Switzerland—all tended to make it believed at that time that the war, already so extended, would take a still wider range; that the lower Rhine would afford a new theatre for it; and that the Allies aspired to attack that mass of conquests which the preceding war had left in the hands of the French, in the north west of Europe. In one word, it was the general idea, that before the end of the campaign, for the first time, no doubt, since the creation of the world, the flames of war would burn from the Zuider Zee, to the banks of the Tiber. Such was the public expectations towards the end of September. The French shut up in Mentz, and Ehrenbreitstein, dared not to keep the field on these points: General Muller, whom the war of Holland had deprived of the reinforcements, which had been intended for him, confined himself to fortifying the left bank of the Rhine, and waited, with uneasiness, at Turckheim, where he had placed his head quarters, for the moment, when the designs attributed to Prince Charles, should be more fully unfolded.

These conjectures, this uncertainty, and this posture of affairs did not last long. On the 27th of September the

the Archduke Charles received at Schwetzingen, the news of the events which had taken place two days before in Switzerland, and of which a detail shall be given in the following chapter. This compelled him to give up all those offensive projects which he might have formed, and to go back to Schaffhausen still more expeditiously than he had advanced from it in the preceding month.

C H A P. XIII.

Reasons why the Russians supplied the place of the Austrians badly—Affairs of the 5th, 6th, and 8th of September—Unaccountable inactivity of Massena—The Directory displeased at it, resolve to deprive him of his command—He determines at length to attack—Projects which the Allies were forming at the same instant—Massena prevents them—On the 25th. he attacks their whole line on the Linth and the Limmat—General Hotze is killed—General Petrarch, who succeeds him, retreats—The passage of the Limmat forced, and Zurich surrounded—Bad conduct of the Russian Generals—General Korsakow evacuates Zurich on the 25th—Fault that he commits on his retreat—The defeat in consequence—March of Marshal Suworow from Italy into Switzerland—He traverses the canton of Uri—Carries the St. Gothard—Arrives at Altorf—Operations of Generals Auffenberg, Lincken, and Jellachich—Defeat of Lecourbe—and of another French corps—Suworow learns the

the events of the 25th and 26th, as Massena does the arrival of Suworow—Defeat of the French on the 30th of September, and 1st of October—The Russians arrive at Glarus, and retire into the country of the Grisons, by the valley of Fleims—They assemble at Chur on the 9th—The Archduke returns from the Palatinate into Suabia—Attempt at a diversion in favour of Marshal Suworow, but undertaken too late—Triple action of the 7th of October at Constance, Dissenhoffen, and Schlatten.

TO the circumstance of the Imperial troops, which had quitted Switzerland at the end of August, having been succeeded by an inferior number of Russians, was added the disadvantage of the loss of unity, of views, of action, and of authority. This was not the only unfavourable effect produced by this change. However great and well merited was the reputation of the Russian troops, and with whatever distinction they had served in the plains of Italy during this campaign, men of observation were apprehensive that they might not experience similar success in a country of mountains, where warfare is of a nature quite different, not familiar

to the Russians, and even out of the line of those military qualities which characterize them. Nor did it agree any better with the national temper of the majority of the troops who composed the Austrian army, but experience had corrected in them their natural disposition. The army contained but few officers or non-commissioned officers, who had not served in the Tyrol, in Carinthia, or in the Black Forest; and it possessed many corps consisting of Mountaineers, Tyroleans, and Styrians, or of active and intelligent Walloons and Hungarians. It was still a more important advantage that the Austrians could not fail to be well acquainted with that part of Switzerland which they had conquered, and which they had for three months, had leisure and interest to study; they besides spoke the language, an advantage by no means trifling, which the Russians had not. If in every respect, except that of bravery, the latter but ill supplied the place of the former; it must be agreed that General Korsakow was an unequal substitute for the Archduke.

This inequality in several particulars was not however at first perceivable; and the French, there is reason to believe, entertained opinions on this point, the

the reverse of the truth. The reputation of superiority which the Russians had acquired, and which they had not forfeited in Italy, and all that the imagination of soldiers, no less than that of other men, adds to what is unknown to them, imposed on the Republicans. They did not even attempt any thing worthy of notice from the 29th of August, (the day on which the Russians relieved the Austrian advanced posts before Zurich), till the 8th of September. On that day they renewed the attack which they had so often made on the post of Wallishoffen. It had the same issue as those which preceded it; and they returned to their position with some loss. Massena on this occasion, repeated what Frederic had formerly said of the Russians. " You may kill them; but you can neither make them retreat nor surrender."

Three days after this affair, which had no other object on the part of the French, than to bring the Russians to the test, and to familiarise themselves with their manner of fighting,* the right of the Re-

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publican

* Something might here be said on this subject, if it did not come more properly in the account of the campaign of Italy, where the Russians bore a greater part, and more adapted to the display of their military character.

publican army had gained some ground, and got possession of the important post of Kerenz, the point of communication of the vallies of Maderan and of the Rhine; a post which the Austrians retook the day following. There were also in the three first weeks of September, several other trifling affairs in the Grisons, and in the cantons of Schweitz and Glarus; but as they occasioned on neither side any considerable loss of men, and as they made little or no alteration in the great positions respectively taken at the end of the preceding month, they must give way to the narration of the important events already announced.

Although after the departure of the Archduke for Suabia, Massena had been superior by at least 20,000 men to the force which was opposed to him; notwithstanding the disorder occasioned by replacing the troops of that Prince by those of General Korsakow, which such a movement made in the presence of an enemy, could not fail to produce in the means of defence; notwithstanding that the total ignorance which the new comers had of the country, presented an opportunity in all respects favourable to the Republican General, he had not yet attempted to turn it to advantage; and with the exception

ception of some movements which he caused to be made on his right, and a few attacks which he directed in order to confine the enemies line in the Grey League and the country of Glarus, he had continued in a state of inactivity, as extraordinary, as it was beneficial to the allies. Observers were astonished at it, and endeavoured to account for it from the want of money, of provisions, of cloathes, and ammunition, which they supposed this army suffered ; but these insufficient reasons did not satisfy the directory, accustomed to consider the wants of the soldiers as an additional motive for attack, and, if it may so be said, as an incentive to victory. They had often sent an order to the Republican General to act offensively, which was constantly evaded. Generals Müller and Championnet joined in pressing this demand; and the march of Marshal Suworow for Switzerland, which had already commenced, imperiously called for its being obeyed. The cabinet of the Luxembourg, more and more dissatisfied, took the resolution of depriving Massena of the command, leaving at the same time in his power to avoid this disgrace by an immediate and general attack. He determined to make it, and prepared for it along his whole line.

The enemy meditated one not less decisive at the same moment. The views of the court of Vienna, the obstacles which the middle of the campaign had presented, and the motives which had caused Prince Charles's departure from Switzerland, had made it necessary to substitute to the original grand plan, which was to turn Switzerland on the north and on the south, a plan of attack of less magnitude, which required a less considerable force, and which was purely military.

The object proposed was to recover immediately the possession of the small cantons, and to turn the position so long held by Massena on the lakes of Lucerne and Zug, and on the Albis, which would have obliged him to retire on the Aar, the whole line of which it would have been absolutely impossible for him to preserve. To attain this end, General Korsakow was to attack, or rather to keep in check, the French on the chain of the Albis, while Generals Hotze and Jellachich should endeavour to drive them from the cantons of Schwitz and Glarus, as well as from the Grey League, in which they would be powerfully assisted by the grand diversion which was to be made by Marshal Suwrow. It was he indeed, whose operations shall

not

not yet be described, although they were already commenced, who was entrusted with the principal enterprize. He had to force the St. Gothard, to descend the valley of the Reuss, to turn the lakes of Lucerne and Zug, and thus to take post on the flank of the centre of the French army, and on the rear of its right, which would have been placed between two fires.

The three allied corps were to unite in the canton of Lucerne, under the command of Marshal Suworow, and thus to give him an army of more than 60,000 men, with which he flattered himself, that he should terminate the campaign in Switzerland, as brilliantly and as usefully as he had began it in Italy.*

Massena

* Those who wish for more details of this plan, on the issue of which depended the possession of Switzerland, will see in the following letter what were the views and arrangements of the Russian General on this object at the beginning of September.

To the Field-Marsbals, Lieutenants, Baron Lincken, Baron Hotze, and Korsakow.

Asti, September 7th, 1799.

The Imperial Russian troops which have been till now with the army in Italy, will set out from Piedmont

Massena knew these projects, and having learnt that Generals Korsakow and Hotze had resolved to

Piedmont on the 8th of September, on their march for Switzerland; and I expect to arrive there with them on the 17th at Airolo, at the foot of this side of Mount St. Gothard, which I propose attacking on the 19th.

As the troops of the Royal Imperial Colonel Strauch, of Prince Victor de Rohan, and of Field-Marshal Lieutenant Count Haddick, must co-operate in the attack, it will be very necessary that the armies of the two Imperial courts united in Switzerland, should make, with vigour and constancy, a general, simultaneous, and combined attack on all the positions of the enemy; but especially the left wing, under the orders of Field-Marshal Lieutenant Baron Lincken, must unite all its means, and exert every effort to facilitate and support the passage of the Russian corps over Mount St. Gothard, through the upper valley of the Reuss, and that of the Linth. As it will even be possible to attack the French in flank, they may also be prevented by a rapid march, and a concerted advance of the left wing of the Imperial army in Switzerland, from defeating the Russian corps from Italy, and destroying it in detail.

As I have not an exact knowledge of the positions of the two Imperial armies, united in Switzerland, and as the intelligence which I have received makes me presume that the corps of Russian troops under the orders of Lieutenant General Korsakow, is posted between Zurich and the Aar, along the right bank of the Limmat; and the royal Imperial troops under the orders

to begin the execution of them on the 26th, he determined to be before hand with them. There re-

mained

orders of Baron Hotze, between the lakes of Zurich and Wallenstadt, and in the Rheinthal from Mayenfeld Dissentis, I must in the first place wait for the junction of the troops of the latter. I wish to learn from himself, as being better acquainted with local circumstances, how and where this may be also effected on my part. As soon as the junction shall have taken place, I hope that the Russian troops of Italy, no longer in danger of being stopped, may be able to penetrate along both banks of the Lake of Lucerne; those of Messieurs de Lincken and Hotze, between the lakes of Zurich and Zug; and finally, that an entire union of the Russian troops of General Korsakow may be effected near the right bank of the lower Reuss, and of the Aar. This will be the only manœuvre which can promise a decisive result to ulterior operations.

As I shall lose no time in informing you from Bellinzona of the arrival of the Russian troops in Italy, it is also at Bellinzona at the latest, (if it cannot be done sooner by the route of Novarre and Varese), that you will make me acquainted by couriers of the position and force of the troops, as well Russian as Royal Imperial, which are acting together in Switzerland, and also of the positions of the enemy, their strength, and their distribution. I wish also that the Generals Baron Hotze and Lincken, will communicate to me their opinions, and their local knowledge of the ground, and of the manner of making war in that country; pointing

out

mained to him no other means of success ; and it will be seen in what follows, that these ought rather to have failed than succeeded.

In

out how a quick co-operation of all the troops which are already in Switzerland, and of those which are marching thither, may be the most effectively and usefully executed. By these means I shall be able to make preparations for an attack, and to determine positively the day and hour.

P. S. I must recommend for the general attack, the precaution which is always necessary, of keeping the forces as much as possible united, that the attack may not be made insufficient by unnecessarily parcelling out the troops, and thus weakening them. Besides each section should know with truth and exactness, the position and force of the hostile corps opposed to it, and should at all times hasten to announce it, as we ought every day reciprocally to communicate by couriers, detailed accounts of our first movements.

I wish also, that all the united troops should exercise themselves on open days in the interval, till the general attack, in three columns with *the bayonet and the sabre*.

It is to this mode of attack, that we here owe exclusively our multiplied successes, and which have been by no means bloody ; and it is my advice that General Korsakow should send some Russian officers who understand this exercise, to the Imperial corps which is in Switzerland.

The above mentioned General Korsakow is authorized so to do, by the orders here given.

Signed SUWOROW.

In the night of the 24th to the 25th, near 50,000 French put themselves in motion on the line from the Linth to the Aar. At break of day the division of General Soult, reinforced by part of Lecourbe's, assembled between the lakes of Wallenstadt and Zurich: it threw a bridge over the Linth, near Wesen, a point, protected only by a battalion of the regiment of Bender, which being attacked by five French battalions, in vain performed prodigies of valour, and was almost wholly destroyed. A Hungarian battalion, which came to its support, was not able to restore the engagement; and after having also been very roughly treated, was obliged to retire, along with the remnants of that of Bender, towards Utnach. At the sound of musquetry, General Hotze, along with his Staff, hastened from his head quarters at Kaltbrum. Too well informed of the localities, and of the general state of affairs, not to conclude that this was a serious attack, he wished to reconnoitre closely the force and the positions of the enemy. A party of French rangers made a discharge on him and his suit, which struck him almost dead from his horse. The greater part also of the officers, who were about him, were either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. This brave and able General fell into the hands of the

the enemy, and died a few hours afterwards*. His death, which would at any time have been a severe loss to the Austrian army, was at this time a misfortune for Europe. He alone could have prevented or repaired the disaster of this day. Deprived of their commander, the regiments which defended the right bank of the Linth, and covered the entrance of the valley of the Toss, nevertheless bravely stood their ground, and for a long time pretty equally maintained the action.

While these things were passing on the left of the allies, the French had established a bridge at the extremity of the lake of Zurich, and advanced in force towards Schmerickens, but they were attacked by the Russians, who were coming from Rap-

* His body was sent back to the Austrians by the French on the 28th, and interred the day following at Bregentz, with all the honours of war. This General, born at Richterswill near Zurich, son of a Farmer of that canton, and brother to a respectable physician, had been in the service of Russia before he entered into that of Austria. He never ceased to distinguish himself in the latter by his bravery and talents, and contributed very much in this campaign to the success of the Imperialists in Switzerland. He had much at heart, the deliverance of his country; and at least had not the pain of seeing it fall again, entirely, under the yoke of its oppressors.

Rapperschwill and repulsed as far as their bridge, which being broken down, all that remained on the right bank were either killed, taken, or drowned. This might have restored affairs on the Linth, if General Petrarch, to whom rank and superiority gave the command, on General Hotze's death, had also stood firm on his side; but instead of this, and fearing to be turned on his right, he precipitated his retreat by the Toggemburg, nor discontinued it till he reached the Rhinthal; thus abandoning the whole of Eastern Switzerland, uncovering the left flank of the Russians, and leaving without remedy, any check which they might have experienced, as well as rendering of no avail, any success which might have attended their resistance. The latter case was not indeed what had happened; and if it was matter of regret that the left wing of the allies had lost its commander, it was no less unfortunate that the right was not commanded by some other than the General who directed it.

At break of day, Massena had marched a division near to Bruck, which feigned a serious attack on this point. While the attention of the Russians was engaged by this feint, and by a violent fire, another division threw a bridge over the Limmat

near

near Dietikon, and two others attacked Wallishofen, and all the other posts which the enemy had in front of Zurich between that town and the Albis. Here the Russians on their guard, and in sufficient force, vigourously repulsed the French, gained ground upon them, and pursued them closely, as far as the summit of the Albis.

Agreeably to the general plan of attack concerted by the allies, a corps of 5,000 Russians was to act on the right of General Hotze. Three Russian battalions had already been for some days at Rapperschwill for this purpose, and five others were sent in the night of the 24th and 25th, three of which were drawn from the camp of Seebach behind Zurich, and two from before that town. The departure of this strong detachment, which set out a few hours before the French began their attack, had very much weakened the defence of the right bank of the Limmat; and there remained scarcely 12,000 men on the right bank, from Zurich to the Rhine. This number would, however, have been sufficient to make the enemy repent of his enterprise, had it been properly and skilfully employed: but this was far from being the case, General Durazow, who commanded quite on the right of the Russian army, completely duped by the false attack

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which

which the French had made on the side of Bruck, instead of informing himself of what was passing on his left, and, consequently, closing up to the centre, which was really attacked, remained stationary on his own ground. Hence it happened that the enemy's column which had thrown a bridge over the river at Dietikon, was enabled to complete it without interruption, and to advance rapidly on the right bank of the Limmat; General Markow who commanded at this point, being too weak to oppose it, and receiving no reinforcement from the left, which had been weakened by the departure of the five battalions, nor from the right, paralysed as it was by the misconduct of General Durazzow. The latter seeing himself separated from the rest of the army, by the division of General Lorge, which had crossed the river, instead of marching against it, and thus placing it between two fires, turned about, and directed his course towards the Rhine.

General Lorge, who had been followed across the Limmat by reinforcements, and by Massena himself, experiencing hardly any opposition, left a part of his division to observe Generals Durazzow and Markow, (for the latter, wounded it is true, suffered

himself also to be cut off,) and marched with the remainder towards Zurich. He found on his way no other enemy to encounter, but one battalion of the regiment of Sacken, and four squadrons of dragoons, who dismounted, and a division of Cossacks. This handful of men, consulting only their bravery, attacked the French, and twice succeeded in repulsing them; but at last, overwhelmed by numbers, after having kept the enemy in check for four hours, between Winnigen and Zurich, it was obliged to fall back to the latter town. About one o'clock the French found themselves masters of part of the Zurichberg, and of the principal approaches to the town on the north. In order to extricate himself from the critical situation in which General Korsakow, who had with him only two or three regiments, was now placed, much greater presence of mind, boldness, and ability, was requisite than he displayed. He made no prompt and vigorous dispositions, nor did he take any advantage of local circumstances, to defend with regularity the heights which command Zurich. Having however been reinforced in the afternoon, by a part of the five battalions which had been sent to Rapperschwill, and which had received orders

orders to return, and also by a part of the corps which defended the left bank of the Limmat, he made many unsuccessful attacks on the division of General Lorge. The French scattered in the vineyards, kept up upon the Russians a destructive fire, and whenever the latter rushed upon them with fixed bayonets, they retired under the protection of their cannon, which raking the Russians in front and flank, made great havock in their ranks : The French remained finally masters of the Zurichberg. About six o'clock they threatened to turn the Russian corps which was in the plain of Zurich. General Korsakow then caused the camp to be burned, and withdrew all the troops into the town : all the gates were shut, except that of Rapperschwill. Towards the evening, the French completed the investment of the town on the north and east : it was also surrounded on the west ; for after having fought with great bravery, the Russian corps on the left bank of the Limmat, weakened by the reinforcements which it had sent to the other side, and incessantly attacked by superior numbers, was compelled to fall back under the walls of Zurich ; in this situation passed the night of the 25th to the 26th.—General Korsakow, already informed of

what had happened on the Linth, and a good deal embarrassed how to act, passed the night in preparing for battle, and still more for a retreat.

Massena well judging that the Russian General surrounded as he was almost on all sides, could not think of maintaining himself in the town, but at the same time knowing what he had to fear from the bravery of Russian soldiers, if he reduced them to the necessity of cutting their way with the bayonet, and not being himself sufficiently strong to occupy at the same time the roads of Winterthur and of Eglisau, he in the night withdrew his troops from the former, and contented himself with guarding in force the heights which command the second. At the same time he sent an officer with a flag of truce to the Russian General, to offer conditions for the quiet evacuation of the town, and for his retreat to the Rhine; but the Cossacks robbed this officer of his dispatches, and he was kept in the town till the following day.

On that day, while it was expected that the Russians would make a capitulation with the French General Oudinot; General Korsakow taking with him all the troops that he could collect, began his retreat, having his baggage and artillery disposed in the

the intervals of his columns ; but instead of taking the road to Winterthur, which the enemy had left open to him, he only sent that way a small part of his troops and of his baggage, and directed his march with the body of his army towards Eglisau. The French had no expectation of being called into action ; but, seeing the Russian army approach, they concluded it was coming to attack them. Advantageously posted on the heights which command the road, they suffered the Russians to approach, and then opened on them a terrible and commanding fire of artillery and musquetry. Thus the battle began, but partially, and without regularity. The Russian regiments, which were rather in order of retreat than of battle, fought individually, without concert or object ; overwhelmed along the whole of their column by the grape shot of the French, whose flying artillery manœuvred on this occasion with great effect, they rushed repeatedly with fixed bayonets on the enemy, and forced them for some moments to give way ; but as the prodigies of valour performed by the Russian infantry, neither were nor indeed could be turned to any account by the superior officers, considering the situation of affairs, they only served to render the defeat more

bloody and more complete. This little army was broken on all points, and a considerable number of men, as well as part of the artillery, baggage, and treasure, were taken. General Korsakow with all that escaped from the enemy, forced his way to Eglisau, where he hastened to pass the Rhine,

We shall not here stop either to estimate the loss which the Allies sustained on these two days, and which was so much exaggerated by the Republicans, or to impart to the reader the many reflections to which these events gave birth. These will naturally find their place elsewhere. It will be sufficient here to say, that the Russians having placed the Rhine between themselves and the French, and the Austrians retiring also towards the Rhinthal, all eastern Switzerland was open to the French, who lost no time in overrunning it. What follows will shew how unfortunate it was for the interests of the Allies, that this extent of country was not disputed some time longer,

Conformably to the plan that had been agreed upon, and which has been stated, Marshal Suworow was to have set out from Asti on the 8th of September; but the French having shewn a disposition to relieve Tortona, which had engaged

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to surrender on the 11th of the same month, unless it received succours before that day, he deferred his departure till that day; but anxious to regain the time thus lost, and pursuing the method to which he had owed so much success, he marched his army composed of 17,000 effective men, the remains of the 30,000 which had been sent into Italy, with such rapidity, that in five days it had advanced 116 miles, and reached Taverna near Bellinzona on the 15th, that is to say, on the very same day on which he had proposed to be there before the delay took place. He unfortunately experienced another, which he had it not in his power to prevent, and which, as will be seen, was very fatal to the affairs of the Allies. For instead of finding ready at Taverna as had been promised him, the necessary beasts of burden, he was obliged to lose three days in endeavouring to obtain them in the country; and not being able to procure a sufficient number, he was obliged to dismount his cossacks and to employ their horses in transporting the baggage.* The impossibility of

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* In a letter addressed to the Emperor Paul, and published at Petersburg, the Marshal openly threw the blame
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making use of carriages in the road of the great Alps, had obliged him to send his artillery by the lake of Como, and the route of Chiavenna, from whence it afterwards rejoined him in the country of the Grisons.

Every thing being ready for the passage of the Alps, General Rosenberg with the Russian advanced guard, twelve battalions strong, began his march on the 19th, and arrived on the same day at Bellinzona. This corps was, by the source and the valley of the middle Rhine, to turn the St. Gothard, which it was probable the French would attempt to defend; and on this account being obliged to go by a roundabout way, it was necessary for him to be a day in advance before the rest of the army.—On the 21st, this General marched to Donjio, and on the same day Marshal Suworow, whose advanced guard was composed of some Austrian light troops, who had joined him under the command of Colonel Strauch, advanced to Bellinzona.—On the 22d, General Rosenberg arrived at St. Marie, and Suworow at Giurnico.

of this delay on General Melas, and on the subordinate Generals. *The Austrian General Teller, said he, and his Commissaries, deceived me by their shameful equivocal promises, &c. &c.*

Giurnico. On the 23d, the former advanced to Tavetsch, and the latter to Polmengo; his advanced guard being at Piolta and his head quarters at Faido. — On the 24th, the army arrived at the foot of the St. Gothard, and encountered the first posts of the enemy, about a mile from Airolo. Colonel Strauch attacked, defeated, and drove them constantly before him. The army cleared the St. Gothard, and carried the last post at four in the afternoon. About an hour before, General Rosenberg had arrived at Urseren, at which place he rejoined Marshal Suworow.

The French General Gudin, who commanded in that quarter, caused his troops to fall back, part by the Devil's Bridge, and part by Hospital towards the Furca. On the 25th, the Russian army followed the course of the valley of the Reuss, and arrived in the evening beyond Wasen.

When Marshal Suworow began his expedition, not being able to flatter himself that the French would throw no opposition in his way, he had concerted his plan of attack, so as to be supported on his right and on his left. While then the latter was protected by the manœuvres which General Haddick, and Prince Victor de Rohan were making

making on the frontiers of the Valais, the Austrian corps which occupied the country of the Grisons, and which, as has been seen, had not been attacked, put themselves in motion to co-operate with the Russians. General Auffenberg with the advanced guard, four battalions strong, set off from Dissentis on the 24th, and following the course of the Maderanerthal, he arrived on the same evening at Amsteig. General Lecourbe, who had begun his march on the same day, to make also an attack in the Grison country, and who had advanced as far as near Wasen, found himself placed between this Austrian column and the Russians. Falling back before the latter, he threw himself on the 25th upon the former, and forced it to retreat towards the Maderanerthal. It was not, however, without leaving some hundreds of his men on the field of battle, or in the hands of the enemy, that he succeeded in cutting his way. He hastened to retire to Altorf, evacuated that town, and passed to the other side of the Reuss, in order to cover the country of Unterwald, and the Engelberg. If either on the 24th or 25th, the Russians had been able to advance a few miles farther, this French corps would have been entirely destroyed or taken.—On the 26th, the allied army arrived without meeting any obstacles

at Altorf, having thus conquered, in less than a month, the whole canton of Uri, which is about 70 miles long.

In conformity to the previously concerted arrangements, the Austrian Generals Lincken and Jellachich were to have advanced into the canton of Glarus, in order to join themselves on their right to General Hotze, and on their left to Marshal Suworow. General Jellachich, with this view, had departed from Sargans, and advancing along the Linth and the lake of Wallenstadt, he penetrated on the 26th as far as Miollis, from which he drove the Republicans: but having learnt the misfortunes of the preceding day, and the retreat of General Petrarch, he quitted that place a few hours after he had got possession of it, and returned towards Sargans, where he arrived on the 27th.

General Lincken on his side, setting out from Ilantz, had advanced with 3,500 men by the difficult road of Pannick, Elm, and Schwanden in the canton of Glarus. On the 26th, he met, near Rettarn, a column under General Soult, beat it completely, and took 1,100 men prisoners. Following up this advantage, he marched against Glarus, of which he made himself master; but not learning that any corps, either Russian or Austrian had penetrated into this canton, and

and not being able to communicate with any one, either on his right or left, he retired also, and returned into the country of the Grisons.

On the 27th Marshal Suworow, always following up the execution of his projects which had so far completely succeeded, pushed his advanced guard across the Culmerberg, as far as Mitten, in the hope of being there joined by General Lincken. He found at Mitten a French piquet, which was taken, and from which he learned that the Republicans were still masters of Glarus. On the 28th the remainder of the army arrived at Mitten, and it was there that Marshal Suworow, learned by a dispatch from General Lincken, the events which had taken place upon the Linth and the Limmat; and it may be well conceived with what bitter regret, he saw the hopes vanish, which had brought him into Switzerland. It could indeed be no small disappointment for this old and active warrior to lose in one day, and through the misconduct of others, an opportunity of crowning his labours, and of completing the glory of his campaign: It was excusable in him to receive this blow of fortune with some impatience. Too tenacious however to be inclined to measure back his steps, too evidently threatened

threatened at the same time to think of pushing forward, or even to remain in the canton of Schweitz, and possessed of too much boldness not to employ it under circumstances so critical, instead of falling back towards St. Gothard, or retiring into the country of the Grisons, he resolved to pass by the vallies of Mutton and Clonthal, into the canton of Glarus, there to join General Lincken; flattering himself that on the news of his arrival, and of the departure of Massena to engage him, Generals Korsakow and Petrarch having a less force against them, might be enabled to turn about, and that every thing might be retrieved. It was in this hope, so glorious for him to have still retained, that he wrote to the Russian Generals in Korsakow's army: "you will answer with your heads for every farther step that your retreat; I am coming to repair your faults."

On the same day, (the 28th), General Auffenberg was detached to endeavour to join General Lincken, who had demanded assistance. He carried on the 29th, the mountain of Blakel, which separates the vallies of Mutton and the Clonthal. On this day the Russians remained stationary for want of bread and mules.

Whatever

Whatever surprize Marshal Suworow had felt, in learning the disasters of the Allies, no less was experienced by Massena, when he was informed of the rapid and victorious march of the Russian General. It was necessary instantly to stop his progress, or to run the risque of a second time losing the lesser cantons—Massena determined on the former step; and suspending for a moment all his designs against Generals Korsakow and Petrarch, he sent off on the 26th, one division to Schweitz, another to Wesen, a place situated on the point of the lake of Wallenstadt, and marched himself with a third upon Altorf by Lucerne. It may be seen, from the direction of these columns, that Massena wished at the same time, to prevent Marshal Suworow from pushing farther on his rear, and to shut against him, the pass between the lakes of Wallenstadt and Zurich; a pass which would have brought him most shortly, and most easily, to Generals Lincken and Petrarch. He placed only a few hundred men at the double *debouché* of Ensilden, flattering himself that the Russian General would be tempted to take it, and then he might fight him in the plain with superior force, and on three different sides. The French considered

dered this little army, entangled amongst the defiles of the small cantons, without artillery, and almost without cavalry, (the Cossacks having dismounted, that their horses might carry the bread and baggage), as a prey which could hardly escape them; they already formed the brilliant perspective of treating this Russian army as the first, and thus burying under the mountains of Switzerland, the glory of the conqueror of Italy, perhaps even of seeing him fall into their hands, as well as the Grand Duke Constantine, (son of the Emperor Paul), who had followed him.

On the 30th Marshal Suworow put himself in motion by the Muttenthal, Prince Bagration commanding his advanced guard, and General Rosenberg being left with the rear guard at Muten. On the same day the French division, which had been sent upon the Linth, and which had taken an advantageous position upon the Clonthalerssee, on perceiving the arrival at that place of the small column of General Auffenberg, attacked it, and having almost surrounded it, summoned their General to surrender. He far from acceding to this proposition, defended himself with obstinate bravery, and gave time to Prince Bagration to arrive with the
Russian

Russian advanced guard to his assistance. The Allies then attacked the French in their turn with fixed bayonets, broke their ranks, and put them to the route. Near 400 of them fell into the hands of the Allies, and a much greater number were killed. Two pieces of cannon were also taken by the conquerors, whose loss likewise was not inconsiderable. Prince Bagration was himself wounded. The Russian army arrived on the Clonthalensee at night fall: both sides passed it under arms and in presence of each other, the French occupying the mountains, and their enemies the road through the valley and on the banks of the lake. It would have been difficult for the latter to continue their march with safety the following day, if they had left the French masters of a position which entirely commanded their flank. Prince Bagration turned it during the night; and at break of day attacked the French. This was done with the same intrepidity and the same success as the day before. They were broken with the loss of a considerable number of men, and several pieces of cannon, which the impossibility of carrying them off, determined Marshal Suworow to have buried. After pursuing the

enemy

enemy nearly to Naefels,* this General marched towards Glarus, which he reached on the same day, the 1st of October.

Massena, who on the 30th, had joined Lecourbe at Altorf, had began the pursuit of the Russians in the valley of Mutton. His advanced guard 4,000 men strong, came up on the same day with General Rosenberg, and immediately attacked him, but the latter repulsed it with loss. On the next day, the 1st of October, General Massena came in person, with from 6 to 7,000 men against General Rosenberg, who was left at Mutton to guard the entrance of that valley, and to secure the march of the rest of the army. Massena attacked him in three columns, one keeping the centre of the valley, and the two others occupying the two sides of the mountains. General Rosenberg animated, and animating his soldiers with the same desperate courage, with which the Field Marshal had inspired his, charged so vigorously Massena's centre with three battalions, that he broke it and forced it to fly; an example which was followed by the two other

VOL. III. T columns

* The Austrians were defeated in this place by the inhabitants of the canton of Glarus, in 1388.

columns. The Russians pursued the enemy beyond Schweitz, after having killed or wounded 5 or 600 men, and taken more than 1,000 prisoners, amongst whom was General Lacour, and two chiefs of brigade. Seven pieces of cannon fell into their hands, which, like those which Marshal Suworow took the same day, were consigned to the earth. This affair cost General Rosenberg about 300 men.

These advantages gained at the same time by the advanced and rear guard, gave the Russians peaceable possession of the road from Schweitz to Glarus, and they took advantage of this to collect in the latter town, their wounded and sick. Marshal Suworow had flattered himself, that he should there be joined by some Austrian corps; but General Petrarch having already retreated into the Voralberg, and Generals Jellachich and Lincken into the country of the Grisons, the Russian General having no other support to expect but that of General Auffenberg's brigade, was obliged, notwithstanding an ardent desire to maintain himself in the small cantons, to renounce it, and to think of his own safety already much committed. After having therefore allowed his army to repose for three days, he began his march

march on the 5th towards the Grison country, leaving his wounded at Glarus, whom the extreme difficulty of the roads, rendered it impossible to transport, and arrived the same day at Elm, after many assaults sustained by the rear guard from the enemy, who had begun a pursuit, but shortly renounced it. However great were the difficulties which had presented themselves in the valley of Zernf, through which they had marched to Elm, that of Fleim by which it was determined to proceed to that of the Rhine, and towards which they marched on the 6th, presented much greater fatigues and obstacles. It was not without infinite labour that this march was accomplished, which cost the army part of its beasts of burthen and baggage, as well as a pretty large number of soldiers, not in a condition to follow them, and that they reached the valley of the Rhine, where this army was reunited on the 8th in the environs of Chur, still amounting to near 14,000 men; having thus lost in this short but terrible campaign, about 3,000 men in killed, wounded, or lost in the mountains, or who had remained behind during the first marches. The actions in which they had been engaged, cost the French

at least 4,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The Russians after their retreat from Zurich had on all points withdrawn behind the Rhine, and quitted Constance. As soon however, as they recovered from their late defeat, at the instigation of the Austrians, they returned on the 30th to that city, where the French had but one piquet, which was easily driven from it. The left of the defensive line of the Russians was then fixed at Constance, and the right at Eglisau. They occupied also on the left bank of the river, the two intermediate posts of Busingen and Dissenhoffen, the bridges of which they guarded. They would have been weak on this line, if their dependence had been only upon their own strength; but besides a Corps de Reserve belonging to General Nauendorf, which was on the right bank of the river, they had been joined at the instant of their retreat by part of the Bavarian Contingent, consisting of about 2,400 men, and a few days after, by the small army of the Prince de Condé, who arrived from the bottom of Volhinia, after having been many months sometimes on his march, and sometimes detained upon the frontiers of Bohemia, by the opposition which

which the court of Vienna made to his passage across the hereditary dominions. This army, including a body of Russian hussars, which had been united to it, was about 5,000 men strong; it took post quite on the left of the Russian army, and occupied the city of Constance. Beyond this point, the western bank of the lake of that name, was entirely abandoned by the Allies, as far as Rhineck.

When General Petrarch withdrew from Utsnach, a part of his corps took their rout towards the Grison country; the remainder, with their commander, marching by the way of Liechtensteig, St. Gallen and Appenzell, went to occupy the Rheintal. The head quarters were fixed at Feldkirch. The celerity with which General Petrarch marched to protect the Voralberg, proved to be of little use, for the French advanced, but in very small numbers, into the canton of Appenzell, and even into the Thurgaw. Their greater force was in the canton of Zurich, and was even compelled to remain there almost inactive, owing to the departure of Massena and a part of the army, for the cantons of Lucerne, Schweitz, and Glarus.

The Archduke had been informed on the 28th of September, at his head quarters in Schwet-

zingen, of the disasters experienced by the allies in Switzerland. Whether this Prince entertained, or not, any project of a campaign upon the lower Rhine, being alarmed at the dangers which menaced Suabia and the Grison country, he hastened to fly to their defence with a part of his army, leaving the remainder under the command of Prince Schwartzemberg, for the protection of the Necker and the Mein. Prince Charles having arrived on the 4th at Donaueschingen, which he made his head quarters, immediately turned his attention, if not to repair the misfortunes of the 25th and 26th, which was now scarcely practicable, at least to prevent their being attended with still more disastrous consequences. Being made acquainted with the first successes, obtained by Marshal Suworow, and with the inconvenience which thence resulted to Massena, he was delivered from all apprehension of an irruption beyond the Rhine on the part of the French, and resolved to carry the war again into the canton of Zurich, with the intention of making there at least a diversion in favour of the Russian General, and thus to enable him either to derive advantage from his first successes, or to secure his retreat into the Grison country. This diversion, however, so much

wished for by Sutworow, and rendered necessary by circumstances, was resolved upon too late; the Russian Field-Marshal was already, before it was attempted to be put in execution, in the valley of the Rhine, and Massena was also already returned with his troops into the canton of Zurich.

The Republican General, freed from the apprehensions which the Russian army of Italy had caused him, thought of nothing but turning to his advantage, the first victories he had gained over the Russian army of Switzerland; and after having sent one division into the canton of Appenzell to keep General Petrarch in awe, he sent on the 6th, his advanced guard to reconnoitre the positions which the Allies then occupied upon the left bank, before the city of Constance, and the bridges of Busingen and Dissenhoffen, having resolved to make an attack upon them at the same time the next morning, and to drive back the Allies entirely on the other side of the Rhine.

In consequence, a strong column from his centre, attacked suddenly the entrenched posts before the city of Constance, which were occupied by the Prince of Condé's army, which was too weak, in point of numbers, to be able to protect equally all approaches

to the city. It for a long time repulsed the attack of the enemy in front, but, in the mean time, the light infantry of the latter, found means to pass a small marshy bog, to penetrate, as far as the town, and sieze the gate of Paradis. While this was transacting, the corps of noble infantry, the hussars of Baur, and other troops, continued to defend the intrenched camp, and there remained to them no other alternative, than that of being made at last prisoners, or of making their way through the city sword in hand. The latter was best adapted to the experienced bravery of this troops, and also to the fate which the republican laws reserved for the emigrant prisoners*. The entry of the city was forced, the streets retaken and cleared of the enemy, who left there a hundred of their dead. This desperate action, almost unprecedented in this war, was performed by the grenadiers of Bourbon, the noble infantry, and their

worthy

* It turned out, however, otherwise, and the Emigrants taken were treated as Russians. There is reason to believe that the retaliations threatened by Marshal Suworow, after the example of the Spanish General Ricardos, contributed as much as the humanity of Massena or of the Directory to this act of justice.

worthy companions the hussars of Baur. During this period the Republicans made an attack upon the entrenched camp, but they were galled by grape shot, and repulsed with the loss of 200 or 300 men. This day cost the Allies 150 men, killed or wounded, amongst whom was General de Salgues, who was slain at the head of the Bourbon grenadiers. The duke d'Enghien, behaved with his usual bravery. The Prince de Condé run the most imminent danger, having passed through the town at the instant when the enemy were there. If the latter had possessed more judgment and resolution, they would have marched straight to the bridge, have broken it down, and all that was on the left side of the Rhine, would infallibly have fallen into their hands. The army of the Prince de Condé remained in possession of the city of Constance, during the night, but quitted it on the morning of the 8th, the strength of the enemy being more than double his own. It went to encamp on the other side of the lake, and on the 9th, fixed his head quarters at Stahringen, near Stockach.

The Republicans were still less successful on other points; they were repulsed during the whole day in the attacks which they made on the head of the
 1 bridge

bridge at Dissenhoffen. The Russian General Wor-
now, not only defended it with spirit and success, but
even took from the enemy 3 pieces of cannon and
some men.

Massena had resolved to attack, on the same day,
the head of the bridge of Busingen, but here he was
prevented. General Korsakow, whether it was that
he wished merely to frustrate this attack, which the
reconnoitring made the day before by the enemy,
gave him reason to expect, or whether, in conformity
to what has been said above, he wished to attempt
something in favour of Marshal Suworow (of whose
march towards the Grey League, perhaps he was
ignorant) passed the Rhine the morning of the 7th,
with about 8,000 men, of whom the fourth part was
cavalry. He had not gone four miles, before he met
with the advanced guard of the enemy, strongly
posted near the village of Schlatten: it was im-
mediately attacked, with fixed bayonets, by the Rus-
sians, and driven from its position: it took a second,
which it lost in the same manner: it was attacked a
third time, and two of its battalions had already laid
down their arms near the village of Trublickon,
when the main body of the French army, with Mas-

sena

sen a himself, arrived at Andelfingen to their support. At sight of this reinforcement, and at the approach of the enemy's cavalry, the Russians desisted from all their attacks, and not thinking it prudent to wait for one from Massena, made a retrograde movement towards the point from which they had come: the enemy followed them, and essayed, but in vain, to get possession in the evening, of the head of the bridge of Busingen, which General Korsakow, after having maintained for some time, quitted, for no reason that can be assigned, in the night time, withdrawing his troops from the other side of the Rhine.—This affair, and those of Dissenhoffen and Constance, scarcely cost the Allies less than 2,000 men, killed, wounded, or made prisoners, and certainly as many to the French.

These three engagements, fought in one day, were, if not the last, at least the only important ones, of which Switzerland was still the theatre, during this campaign. They terminated the bloody scene of the three weeks, which have been the subject of this chapter. These transactions have hitherto been only related: it remains at present, to examine their causes and consequences, the former have

have been the subject of so many discussions, the second of so many fears, and both of so much regret for the more rational part of the inhabitants of Europe, that even the contemporary historian, can hardly keep silence respecting them, whatever degree of reserve, he may on the whole have imposed upon himself.

had come the enemy followed
 but in vain to get possession of the country
 the first of the bridge of Isère, which General
 Kellermann, after having maintained for some time
 against the no less brave and more numerous
 night up, withdrawing his troops from the
 side of the Rhine, in the night, and the
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CHAP. XIV.

Observations upon the events described in the preceding chapter—Examination of the causes which brought on the disasters of the 25th and 26th of September—Degree of blame which ought to be imputed to the Archduke Charles, or to the court of Vienna—Unfortunate effects of the death of General Hotze—Faults of General Petrarch and Korsakow—Faults of Massena—Praises merited by Marshal Suworow and his army—Estimate of the loss of the French and allied armies, from the 25th of September to the 9th of October.

THE first ostensible cause of the disasters which happened to the Allies in the end of September in Switzerland, and of their consequent entire expulsion from it, was undoubtedly the departure of the Austrian army and of its Chief; but this was not the only cause, and ought not to have drawn upon the Archduke Charles, or even upon the court of Vienna, the indiscriminate blame which was so generally lavished on them at the time. It will not
be

be here examined, whether Austria had positively resolved to frustrate the generous project which England and Russia had formed to render the result of the campaign, both in a military and political point of view, as beneficial as possible, and of depriving Marshal Suworow of the honor of delivering Switzerland, after having reconquered Italy; neither shall it be investigated whether, as the Austrians have said, they had in vain proposed from the beginning of the campaign, that the Russians and they should act separately, or whether as the former had asserted, they had not engaged to enter into Switzerland until it was entirely subdued, and whether they had received assurances that the Archduke would not quit it upon any account—These questions it would neither be easy, nor in this work proper to resolve; if at any time politics are introduced into it, it may have been perceived that it is only when absolutely necessary, to give a true idea of the situation, of the forces, and the military projects of the Belligerent Powers.

Considering only in this last point of view, the injury which the departure of the Austrian troops did to the affairs of the Allies, it appears that the great number of those who have said that they
should

should have remained in Switzerland, and the small number who have on the contrary asserted, that they did well in quitting it, are equally distant from the truth.—The French had advanced upon the Mein and the Necker with superior forces; their direction announced the design of turning the Black Forest, and proceeding to establish themselves upon the Danube, which would have placed them upon the flank, or even on the rear of the allied army. They could not be allowed to accomplish these designs, without abandoning to them the plunder of the Palatinate of Franconia and of Suabia, without being obliged to evacuate the Brisgaw, and the Forest Towns, and in one word, without risking the safety of the Allies, and the ultimate success of the campaign. To these military considerations, are to be added the pressing solicitations of the Elector of Mentz, of the Duke of Wurtemberg, and of the Elector Palatine. The first of these Princes, though ruined by the war, had at his own Expence, armed the inhabitants of a part of his Electorate: the two others had just joined the coalition, and as by this step they had exposed themselves, and particularly the Elector Palatine, to the vengeance of the French, so they had acquired
a right

a right to the protection of the Allies, and more especially to that of the General in chief of the forces of the Empire.—All this made it the duty of the Archduke to hasten to rescue Franconia and Suabia from danger ; but at the same time the great force which Massena had in Switzerland, and the interest which the Allies had in retaining the portion of that country which they possessed, either to enable them to conquer the rest, or to ensure the favourable issue of the campaign in Italy, demanded that the Limmat and the Linth should be so powerfully guarded, that Massena might not be able to force that defensive line, the only one on that side of the Rhine, where they could maintain themselves, and upon the possession of which, depended consequently that of all the country occupied by the Allies in Switzerland. The Archduke seems to have had no other way of performing these opposite duties, but that of sending a part of his troops to join General Sztar-ray, which would at least have enabled him to check the progress of General Muller ; and of remaining himself with the rest in Switzerland, in which he would thus have had sufficient force to defend the line of the Linth and Limmat, perhaps even

even to retake the smaller cantons, and what was more essential, he would have prevented the faults afterwards committed by General Korsakow, either from want of skill, or ignorance of the country. One of the causes to which, with a good deal of probability, the departure of the Archduke has been attributed, is that he did not chuse to be himself in Switzerland at the same time with Marshal Suworow, which might have produced a collision of authorities, between the two Field Marshals, in which from his subsequent conduct, there is reason to think that the Russian would not have yielded. It can hardly be believed that notwithstanding the little harmony which prevailed between the courts of Petersburg and Vienna, that case had not been foreseen, and regulated beforehand. It was natural that the brother of the Emperor, Field Marshal of the troops of the empire, possessing so many glorious claims, and having given so many proofs of military talents, should have the pre-eminence over a General possessing the same military rank, enjoying also a very high reputation, but who was personally only a private individual, and who commanded troops inferior in number, troops also which were only auxiliaries,

and were in the pay of a third power. If then it had not been determined that Marshal Suworow should yield the chief command to the Archduke, or that they should act separately, it seems little extraordinary that the Prince should be unwilling to remain in Switzerland, and in that case his error, or that of the court of Vienna is reduced to not having left a part of his troops on the banks of the Limmat; the want of that precaution must appear perfectly inexcusable.

It is not however to that remote cause that the misfortunes of the 25th and 26th of September, must be exclusively attributed. The delay which took place in the march of Marshal Suworow, the death of General Hotze, and the bad conduct of Generals Petrarch and Korsakow, constitute three other principal causes of these events.

When the delay which took place in the march of General Suworow is spoken of, it is not referred to the three days longer, which he remained in Italy in order to secure the fall of Tortona. The great interest which the French had in preventing it, and the *demonstrations* which Moreau made with this view, were motives which prudence could not reject. But what cannot never be excused, and what

what must always be regretted is, the three or even four days which the negligence or bad faith of the Austrian Generals caused Marshal Suworow to lose in the Italian Bailiwicks. It may be affirmed with perfect certainty, that it had been positively promised him, that a sufficient number of beasts of burden for transporting the bread and baggage of his troops, should be collected and ready by the time at which he should arrive at Taverna. Those who some way or other prevented the fulfilment of this promise, it must be allowed are extremely culpable, and indeed it is upon them that the responsibility of all the reverses which the Allies experienced in Switzerland ought to fall. In fact, had Marshal Suworow been able to put his vanguard in motion on the 10th, instead of the 19th, and to sett off himself on the 17th instead of the 20th, he would have arrived at Altorf on the 22d or 23d, that is to say, two or three days before the attack of Massena. It would thus have been prevented—the forces of the Allies would have remained entire—Hotze would have lived—and the invasion of the small cantons would undoubtedly have been made by him with vigour, with concert, and most probably with a success,

which would have immediately seconded the operations of Marshal Suworow—Events very different from those regretted by Europe, it may be believed would have happened. It will be objected that if the Russian General had arrived sooner, Massena would have also made his attack earlier, but this objection which naturally suggests itself, is destroyed by the fact: for Massena was perfectly ignorant of the march of Marshal Suworow, and Lecourbe was on that point in such perfect security, that when he put himself in movement at the same time with the rest of the army on the 24th, he found himself engaged in the valley of the Reuss, between the Russians and the column of General Auffenberg. Since then, Marshal Suworow not arriving till the 26th, had concealed his march from the French, it appears evident that the case would have been more certainly the same, if he had arrived three or four days sooner.

It need not be repeated how fatal the death of General Hotze was to the Allies. That able officer, fighting on and for his native country, would perhaps upon the 25th, have maintained his position against General Soult, or at least his defence would have been more obstinate, than that of
his

his successor. He certainly would not like him have so precipitately evacuated the Toggenburg, the country of St. Gall, and the canton of Appenzell. He would have disputed the ground inch by inch, and would perhaps even have been able to do something in favour of his colleague Korsakow. He would, it cannot be doubted, have justified the confidence which Marshal Suworow had in him, and would have supported him to the utmost of his power. It is probable that in that case, the Marshal finding himself well supported on his right, instead of being obliged to retire into the Grisons, would have kept his post in the small cantons, and that upon the return of the Archduke to the Rhine, the campaign might have been renewed with advantage.

But the immediate causes of the disasters of the 25th and 26th of September, were the faults of Generals Petrarch and Korsakow; those of the former have already been sufficiently pointed out; besides, to say what General Hotze would not have done, is to have said what General Petrarch did do, and what he ought not to have done. He showed himself on this occasion, as he had done some months before, at Frauenfeld, and in 1796,

at Kehl, and in the Black Forrest. To recal these occurrences, is to say enough against that General.

It is a matter of regret, that the conduct of General Korsakow cannot be more favourably spoken of; his amiable qualities, his undoubted bravery, and the honorable use which he made of the favour he once enjoyed at the court of Petersburg, would prevent any reflection, was it not considered that it is not on the man, but on the General, that a judgment is to be passed. In the latter capacity he has been far from fulfilling the expectations, which were to be formed of a man who was selected to go, at the distance of 1,200 miles, to command an army destined to give the last finishing to the success of the campaign. He had brought into Switzerland, or had formed very soon after he got there, prejudices against the Austrians, which certainly were not just to the length that he carried them; for if the military farce which they played off on the 27th of August, and to assist at which they made him come up by forced marches, was not calculated to give him much confidence in their offensive intentions, it ought not, however, to have made him believe that they were disposed to betray and sacrifice him. If information may be depended

depended upon, scarcely was he arrived, when according to the order of his Sovereign, he required that an attack should be made, and did it so keenly, that the Austrians, though perhaps with no great sincerity consented to it, and in consequence a plan of attack was formed. The part which was assigned to General Korsakow, he thought too hazardous, and from that conceived that they wished to have him defeated.—He refused to execute it, alledging that his troops were not accustomed to a war *among mountains*, which every reader will observe, was certainly the same thing as to renounce it altogether in Switzerland.

When by the departure of the Archduke, General Korsakow became entrusted with the chief direction of the defence of a country, which was not only unknown to him, but *mountainous*, the most fortunate thing which could have happened to him, and which he should have sought for with the utmost pains, was to find some one who could inform him of the nature of the country occupied by the enemy, and of the kind of war to be carried on. The local knowledge, the experience, and even the personal interest of General Hotze, rendered his advice more precious than that of any

other, but what he gave was rejected with distrust and contempt. It would be impossible to answer positively for the truth of what is here unwillingly related, but it rests on the authority of Persons not only worthy of credit, but whose situations put it in their power to be particularly well informed.—The best thing which General Kersakow could have done when left to himself, was to have imitated in every point, the measures of his predecessor, as the experience of three months in the same position, had proved their expediency, during all which time the head quarters had been at Kloten, at a proper distance behind the whole line. General Korsakow on the contrary, placed his at Zurich, which was upon the line of defence itself, and thus he exposed himself to be driven from them in the first moment, to lose his baggage, his artillery, and his military chest—It is known that in fact he lost a part of all those, and that misfortune would not have happened, if his quarters had been at Kloten. He would likewise have avoided the excessive confusion which must always be occasioned by the removal of head quarters from danger, at a moment when nothing but fighting should be thought of.

As

As to the faults which were committed upon the days of the 25th and 26th, they have been sufficiently pointed out in the course of this narrative, and they are of themselves so evident, that they need not here be much insisted upon. Though the Russians were on the whole inferior in number to the French, yet the latter had not on the line of the Limmat, 10,000 men more than the former. If General Lorge had been vigorously attacked on both sides, after he had passed that river, or rather if he had been prevented from establishing a bridge, the success of the day might have turned in favour of the Russians, or at least they would have acquired the means of defending for some days, and inch by inch, the canton of Zurich; and when what Marshal Suworow was then doing is recollected, it is evident that to gain time, was to gain every thing. In no point of view can the unskilful and disastrous retreat of the Russian Generals ever be excused, and it appears that the opinion of the court of Petersburg, on their conduct, was not different from that formed by the public; for General Korsakow, with three other Generals, among whom was Markow, were dismissed the service.

It

It is the fate of unsuccessful Generals to be always blamed, and in spite of the *Res Sacra Miser*, it is commonly with justice; for defeats are almost always the consequences of errors. War is a difficult game, at which the ablest player generally gains. The reader will not, therefore, have been surprised to find some censure thrown upon the Generals Petrarch and Korsakow, but he will be so, perhaps, when he finds the conduct of their conqueror still more positively criticised.—The faults of the former were on the field of battle, in difficult, perilous, and hurried moments, when every measure must be decided on instantly, and when some minutes of delay may render ineffectual, or even hurtful, the most excellent dispositions. But the errors of the latter were committed in cool blood, when he was quietly at his head quarters, and when he had every circumstance in his favor.—Let any military man judge of the conduct of Massena—He had under his orders, in the beginning of September, or even in the end of August, at least 70,000 men, of whom about 55,000 were opposed to about 42,000 Russians and Austrians. It was to have been expected, that as soon as the Archduke should be at a certain distance from Switzerland, Massena would take advantage

tage of his superiority, to attack his remaining opponents. The Directory, and the Generals Moreau, Championnet, and Muller, pressed him much, but he remained immoveable and in perfect inactivity for three weeks—he attacks at last : and what time does he chuse? the very moment when Marshal Suwarow was not only on his march against him, but even within a short distance of his rear. What opinion is to be formed of a General, who, having it in his power, during a whole month, to strike an important and almost certain blow without any serious risk, waits to do it till his situation would be most dangerous in case of a defeat, and until, even in case of success, he is no longer able to profit so much by it as he otherwise might have done? Such was the conduct of General Massena.—If he had attacked at the moment when the Archduke arrived with his army on the Necker, before that Prince could have returned, he would have had time, not only to reconquer all Switzerland, but also the country of the Grisons, and even perhaps to pass the Rhine, or to pour 15,000 men into Italy, which would have much embarrassed the Allies, or at least have detained Marshal Suworow at the bottom of the Alps.—Besides, by forcing the Archduke to return,
he

he would likewise have left Franconia, and even Suabia, in the power of General Muller. It must be remarked, that in that case, all the division of General Lecourbe, which on the 24th, began his projected attack upon the country of the Grisons, and which was stopt the next day by the advanced guard of the Russians, and by the brigade of General Auffemberg, would have been able to assist freely the general operations, and would have augmented the force, and the success of Massena. By not attacking sooner than the 25th, that General, notwithstanding the victory which he obtained, and which he owed partly to chance, derived from it only a small part of the advantages which it ought to have produced. He was obliged to retrograde, to oppose Marshal Suworow; he gave time to Prince Charles to return after having defeated General Muller; and he lost, for the rest of the campaign, the chance of getting possession of the country of the Grisons, the importance of which is well known to every reader. Independent of these capital errors, Massena committed a very considerable fault in the execution of this attack, in leaving his right flank so ill defended, by which means the Russians, almost without resistance, got possession of the St. Gothard, where

where they ought, and might so easily have been stopped. There is but one way of explaining the conduct of Massena, and saving his military reputation ; and it is not to be wondered at, that that way must appear probable to many, when it is remembered that he had acted in the month of August exactly as he did afterwards in September, and that then he had delayed his attack on the Archduke till the day on which the army of General Korsakow arrived at Schaffhausen. In every view of the matter, it is surprising that Massena was able to obtain the approbation of the Directory, and of their successors. Like the greatest part of the public, they have probably been dazzled with the brilliant victories of the 25th and 26th, which, indeed, were the only important ones, gained by the Republic, in the course of the campaign.

It is consoling to have to pass from censure to admiration, and such is the case now, that the conduct of Marshal Suworow and his brave army be spoken of. When it is remembered that it was after having come from the interior of Russia, and after a most active and bloody campaign of five months duration, that this army, reduced almost to the half of its original number, penetrated into the middle of the Alps, there

there to open a new campaign, to fight new battles, and to engage in a kind of warfare to which it was entirely unaccustomed, one is struck with admiration of these intrepid soldiers, of their worthy commander, and of the Emperor Paul, who subjected his troops to such labours for the benefit of the civilized world! The march of Marshal Suworow across the Alps, shall not here be celebrated, for the French and Austrians had preceded him; but what must appear much more worthy of praise are the obstinate battles which he fought in the valley of Mitten, and in the canton of Glarus, the constancy with which he and his army supported every kind of privation, and the fatigues of a march which was a continued engagement. Generals Prince Bagration and Rosenberg, already so distinguished in Italy, acquired new glory in Switzerland. Marshal Suworow confirmed that with which he was already loaded, and gave fresh proofs of his resolution and heroism. It has been said, that he received, with much impatience, the accounts of the disasters experienced by Generals Petrarch and Korsakow, and certainly considering how many projects were disappointed by them, and all the mischief they did to the affairs of the Allies, it would have been astonishing if he had received them

them otherwise. He has likewise been reproached with afterwards losing time in the canton of Schweitz, and perhaps with a certain degree of justice, but it is a noble fault to be slow in retiring before an enemy, and he did better than fly before his, for he stopt and beat them.

Before finishing this chapter, something must be said with regard to the loss of men on both sides in Switzerland, from the 25th of September to the 9th of October. It would only be loss of time to refute the extravagant reports made by the French Generals in the intoxication of victory. The final estimate sent by Massena on the 9th of October, in which he stated the total loss of the Allies' at 30,000 men, shall only be attended to, and it may without hesitation be affirmed from various researches made on the subject, that this statement was at least exaggerated by one half.—The Austrians lost few men on the 25th, and had no prisoners taken from them, and it would probably be going beyond the truth, when their numbers of killed and wounded is stated at 1,000. The loss of General Korsakow's army, which has been so variously reported, was certainly not above 8,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Marshal Suworow
in

in these three ways lost about 2,000 men. He likewise left some sick and wounded at Glaris, as did Korsakow at Zurich; but their number could not amount to 2,000. In the three actions of the 9th of October, the Allies lost about 2,000 more, so that on the whole, the void occasioned in their ranks in the course of three weeks, was about 15,000 men. There is reason to believe that the loss of the French in the same period, did not exceed 9,000. They suffered very little in their engagements with Generals Petrarch and Korsakow, and their principal loss was in their combats with General Lincken, Bagration, and Rosenberg. Those who have seen service, and who know how much Gazettes and even official reports exaggerate the destruction of men, which is always too great in a human point of view, will not be surprised to find here reduced so much the losses, which on both sides have been swelled so high. There never is a campaign in which the number of men in the Belligerent armies is not two or three times destroyed by exaggeration or credulity. It is the duty of the historian to avoid the one, and if possible to set right the other.

CHAP. XV.

The French and Imperialists supposed to entertain offensive views, none of which prove real—Marshal Suworow quits the country of the Grisons, and General Korsakow the canton of Schaffhausen—They form a junction behind the lake of Constance—The forces remaining to them—Estimate of their Losses—The French make an attack in the country of the Grisons on the 31st of October—They gain some ground—The Archduke reinforces the troops which guard that country—March of the Russian army towards Bavaria and the upper Palatinate—It halts in Bohemia—Last operations which take place in the country of the Grisons—Conclusion of the campaign in Switzerland.

FROM the moment in which the French were in possession of all Switzerland as far as the Rhine, and when Marshal Suworow had joined the Allies in the valley of the Grisons, two things were almost equally

expected to take place, neither of which happened. It was thought certain, that Massena would hasten to take advantage of the losses which the Allies had suffered, and of the little accord and stability that prevailed as yet in their defensive arrangements, to pass the Rhine, advance into Suabia, lend an helping hand to General Muller, and give his army winter quarters in the enemies country. If he did not undertake this expedition, it was supposed that at least he would bring together a great force against the country of the Grisons, and exert his utmost efforts to make himself master of that bulwark of Switzerland, before the winter set in. On the other hand, a number of speculators, without considering the nature of the season, the scarcity of provisions, the difficulties of conveyance, the fatigue of the troops, and the ruin of their arms and clothes, and supposing that an army is always as ready for motion in the field, as a regiment at parade, were equally confident that the Allies would hasten to pour into Switzerland from all sides, and to lavish the remains of their blood in reconquering that country. Neither of these expectations were gratified; the first it will be allowed, was far less unreasonable than the second. Massena had

an interest most assuredly, in sending part of his troops out of Switzerland, which was no longer capable of supporting them, and to the defence of which they were no longer necessary. As to the passing of the Rhine with all his forces, and opening a new campaign beyond that river, the thing deserved more consideration, and presented more difficulties than was imagined. Notwithstanding the losses sustained by the Allies, they were in the month of October nearly twice as strong as they had been a month before. On one side of the lake of Constance, the troops which had returned with the Archduke, joined to those which had remained upon the right shore, to the wrecks of Korsakow's army, to that of the Prince de Condé, and to the Bavarian contingent, amounted to more than 45,000 men. On the other side of the lake, the junction of Marshal Suworow with the Austrians supported by about 5,000 armed inhabitants of the country of the Grisons, the Voralberg and the Tyrol, formed no less than 30,000 men—Massena therefore had 75,000 men against him. He had not more under his command, and certainly could not bring so many into the field; besides, he was very far from having a supply of arms, and pro-

visions proportioned to the number of his soldiers. They received neither pay nor rations with regularity, and their equipment was in so disordered a state, as to be unequal to an active war. The magazines were in a great measure exhausted, the artillery wanted horses, and the military chest was so completely drained, that although Helvetia made it a common cause with the French Republic, Massena, in contempt of the treaty which mutually bound them, was reduced after the capture of Zurich to impose a contribution of 800,000 livres upon that town, the same upon Basle, and half that sum upon St. Gall. These acts of authority met with a formal opposition from the Helvetic Directory, and inflamed the discontent of the Swiss to such a degree, that Massena judged it prudent to moderate his demands. The Swiss Government still continuing absolutely to refuse them, the French General appealed to his army, and the contributions imposed were finally paid, either in money or in commodities.

In spite of all the obstacles which opposed the enterprises that the French army of Switzerland seemed destined to attempt, it may be thought, that in a military point

point of view, its leader was blameable, if not, for having omitted to invade Suabia with his whole force, if not, for having made no effort to possess himself of the country of the Grisons, at least for not having advanced 15 or 20,000 men by Basle and the forest towns, who would have much harrassed the Allies, and would have supported the operations of the army of the Rhine, which, without this assistance, were rather hurtful than of use to the French. It would have been easy for Massena to have completely equipped such a body of troops; he might have raised contributions, reaped the harvest of a part of Suabia, carried off horses and horned cattle, and taken up in safety positions, which it is unnecessary to point out.

Notwithstanding the great number of the Allies, circumstances compelled them to a conduct strictly defensive; although their army was as numerous as that of the French, and had greater and more certain resources in money and provisions of all kinds; yet it had suffered so much, and especially the Russians, by marches and engagements, and the late events had made such an impression upon the minds of the troops, that it was neither physically nor morally in a state to undertake a second time the con-

quest of Switzerland. To re-enter in the month of October, the career of labours, dangers, and sufferings presented by such an object, would have been to ruin their army entirely, and to render it incapable of engaging in the next campaign; besides, what might have been gained could in no way compensate for what would certainly have been lost: granting that the lesser cantons, and that of Zurich, had been reconquered, it would have been necessary to concentrate themselves in those countries, and to take up winter quarters there. This desolated country would have afforded none of the necessities requisite to an army which had suffered so much from a long and terrible campaign: the repose of the winter would there have been more severe than the fatigues of the summer. Without being certain of effecting the conquest of the whole of Switzerland, as far as the Aar, in one month, which was entirely out of the question, it was impossible to think of disputing the mountains of that country with the enemy and the season, and of disturbing the gloomy repose of its vallies. The Allies had no thoughts of such a project, and they were far from having that concordance of sentiments, and that unison of views, which would have been necessary to success.

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After resting his army two or three days in the environs of Chur, Marshal Suworow recommenced his march to proceed and operate with the other Russian army upon the banks of the lake of Constance, a junction which he had hoped to form upon the Reuss. On the 13th he arrived at Feldkirch, and on the 16th at Lindau, where he was joined on the 18th by General Korsakow's corps, which had reascended the Rhine, and had been succeeded upon that river by the army of the Archduke. The two Russian armies united, formed one of about 25,000 effective men, the remains of 70,000 nominally, who had been sent in the course of the campaign into Italy and Switzerland, but who, in fact, amounted to no more than 50,000 in the field: more than one half, it then appears, was either dead, disabled, in the hands of the enemy, or left in the hospitals. It would be impossible, positively to ascertain the number of men belonging to each of these classes. The Russian commanders in chief are alone acquainted with it; but if a conjecture is to be hazarded, it may be reckoned that 8,000 fell by the sword of the enemy, that 7,000 were made prisoners, and that the hospitals received the other 10,000 either as wounded or sick. One reflexion only is

here necessary. Marshal Suworow and General Korsakow had nearly the same number of men under their command; and the former, during more than six months, of the most active and eventful campaign lost no greater number in killed, and not nearly so many in prisoners, as General Korsakow lost in the space of fifteen days: the first has enjoyed the honour of victory, the second has endured the shame of defeat. Such is the difference resulting from the choice of Generals, and such the importance of that choice.

Massena had announced that he would attack the country of the Grisons on the 16th or 17th of October, but whether he was not yet in a condition to do it, or feared to be himself attacked at other points, or wished to wait until the Russians were farther removed, he did not execute his project before the 31st. On that day General Loison attacked the posts still held by the Austrians, in the valley of the Rhine between Ilantz and Reichenau, whilst General Mortier at the same time attacked the posts which the enemy had retained in the county of Sargans. It was as easy for the one as for the other of these Generals to succeed in the commission given him; the small detachments of Imperialists upon the

the points above-mentioned being merely destined for observation. Attacked by forces, greatly superior, General Auffenberg, who commanded in that quarter, drew off his troops from Vettis and Ragatz, retiring behind the Rhine, and on the side of Tamins and Reichenau, behind the confluence which the sources of the Rhine form at the latter place. The contests to which these operations gave rise, were of slight importance, but Massena did not neglect to attach some to them. He pretended to have made 500 prisoners, and to have killed and wounded a great number of men. He added, to render the whole more probable, that he himself had only lost three men killed and ten wounded.

These were the only hostilities which took place in the end of October. Prince Charles, however, was not inactive: the position taken by the two Russian armies behind the lake of Constance, obliged him to put his troops in motion on all sides to replace them. He reinforced Generals Lincken, Auffenberg, and Jellachich, in the Voralberg and the country of the Grisons. Several companies of chasseurs were formed of the inhabitants of that district, and many more of those of the Tyrol. These measures, and the season, put the Grison country

out

out of danger, and enabled Prince Charles, whose situation was become extremely critical, to employ his forces in the defence of Franconia and Suabia, till he should receive the new regiments, which at the news of the last events in Switzerland, were hastening to him out of Austria and Bohemia.

After having had his head quarters at Lindau till the 30th, without having had an interview with Prince Charles, Marshal Suworow quitted the banks of the lake of Constance with his whole army, and that of the Prince de Condé; and marched by Leutkirch, Memmingen, and Mindelheim to Augsburg, where he arrived on the 8th, with all his staff, and fixed his head quarters. His army took cantonments in the part of Suabia, comprised within the Iller, the Lech, and the Danube. The Prince de Condé had his head quarters at Landsberg, upon the Lech. The Russian General a few days afterwards, received orders from Petersburg, to reconduct his army into the states of his sovereign, and these orders he put in execution about the end of the month. Of this army there only remained upon the Lech, the Swiss regiments of Roverea, Salis, and Bachman, raised by, and in the pay of Great Britain: they formed together about 3,000 men. The Russian troops

troops traversed Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate; fresh orders stopped them upon the frontier of Bohemia, and Marshal Suworow placed his head quarters at Prague, from whence he continued his march towards Russia some time afterwards.

It is not here necessary to enter into the detail of the causes which removed the Russian army from the theatre of the war—Their retreat alarmed Europe, and exposed to view dissensions that had long been perceived by the enlightened part of the public. These differences which had led to the disastrous events in Switzerland, were aggravated by those events, and became so notorious at this time, as to restore the hopes of the French. Although essentially attached to the history of the end of the year 1799, the altercations which took place at the conclusion of a campaign that had crowned with success most of the plans of the Allies, do not yet belong to the cautious historian; it will be preferable, and more consistent with the plan of this work, to give an account of the subsequent military events, events which restored confidence to Europe, and prevented the evils that it seemed probable would result from the defection of the Russians. The fortunate

fortunate termination given to the campaign by the Archduke in Suabia, next claims our attention, which however must yet be detained on the subject which now engage it.

Massena had in no way taken advantage of the progress made on the 31st of October by the divisions of Generals Loison and Mortier, and his inactivity was probably owing to the natural embarrassments in which the French army of Switzerland was entangled, and to the checks which the army of the Rhine had experienced. Whether, however, Massena had not renounced all designs upon the Grisons, whether he wished to discover how that country was protected since the departure of Suworow, or that he was desirous of securing his right flank, he made general Loison pass on the 5th of November, from the lower to the upper source of the Rhine, where the Austrians held the post of Tuisis,* which they were compelled to evacuate, retiring upon Furstenau. The enemy advanced no farther, being unable to do so without incurring some danger, on account of the movements which had been made

* This place takes its name from a colony of Tuscans who settled there.

made almost at the same moment from Bellinzona, towards Dissentis and Airolo, by General Dedowich, who commanded the Austrian troops stationed in the Italian bailiwicks. The possession of the latter district was a great obstacle to the attacks which might be made by the French upon the country of the Grisons—The season already defended it more effectually than any thing else. The snows obstructed the valleys, destroyed the communications, and prevented the conveyance of provisions, in a country which in a manner furnished no more. Frost and snow reigned on the mountains of the Alps; in the valleys, misery and desolation: the lesser cantons had suffered to such a degree from the war, that they were unfit to be again the theatre of it. This consideration, joined to that arising from the reinforcements received by the Austrians in the country of the Grisons, and to the movements they were making in the Grey League, and in the canton of Uri, determined the French to evacuate in a few days afterwards, the two valleys of the anterior and posterior Rhine, and to retire into that of Urseren, where they had already concentrated themselves on the 10th of November. On neither side was there any other

remarkable hostility, for that appellation cannot be given to a reconnoitring made by the Austrians beyond the Rhine near Oberried, which merely occasioned some insignificant firing of musketry. From that period the campaign may be looked upon as terminated, and the troops of each party entered into winter cantonments.

The position in which the interruption of hostilities left the two armies, was as follows—The French occupied the Valais to the source of the Rhone, the Grimsel, and the St. Gothard; from thence their line traversed the canton of Glarus and the county of Sargans; followed the left bank of the Rhine to Rhineck; skirted the western shore of the lake, and again extended from thence along the left bank of the Rhine to Basle, in front of which place, on the other side of the river, they had entrenched posts—The Austrians occupied the foot of the mountains of the Valais, the Italian bailiwicks, the major part of the Grey League, occupied the right bank of the Rhine, from Reichenau to the lake of Constance, upon which they had a flotilla; and guarded as far as Basle, the bank opposed to that in the possession of the French, having brought away the bridges which they had

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at Eglisau, Stein, Dissenhoffen, and Constance. We see that the Rhine separated the two armies: they could not have a barrier more natural, or which more effectually secured repose to each of them.—The Archduke Charles continued to command in chief all the Austrian troops within the Alps.—Massena on the contrary quitted his army a short-time after, and went to Paris, to cultivate the good graces of Buonaparte, who, returning on a sudden from Egypt, had no less suddenly overthrown the revolutionary work of 10 years, and usurped the sovereign power, under the title of Chief Consul. The assent which both Massena and Moreau gave in the name of their armies, to this new order of things, secured to them a continuance in the chief command; but they changed armies—The first went in the room of the second, to put himself at the head of the army of Italy; the other assumed the command of the army of Switzerland, a command to which was united, that of the army of the Rhine, and which he went to exercise in the end of December.

C H A P. XVI.

Respective positions of the Imperial and French troops from Kehl to Mentz, at the end of September—The latter recommence offensive measures the following month—On the 4th and 5th of October, they pass the Rhine on many points—Possess themselves of all the country situated between the Mein and Lahn—Enter Frankfort, and drive from Mannheim and Heidelberg the Imperial troops, who retire to the Enz—Position of the opposed troops on the 1st of November—Dangerous and embarrassing situation of Prince Charles—Military measures which he adopts—Proclamation addressed by him to the States, and inhabitants of the Empire—Declaration also made to them by the Emperor of Russia—Effect produced by these two political papers—The Austrians having been reinforced, attack the French, and defeat them on the 3d, and following days—Compell them to withdraw into the angle formed by the Neckar and the Rhine—and raise the blockade of Philippsburgh—General
Lecourbe

Lecourbe on the 16th, makes a new attack and again invests this fortress—The Austrians fall back as far as the Enz—The Archduke sends General Sztarray with fresh reinforcements—The latter on the 3d of December makes a general attack, which meets with full success—Philipsburgh is relieved, and Lecourbe is forced to retire to Manheim—He proposes an armistice, which is accepted on condition that it is ratified by the Archduke—This Prince refuses to do it—The French evacuate Manheim and Neckerau, and completely repass the Rhine—End of the campaign.

WHEN at the end of September, Prince Charles quitted the banks of the Necker, to return to the borders of Switzerland, he left in the Palatinate Prince Schwartzenberg, with sufficient forces, if not to maintain an active offensive line of conduct, at least, to keep in check in that quarter, the French army of the Rhine, and to prevent its making any rapid and dangerous progress. There was not then between Kehl and Mentz a single Frenchman upon the right bank of the Rhine. From the latter city, as far as Basle, there were about 20,000 Austrians, sustained by the Lands-

turn, regularly organised, and about 10,000 strong. This last body, to which were attached some Mentzer and Imperial Hussars occupied the two banks of the Mein, confined the French in Cassel,* and left them scarcely any communication upon the right bank. The head quarters of this division were at Niederrad. Besides this national support, the Austrians reckoned also upon that of the inhabitants of Brisgau, the armament of which had been fixed upon, and even already, in part executed : Some companies of peasants were doing duty along with the Imperial troops, in some of the posts established in the environs of Kehl. The neutrality which the Margrave of Baden, persisted in maintaining, prevented the levy in mass, from being general in Suabia, and from forming a chain of Militia from the frontiers of Switzerland, as far as the country of Hesse Cassel. The French, ever since the retaking of Mannheim by the Austrians, had kept upon the

* It is well known that Cassel is a fort situated opposite Mentz, on the other side of the Rhine. Custine added to its fortifications in 1793 ; but it was the Austrians, who in the year 1795, put them really in a state of defence. They have since been still more improved by the French.

the defensive, contenting themselves with guarding with attention the left bank of the Rhine. But General Ney the provisional successor of General Muller, in the command of the army of the Rhine, which was intended for General Lecourbe, had no sooner learnt the victories of Massena, and the departure of the Archduke, which had been the consequence of them, than he thought of again resuming the offensive. His army amounted to about 25,000 men, and some reinforcements were on their march to join it. His first object was, and it was at once the most urgent and the easiest to be accomplished, to drive the enemy's posts from the environs of Cassel, and from all the country situated between the Mein, the Nidda and the Lahn.

On the morning of the 4th of October, the Republicans set off in force from Mentz, and advanced rapidly on the rout towards Franckfort, drove the posts of their enemies from Heidersheim, then from Sunlingen and Höchst, and obliged them to repass the Nidda. The next morning they forced the passage of this river, attacked the intrenchments, which the Mentzers had thrown up to cover a bridge of boats which was upon the Mein, at Griseheim.

These intrenchments were well defended, till the arrival of the French heavy artillery; but its fire quickly obliged the German troops to abandon them, and to withdraw their bridge. At the same time, a strong detachment of French pushed as far as Franckfort, on which it attempted again to levy a severe contribution. The magistrates of this town had the firmness to refuse it to them, and the double good fortune to remove, at the end of two days, these importunate visitors, at the price of only a few hundreds of Louis.

The Landsturm being apprehensive that the French would pass the Mein by the bridge of Franckfort, and cut off their retreat, hastened to effect it and retired in disorder towards Hauenstein, where they placed their head quarters. They were not pursued by the French, those having preferred to march in force towards the upper Nidda, to try to cut off the Imperial corps, which had been bold enough to advance into Rhingau, and even upon the banks of the Lahn, from whence, however, it effected a safe retreat, bringing along with it both prisoners and booty. The same day, the 5th, some hundreds of French passed the Rhine, near Lautersburg, and in spite of the neutrality of the country of Baden, pillaged

pillaged some villages of their grain and cattle, and returned to the other side of the river with their booty. A similar excursion took place at the same time at Sandhoffen, below Mannheim; but the Republicans had besides, the good fortune to surprize there a piquet of Hullahs, which they made prisoners. General Ney made the loss of the enemy, in these different actions, amount to 3,000 men, and his own to 100. It would be speaking largely to say, that the loss which the Germans experienced, amounted to three or four times the latter number.—It is clear, that the French had wished to alarm, at once, the Austrians on all the line along the Rhine, and it is easy to perceive that their aim was to ascertain the degree of strength in which the departure of the Archduke had left the Imperial troops on the Rhine. On the 6th, the French made before Kehl an attack which did not succeed: the same day the Landsturm advanced afresh as far as Niddergrad.

The easy successes which the French had obtained on the 4th and 5th, but which they did not follow up for many days, having proved to them that the Imperial troops were not in great force upon the Rhine and the Mein, General Ney resolved

to take advantage of their weakness, in order to advance into Germany, perhaps in order to compel the Archduke to send reinforcements thither, and thus render himself more feeble in Switzerland. In consequence of this, upon the 11th, he put all his troops in motion. A part of them passed the Mein, near Costheim, and another part the Rhine at a little distance from Gros Gerau. At their approach, the light troops of the Austrians, and the armed peasants fell back, part towards Aschaffenburg, and part towards Heidelberg. The French left a small body upon the Mein, to face the enemy, and marched with the rest of their forces to the Bergstrass. Some reinforcements which the Imperialists had received, put them in a condition to make some stand against the enemy, and impede their progress. The latter, however, gained ground every day, and having caused new forces to pass the Rhine, both above and below Mannheim, presented themselves all at once on the 17th, before that city and that of Heidelberg. The Austrians having had the precaution not to leave any thing in the former city, except some piquets without baggage or artillery, evacuated it at the approach of the French. The latter did not so easily get possession of Heidelberg, which they attacked

tacked by the right bank of the Neckar. They wished to pass the bridge, but found it so well defended by the artillery, planted both upon the side of the river, and on the heights, at the foot of which the town is situated, that after many attempts which cost them dear, they were obliged to give up the enterprize. Prince Lichtenstein, who had the command at Heidelberg, learning that the French were already in considerable strength upon the left side of the river, and having reason to fear being turned by them, quitted Heidelberg the next morning. The enemy having pursued him, and being joined by another body, which had passed the Neckar at Neckerhausen, a very warm engagement of cavalry ensued, in which prisoners were made on both sides. Count Esterhazy, Colonel of hussars, was made prisoner, and Prince Lichtenstein wounded. The Austrians retired, part towards Heilbron, and part towards Bruchsal, where the head quarters were fixed, and where Prince Schwartzembergh, who was ill, gave up the command to General Gœrger. The latter being reduced to act strictly on the defensive, had no other object than to cover Philipsburgh, as long as possible, and with this view he formed a chain of posts, all

along from the Rhine to the Necker, and passing by Wisenthal, Obstadt, Odenheim, and Sinzheim, nor did he lose a moment to introduce reinforcements and provisions into this fortress.

The French continuing to push forward, and having also caused some of their troops to pass the Rhine, above Philipsburgh, General Gœrger, on the 20th, transferred his head-quarters to Knitlingen, and drew back a little his chain of posts, still preserving, however, his communication with the fortress. The French approached it on the 21st, and attacked the posts of observation, which the Rhingrave of Salm had on the side of Graben, but they were repulsed, and fell back on the 22d.—It would be useless to continue the daily detail, of the trifling movements of the advanced posts of the two armies; no action of any consequence took place till the 1st of November; at this period, the French, who had every day gained a little ground, were in possession of the Palatinate and of the Bishopric of Spire had driven back the Austrians as far as the other side of the Enz; occupied both banks of the Necker, to the confluence of these rivers, and blockaded Philipsburgh: General Lecourbe had taken the command of the army, of which the
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advanced guard continued to be led by General Ney.

The Archduke found himself, towards the end of October, in a situation singularly embarrassing. Attacked in the Palatinate and in Franconia, threatened with being so in Suabia and the Grison country ; it was at this critical moment that he saw the Russians abandon the theatre of war. The two armies which he had opposed to him, consisted of more than 100,000 men, and he had scarcely himself 70,000 to line the banks of the Rhine, from its source as far as Kehl, to defend Suabia, and support the armed Peasants who covered Franconia. To meet at once so many difficulties, were required a judgment, a combination, and a skill, which were happily found united in Prince Charles. The preservation of the Grison country being of most consequence both for the safety of Italy, and that of the hereditary dominions, it was the first object of the Archduke's concern ; and the manner in which he placed it out of all danger of invasion, has been already pointed out.

From the lake of Constance to Kehl, the posts were so well chosen, that upon whatever points the enemy might wish to pass the Rhine, a large body of troops were enabled immediately to unite itself
against

against them. Little Basle and Kehl, from which they could have defiled, were particularly watched; these measures enabled the Archduke, who overlooked the whole from his excellent central position at Donauschingen, to send some reinforcements to the Necker, which arrived there on the last days of October: they were principally composed of heavy cavalry.

However well-concerted these dispositions might be, and however great the confidence which Prince Charles placed in the courage of his troops, he was far from being quite easy with respect to the dangers which both the present and the future threatened.

The misfortunes which had already taken place in Switzerland, the probability that the French would be eager to take advantage of their success and of their superiority, and the little confidence with which he could henceforth place in the support of the Russians, had determined him to address, on the 10th October, to the states and inhabitants of the German Empire, a proclamation, the length of which prevents its entire insertion, but the end of which, as containing some demands, which are not to be found in any of the preceding proclamations, shall be transcribed. After having recapitulated the
complaints

complaints of the Empire against France, recalled the efforts made, and expences incurred by the Emperor, for the defence of the former, and renewed his solicitations for the arming of the contingents, and the payments of the Roman months ;

He added—" Such is the situation of all those
 " countries which are unfortunately invaded by the
 " French, that the demands which I now make for
 " their security can bear no comparison with the
 " miseries they must experience from the oppres-
 " sions and unbounded extortions of the enemy.
 " I therefore trust, with confidence, that the states
 " and inhabitants will not only comply with the
 " proposal now made to them, but also voluntarily
 " come forward with free gifts, conformable to their
 " means and resources.

" These free gifts may be as various as the wants
 " of the army, and may be furnished in ready
 " money, obligations, corn, forage, serviceable
 " horses, linen, cloth, leather, and in any other
 " commodities useful to an army.

" As some difficulties may occur, however, with
 " many whose dispositions may lead them to make
 " patriotic gifts, without the immediate power of
 " carrying their intentions into effect, because,
 " though

“ though not in possession of specie, or commodi-
 “ ties necessary to the support of an army, they
 “ may have articles in gold or silver, either of
 “ real use, or ornamental; to enable such persons
 “ to be useful to their country, and to make their
 “ effects of permanent value to themselves, it is
 “ hereby declared, that such gifts in gold and silver
 “ shall be received in real value, the mark of gold
 “ at 380 florins, and that of silver at 24 florins 30
 “ krentzers; and it is also declared, that such per-
 “ sons shall receive in exchange, obligations at
 “ 4 per cent. The gold and silver to be furnished,
 “ to be delivered at the royal mint, at Guntzburg.”

This address had but little effect, and the example
 of patriotic donations, so ridiculously given in
 France, and adopted with so much efficacy in Eng-
 land, did not meet with a great number of imita-
 tors in Germany; as in Italy, the patriotism there
 resided chiefly in the lower classes; these had only
 arms and courage—and they had offered both.

About this period also, was circulated throughout
 Germany, a declaration made on the 15th of Sep-
 tember, by the Emperor of Russia, to the Members
 of the Germanic Empire, and presented to the Diet
 of Ratisbon. The warm interference of the Em-
 peror

peror Paul in the affairs of Germany, has proved an event of such importance to Europe, and may be productive of so decisive consequences in future, that the acts of this Prince, whose personal opinions seem to direct the politics, cannot be separated from the history of the time. This consideration will appear without doubt, to justify the insertion of this declaration.

“ His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of all the
 “ Russias, ever animated with zeal for the cause of
 “ Sovereigns, and wishing to put a stop to the
 “ ravages and disorders which have been spread by
 “ the impious government, under which France
 “ groans, to the remotest countries; being fully
 “ determined to dispatch his sea and land forces
 “ for the support of the sufferers, and to restore
 “ royalty in France, without, however, admitting
 “ *any partition of that country*; to re-establish the
 “ antient forms of government in the United Pro-
 “ vinces, and in the Swiss Cantons; to maintain the
 “ integrity of the German Empire; and to look for
 “ his reward in the happiness and tranquility of
 “ Europe; Providence has blessed his arms, and
 “ hitherto the Russian troops have triumphed over
 “ the enemies of thrones, religion, and social order.

“ His

“ His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias,
 “ having thus declared his views, and the motives
 “ by which he is guided, addresses this declaration
 “ to all the members of the Germanic Empire,
 “ inviting them to unite their forces with his, to
 “ destroy the common enemy, as speedily as possible;
 “ and to found upon his ruins permanent
 “ tranquility for themselves and their posterity.
 “ Should his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias
 “ perceive that they support his views and rally
 “ round him, he will, instead of relaxing his zeal,
 “ redouble his exertions, and not sheath his sword
 “ before he has seen the downfall of the monster,
 “ which threatens to crush all legal authorities: but
 “ should he be left to himself, he will be forced
 “ to recall his forces to his states, and to give
 “ up a cause so badly supported by those who
 “ ought to have the greatest share in its triumph.”

This declaration was not in any respect vain;
 for as the Emperor of Russia had throughout all
 the campaign, powerfully contributed to the safety
 of Germany, so he likewise according to his word,
 abandoned this country to itself, and recalled his
 troops from thence, as has been stated in the last
 chapter, about the end of October.

The solicitations of the two Emperors, made with so much urgency, but without mutual concert, had no effect upon the principal powers of Germany. Prussia, Saxony, and all the north persisted in their neutrality, and in the treaties by which France guarantied it to them. The south, more threatened with danger, not being included within the line of demarcation, and in some measure dependent on Austria, make some efforts. The elector of Bavaria placed at the disposal of the Archduke, the troops which he had in the Palatinate.* The Duke of Wurtemberg increased to about 2,500 men, the troops which he had upon the banks of the Neckar. The circle of Suabia assembled; and resolved upon the future armament of 10,000 men. Wurtzburg and Bamberg, thought also of contributing to the defence of Franconia, and formed some companies of peasants who went to join those of the Spessart and the Odenwald. These measures produced some support for the moment, and gave hopes of one more considerable.

It

* His contingent which had joined the Russian army in Switzerland, had followed it in its retreat into Bavaria.

It is time to revert to the military operations the recital of which has been unwillingly, but necessarily interrupted. The Imperialists, and the French, were left opposed to each other at the end of October, upon the banks of the Mein, the Necker, the Enz, and the Rhine, Philipsburgh being blockaded by the latter: General Ney's headquarters were at Brackenheim. The line of the respective advanced posts extended from the Rhine to the upper Necker, at a little distance from the Enz. The object of the French was to cover the siege of Philipsburgh, which they bombarded, and hoped to carry by the weight of their fire. That of the Austrians was to raise it, and at all events to shelter the Duchy of Wurtemberg. Prince Charles of Lorraine * was commander in chief upon the

Necker

* The same, who under the name of Prince de Vaudemont was before the revolution in the service of Louis the XVIth, as well as his eldest brother the Prince of Lambesc, who was *Grand Ecuyer* of France, one of the first posts in the kingdom. They quitted France at the beginning of the revolution, and gave themselves up entirely to the service of Austria, who acknowledged them as Princes of Lorrain, and took them into her service in the rank of Colonels. They are both of them become Field-Marsbals Lieutenants.

Necker, and his advanced guard was under the orders of Prince Hohenlohe. General Gœrger had the command from the Enz to the Rhine: A flying corps was with General Szenkeretzky upon the right bank of the Necker, to cover the right flank, and scour the country round it. This defensive position of the Imperial army, was almost the same which the Prince of Baden took in 1693, and which he maintained so successfully against Marshal de Lorges.

Prince Hohenlohe having advanced on the other side of the Enz, drew the attention of the French, who collecting superior forces attacked him on the 1st of November, near Bonigheim, and compelled him to withdraw as far as Bletigheim upon the Enz. During this, the body of French which was on the right bank of the Necker, advanced as far as Marpach, and thus outflanking the right of the Austrians, obliged them to send a part of their forces towards Bonigheim. The next morning, Prince Hohenlohe was reinforced by about 3,000 Austrians or Wurtembergers. This support arrived most seasonably; for on the 3d in the morning, his advanced posts were attacked and repulsed as far as the Enz, and the enemy appeared desirous to ad-

vance to the other side of the River. Prince Hohenlohe passed it himself, attacked the French with spirit, gained their right flank, beat and forced them to fall back as far as Erligheim, where being joined by their reserve, they took a position in order of battle. Prince Hohenlohe pursued them there, and had the skill to charge their cavalry at the moment when it was changing its front. This timely and vigorous charge met with complete success; the French cavalry was broken and put to flight—General Ney commander in chief, and the General of brigade Lorget, were wounded on this occasion. The French infantry deprived of the support of its cavalry, was, in spite of the obstinate defence it made, cut to pieces, or put to the route. This affair cost the Republicans more than 700 men, made prisoners, and about 1,500 killed or wounded. What was still more, it occasioned their losing all the advantage of the progress which they had been making for a month, and overturned all their projects with respect to Germany.

In fact, the conquerors having followed the enemy in their flight, chased them from the borders of the Necker, and drove them back the same day beyond Neuburgh. The column which had advanced
from

from the other side of the river to Marpach, had only time to fall back precipitately upon Heilbron and Sinzheim, and was near being cut off by an Imperial corps which crossed the Necker at Lauffen. On the 4th, the Palatine Colonel Wrede attacked the enemy in flank, forced the passage of the Necker near Pletten, and carried sword in hand, the village of Obrickeim; being seconded by a detachment of light Austrian cavalry, which swam across the river, he attacked the French afresh, forced them to give ground, and made some prisoners. This advantage was the more valuable, as it placed the Imperialists in the rear of the enemy, who had to fear every instant being taken between two fires, and, could not, consequently, hope any longer to sustain themselves beyond the Necker; they therefore continued to retreat, and on the 5th, Colonel Wrede took possession of Helmstadt. The preceding night the French had evacuated Pfortzheim (which they had entered on the 2d) a post which was too advanced for them to be able to maintain with safety, since the progress made on the other side of the Enz, by Prince Hohenlohe. The Austrians hastened to take advantage of their success: on the 6th, their advanced guard drove the

enemy from Knitlingen, and from Bretten, and made a great number of prisoners. On the 7th, Prince Hohenlohe occupied Sinzheim, a place famous for the battle fought there by Marshal de Turenne in 1674.

The enemy still had possession of all the Bishopric of Spire, and covered the blockade of Philippsburgh. General Gœrger received orders from Prince Charles of Lorraine to force them also to retreat from this point; The French were in consequence of this attacked on the 8th, driven from Bruchsal and repulsed to Obstadt, where having attempted to make a stand, they were turned and put to flight by an Austrian column, which had advanced to Stetfeld. At the same time a large detachment of Imperial hussars moved rapidly forward towards Graben, and attacked with such spirit the enemy's troops which immediately covered the blockade of Philippsburgh, that it destroyed, took or dispersed them, and thus relieved this fortress. On the 10th, an affair took place between the advanced posts near Hofheim, which turned out to the disadvantage of the French. On this and the following day, they compleated their retreat into the

the angle formed by the Rhine and the Necker, having their right upon the former river, their left upon the latter, their centre at Schwetzingen, and their head quarters at Manheim. The Austrians did not think fit to attack them in this concentrated position, where they were joined by some thousands of men from Holland. It was then, that they learnt that Bonaparte had on the 10th of the same month, overturned the directorial power, and they received at the same time orders to mark this new Era, if possible, by victories. The soldiers shewed as much joy and approbation at the downfall of the constitution of 1795, as they had shewn at its establishment. Their General was eager to take advantage of the momentary enthusiasm, which any thing new never fails to produce among the French, and especially among the soldiers.

On the 16th, on the morning, the four divisions were put in motion, and advanced in all directions against the enemy. The first marched along the Rhine, and attacked at Neulusheim, the posts which the garrison of Philipsburgh had pushed to this place; beat, and drove them back into Wagheusel, after having made a great number of them prisoners; the left of this same division went by Kisloch upon the

Wisenthal, and penetrated to Graben; thus all communication with the Imperial army was cut off from Philippsburgh. The second division, marched in the same manner, in two columns; that of the left towards Gochsheim, and that of the right by Minglesheim, towards Obstadt. General Lecourbe favoured the movement of these two divisions, by advancing himself between them, with a reserve of cavalry by Wagheusel, Hambruch, Forst, and Bruchsall, from whence he dislodged the enemy, who fell back to Bretten. The third division experienced more resistance than the two first, but nevertheless got possession of Weibstadt and Sinzheim. The fourth which was designed merely for observation, gained also some leagues of ground along the Neckar.—We see by this account, that General Lecourbe had carried the greater part of his forces towards the right, and that his aim was to invest Philippsburgh afresh. He succeeded in his object, and it cannot be denied that he shewed himself as skilful in the plains of the Palatinate, as he had done in the mountains of Switzerland. At the same time that this is acknowledged, his statement, that this day produced him 1,200 prisoners cannot be assented to. He pretended to have made

1,000 of the garrison of Philipsburgh alone, but nobody will believe that a garrison, at most 3,000 men strong, should have the third part of them upon a single point, its most advanced post of observation; nor did Lecourbe say that he had taken the whole of the troops which were at Neulussheim. It would be therefore nearer the truth, to estimate at 5 or 600 men, the number which fell into his hands. The conduct of the Imperialists did not expose them to suffer any great loss; their line of advanced posts, too weak to make head against the enemy, gave ground without much resistance, the expected reinforcements not having yet arrived. It appears however, that the latter ought to have covered Philipsburgh with a greater number of troops.

The result of the affair of the 16th, was that both parties resumed pretty nearly the same positions which they had occupied before the action of the 3d. The French blockaded Philipsburgh, and had their head quarters at Bruchsal—Those of the Austrians were at Vahingen upon the Enz; their advanced posts occupied however, many leagues of country before this river and the Neckar.

The rest of the month was passed in these respective positions without any action taking place worthy

of being related. There were during this interval, some slight affairs between the French corps which occupied the country of Darmstadt, and the militia of the Odenwald. They disputed, and had in turns the possession of Bergstrass; it was on both sides only a contest of observation. General Lecourbe, who after the action of the 16th, had repaired to Mannheim, returned to his army about the end of the month.

The inactivity in which the French, and the Imperialists remained opposite one another, was caused on one side by the desire of reducing Philipsburgh before any further enterprize was undertaken, and on the other, by the superior, and daily encreasing force of the enemy, who seemed determined to make their winter quarters beyond the Rhine. The fear lest they should succeed in this, and lest they should extend them as far as the Danube, determined the Imperialists to make their magazines fall back as far as the borders of this river, and the court of Wurtemberg prepared also not to be surprized at Stutgard, by the French. The Archduke Charles, however, was far from consenting to yield up Suabia to them, or even the bishoprick of Spire, and the Palatinate. The evacuation

evacuation of the Grison country by the Republicans, the inactivity of their army in Switzerland, and the winter's being already commenced, prevented this Prince from suffering much uneasiness with respect to the safety of his defensive line, from the source of the Rhine, all the way to Basle; and enabled him to give more attention and support to the war upon the Necker. As soon therefore as he was informed of the reinforcements received by the enemy, and of the action of the 16th, he sent into the Duchy of Wurtemberg, some fresh troops under General Sztarray, and he also gave orders to General Meerfeld, to carry upon the Enz, where they arrived the 21st, a part of those who were in the Brisgau, and which were to be replaced by the immediate armament of about 4,000 of its inhabitants. General Sztarray had arrived on the Enz, on the 29th of November, with the body of troops entrusted to him, and which pretty nearly re-established the balance between the opposite forces. There were about 20,000 men on each side; the Austrians had, it is true, the support of the Landsturm.

On the 1st of December, General Sztarray concentrated his troops in the villages nearest to Sinsheim

zheim and Odenheim, points upon which he proposed to penetrate, and caused the advanced posts of the French to be driven from Eppingen and Gochsheim. He dispatched at the same time a large detachment of light troops on the other side of the mountains, which border the plain of the Rhine, in order to alarm the blockade of Philipsburgh.—The next day, the 2d, [all the Austrian army was in motion in five columns, three of which were particularly destined for the attack; the two others, placed upon their flanks, were to cover them, and to serve in case of necessity, for a reserve. The first column, led by Prince Hohenlohe, which was to begin the action, advanced first upon Furfeld and Schweigern, which it carried, and from thence to Sinzheim, where the enemy was in force; at the same time the centre column under the orders of Prince Charles of Lorrain, directed itself towards Weiler, where the French were entrenched. These two points of Sinzheim and Weiler, which were, properly speaking, the left of the position of the French army, (not including in the line the body of observation, which was upon the Necker), were attacked in concert, and with spirit by the two Austrian columns, who after a warm engagement, succeeded in getting possession

session of them. It was not till after this first success, that the left wing of the Imperial army, commanded by General Gœrger, put itself in motion to march against the enemy, who occupied the two villages of Munzingen and Odenheim. General Gœrger turned the first post, while a part of his column marched towards the second, in such a manner, as to separate in some degree, the two positions occupied by the enemy. The latter driven from Munzingen, threw themselves back to Odenheim, and fell in with the Austrian column, which was proceeding obliquely towards this place. They immediately engaged, and after having defended themselves with courage, the French ultimately were either cut to pieces, or dispersed by the Austrian cavalry.

The three attacking columns had met with full success, and the posts of Sinzheim, Weiler, Munzingen, and Odenheim, were in their possession. All the centre of the line which the French army held from the Rhine to the Necker, was broken. The Imperial column of observation, which had been placed quite on the left near Bretten, rejoined towards the close of the day, the centre of the army ; that which acted the same part on the right, continued to be detached from it : it had effectually contributed to the event of the day, by turning the
left

left of the enemy by Weibstadt and Aglatershausen, and by advancing near Lobenbeld, where it had to sustain an attack from the enemy, which proved of no effect.

In the night of the 2d and 3d, Lecourbe concentrated his forces, and took an advantageous position on the heights which are between Sinzheim and Wisloch. General Sztarray did not wish to give him time to strengthen himself there, and at break of day he advanced in four columns. That on the right conducted by General Szenkeretzki, having under him the Palatine Colonel Wrede, endeavoured, as on the preceding day, to turn the left flank of the enemy, and to gain its rear. Prince Hohenlohe, with the 2d (which in order of march the day before had been the first) went straight from Sinzheim to Wisloch. The 3d, under Prince Charles of Lorraine, proceeded towards the latter place, by Waldangeloch. General Gœrger, with the 4th, in order to arrive at the same point, made for the Bergstrass, passing by Mingolsheim.—Prince Hohenlohe, who attacked the front of the enemy, could not break it, and was repulsed for many hours; but in the mean time, Prince Charles of Lorraine and General Gœrger, who marched upon the right of the enemy, out-flanked

flanked it, arrived upon their rear, and got possession of Wisloch : this operation was favoured by a thick fog, which rose about the middle of the day ; but this same circumstance permitted the enemy to march rapidly, and in a body from the Fayerthal to Wisloch, and to retake this place, a point necessary for his retreat, and the approaches to which he hastened to defend with artillery. He did not long remain master of this place : for the Austrian infantry attacked and carried the batteries with fixed bayonets, and to the sound of music ; penetrated into the town ; and after a bloody combat, fought even in the streets, drove the French out of it.—The army of Lecourbe, forced to quit the field, and the road towards the Rhine being occupied by the left wing of the Imperialists, made its retreat towards Lamén and Heidelberg. This it did not effect without difficulty, as well as loss. The Austrian cavalry repeatedly attacked and beat the rear guard, and night only saved the rest of the army from a total defeat. These two days, cost the enemy about 4,000 men, killed, wounded, or made prisoners : the loss of the Imperialists did not amount to a fourth part of that number.

It is evident that the plan of General Sztarray, who displayed

displayed as much ability in his dispositions, as his troops shewed courage in carrying them into execution, was precisely the reverse of that which Lecourbe had adopted on the 16th of the preceding month. The latter had carried the greater part of his forces into the valley of the Rhine, and upon the mountains which border it; his aim was to deprive Philipsburgh of the support of the Imperial army, and to invest suddenly this fortress. That of the Austrian General being to deliver it, he did not think of attacking its blockade, but judged that the best means of raising it, was to break through the centre of the enemy's line, and to force it back upon the Lower Necker, which would oblige the right wing to retreat also, and to raise the siege of Philipsburgh. This turned out to be the case; and on the 4th, the fortress opened its gates to the Imperialists. For the fourth time, its brave garrison, and their worthy commander, the Rhingrave of Salm, received the reward of their constancy and heroism. Never perhaps did it happen before, that a fortress, resisted with success in the course of one campaign, four blockades, accompanied with an almost constant bombardment. The means of resistance which this place possessed, consisting less in its fortifications,

tifications, which are but indifferent, than in the power which it has to inundate all its approaches, the French unable to besiege it in a regular manner, hoped to reduce it in time, by an incessant fire from their mortars and cannon, and they indeed succeed in rendering it almost a heap of ashes. The garrison could not have resisted these terrible and repeated trials, without the shelter afforded by the casemates ; but the uninterrupted service of the batteries, the privations, the fatigues, and during the last blockade, the rigour of the season augmented by a scarcity of fuel, occasioned it great miseries, and a considerable loss. Being principally composed of troops of the empire, it gave a proof that these soldiers, well commanded, could rival those of the Emperor, in the defence and safety of Germany. This garrison is entitled to the gratitude of all the inhabitants of that country, and to the admiration of all military men.

The French army took again on the night of the 3d or the 4th, the same position, which it had three weeks before, that is to say, its right towards the Rhine above Neckerau, its centre in front of Schwetzingen and its left towards the Necker, above Heidelberg : Head quarters were at Mannheim. It was not possible for the Austrians,
who

who had approached thither on all points, to force immediately this position so capable of defence. Lecourbe nevertheless, apprehensive that they should attempt to do this and succeed in it, unable to flatter himself that his army could resume the offensive in this campaign, and desirous of preserving till the following one the bridges upon the Rhine, of Neckerau and Mannheim, proposed on the morning of the 4th, to General Sztarraf a suspension of arms, of which the conditions were, that the French should remain in possession of those two bridges, and an extent of ground in front of both; that all hostilities should cease throughout the whole line from Philipsburgh to Oppenheim; and that they should not be recommenced without 18 days notice. This suspension of arms was accepted by the Austrian General, with the reserve however, that it should be ratified by the Archduke Charles. Lecourbe, hoping this ratification would be granted, and being desirous at all events to bring back his army safe behind the Rhine, made all haste to pass the river the same day, sending it to take Cantonments, part in the Palatinate, part in the Bishopric of Spire, and leaving only one battalion at Mannheim, and another at Neckerau. He transferred his head
quarters

quarters to Worms, from whence he set out on the 7th to join the army in Switzerland, the provisional command of which, he was about to take upon himself till the arrival of General Moreau. Baraguay D'Hilliers remained mean while chief of the army of the Rhine, which for the second time lost under his command the possession of Manheim and Neckerau. In fact, the Archduke Charles, not well pleased that General Sztarray, should voluntarily deprive himself of all the probable consequences of his success, and that he should give up for the winter to the French, the peaceable possession of Manheim and of Neckerau, which would have become before the spring, very formidable posts, refused to ratify the armistice. This refusal was made known to the French on the morning of the 8th, who, not being in a state to defend the two posts above-mentioned, and not doubting but that after the movements which the enemy had already made, they should be attacked before any reinforcements could reach them, quitted them in the night of the 8th and 9th, and drew up the bridges of boats, which were in both these places, of which the Palatines and the Austrians took possession the same day. This was, properly speaking, the last operation

ration of the campaign. It gave occasion, it is true, to new movements in the French army, but they produced no military consequences, and this army soon afterwards took up its winter quarters along the Rhine, between Strasburgh and Mentz. The Austrians took theirs upon the opposite bank, and the troops which they sent for this purpose upon the Mein, enabled the Landsturm to reoccupy the two banks of this river to very near Mentz, where the French shut themselves up; and to push parties upon the Lahn, as far as the line of Demarcation.—The Archduke Charles did not think of terminating this campaign, like that of 1796, by the taking of Kehl, and he was not even tempted to try a Coup de main upon this fortress, when about the end of December, the frost interrupted for some days its communication with Strasburgh. It has been already said in the preceding chapter, that this month passed without any hostilities taking place from the source of the Rhine, as far as Kehl.

After having for near nine months, been the witnesses and the victims of war, and of all the evils which it carries in its train, the numerous inhabitants of the countries which are enclosed between the
frontiers

frontiers of Italy and that of Westphalia, at last enjoyed some repose, which was nevertheless disturbed by the expectation of finding in three months after, their dangers and their sufferings renewed. However long may have been already the recital of the events of this long campaign, it is still necessary in order to compleat it, before we direct our attention to the still more eventful campaign made in the same year in Italy, to present some observations upon all that has been said, and to take a general and systematical survey of the combined war, of which Switzerland and Germany were the bloody theatre.

CHAP. XVII.

Four principal periods presented by this campaign—Examination of its result, as to territory—Review of the faults committed on each side—Estimate of its respective losses—Interest excited by this campaign, arising from the novelty of the theatre upon which it was acted, and of the species of war which it required—It will be looked upon as a model in future.

WHOEVER has read with discernment the narration which has just been terminated, and not content with the mere successive account of the operations and events of the campaign, has endeavoured to take a view of the whole, to judge of the manner in which it has been conducted, to class its vicissitudes, and to appreciate its result, will have seen,—that it comprises four distinct periods—that the French suffered the odium, but at the same time enjoyed the advantage of attacking—that by the first battles, they were compelled to abandon the offensive in Germany, and that the Imperialists resumed

sumed it also in Switzerland, towards the end of April—that they preserved it in both countries until the middle of June,—that from that epocha the war was, during two months, what Feuquieres has called, “ *a war between equal powers*”—that from the middle of August, the balance leaned on the side of the French,—that the offensive was theirs throughout the rest of the year :—that they derived advantage from it in Switzerland, but that in Germany, on the contrary, they were punished for having assumed it—that they ended the campaign in the first of these two countries as they had begun it, namely, by attacking, and being victorious ;—and that they also ended in the second, as they had begun, by attacking, and being beaten.—If the reader has turned his eyes upon the definitive result of these vicissitudes, he will, in like manner, have seen,—that it replaced the French, in regard to Germany, exactly in the same position which they occupied before the renewal of the war—that the Imperialists, who were at that epocha upon the Lech and the Danube, found themselves at the end of year upon the Rhine, the Necker and the Mein,—and that this progress, which at the first glance appears to be but negatively advantageous, (the Imperialists having made it

not upon the enemy's territory, but upon their own) was yet of great benefit to them, because it removed the war from the centre of Germany, and fixed it at one of the extremities of that country ; because, if it did not prevent the temporary invasions of the French, it at least hindered the weight of their dominions from being long felt ; because it assured to the Austrians, and (the state of the finances of the French republic considered) what was of more consequence, wrested from the enemy the products, the physical resources, and it may be said also, the population of all the territory lying between the Lech and the Rhine. The little gain resulting from this campaign in Germany, belongs therefore, evidently, to the Imperialists. With regard to Switzerland, the case is the same ; for although the French ended, by reconquering the whole of what they had at first lost in the country, enclosed by the Rhine, from its source to the mouth of the Aar, yet they could not prevent the Imperialists from retaining a threatening position round this semi-circle, and chiefly, they could not retake the Valteline and the Italian bailiwicks, countries equally important, and even necessary to the defence of the country of the Grisons and of Italy, and the possession of which, assured

to

to the Imperialists that of the two latter countries.— Every thing considered, every thing balanced, it will be seen that the issue of the combined campaign of Germany and Switzerland, though far from being such as was expected by the public, was nevertheless of use to the Imperialists : if it had little value in the eyes of politicians, it had more in those of military men.

What has just been said, naturally leads to examine what were the causes which so much circumscribed the result of this campaign, and which rendered almost equally useless to both parties, so much blood spilt, so many labours undertaken, and so much expence incurred. This scrutiny cannot be other than that of the faults committed on either side. Whatever reserve, it may be wished and reason requires to be maintained, an opinion may still be pronounced upon some of the operations of this campaign, when it happens to conform with that which has been generally expressed, by observing and well informed men of the profession, and when it is justified by the succession of events.

The first fault, a very essential one, was committed by the Directory, in forming projects, as contrary to its interests, as they were above its

means, and in resuming the contest with unequal forces. Nothing more shall here be said upon this point; it has been touched upon in the beginning of this volume, and there will be occasion to return to it in the end of the next. A second fault arising from the first, and which immediately relates to the subject of this chapter, was causing an offensive campaign to be opened on the 1st of March, by an army, (that of Jourdan) inferior in number to that which it was going to attack, and which had besides more foot soldiers than muskets, and more horsemen than horses. A delay of one month more would have given time for the arrival of reinforcements, which were already on the way; the cavalry and artillery would have been remounted; the army of observation, the nullity of which occasioned the defeat and precipitate retreat of Jourdan, would have weighed in the balance, by advancing either into Franconia, or, what would have availed more, into Suabia, upon the Necker and Danube. This delay would not have injured the affairs of the Republic, and would not have deprived it of the advantage of aggression. Every thing has proved that the Austrians were determined to leave the odium of that to the French.

The faults committed by Jourdan himself, have been sufficiently pointed out, to render it needless to recapitulate them here.—That of having left a part of his left wing on the other side of the Danube, was the greatest that could be committed in his situation, and he was punished for it as he deserved.—He seems to have been sensible of it himself, for he laboured to palliate it in a memoir, which appeared long after the commencement of this volume had been written.—Neither did he nor the inferior Generals take advantage of the means of defence offered by the mountains of the Black Forest.—It would have been easy to maintain themselves in them for some time, which had they done, the army of observation could have joined them, and they might have held their ground upon the right bank of the Rhine, and prevented the invasion of Switzerland.—The short campaign made by Jourdan, presented in ten days the contrast of boldness and weakness, of confidence and discouragement.—It must be allowed, however, that the blame falls rather upon the Directory than upon that General.

Massena's outset in the country of the Grisons, was well conceived and ably directed; his right under General Lecourbe, profited with ability of
these

these first successes. It does not appear that the fruitless attacks, made by the former of these Generals, upon Feldkirch, furnish a subject for criticism, nor does it seem that he can be reproached with anything material, until the battle he gave before Zurich, on the 4th of June. It has been said, and still is persisted in, that he either ought not to have risked the first battle, or should have waited a second. But the greatest cause of reproach which Massena has given to the French Republic, is to be found in the two great attacks made by him upon the 14th of August, and upon the 25th of September. Three weeks or a month before the first of these epochas, the reinforcements he had received, and the departure of the Austrian General Bellegarde's army for Italy, had given him a great superiority over the Archduke; he delayed taking advantage of this opportunity, until the very day on which the Russian auxiliaries arrived in the canton of Schaffhausen, which prevented him from pushing his successes. He acted in the same manner in the following month. On quitting Switzerland, the Archduke had left General Korsakow in the same dangerous situation, from which the arrival of that General had delivered himself. General Korsakow
might

might be attacked, beaten, and driven from Switzerland, fifteen days or three weeks before either the Archduke, or Marshal Suworow, could come to his assistance. Yet Massena waited the moment when they both had it in their power to succour him ; nay, he remained inactive until the Marshal, in spite of delays ever to be regretted, was already master of the St. Gothard, and upon the rear of the French army.—Though strange this conduct, nevertheless the definitive advantage was Massena's, and on considering his force and position, it will appear almost impossible, that matters should have fallen out otherwise. But had he beaten General Korsakow and Petrarch, fifteen days sooner, he might have driven them entirely out of Switzerland in two days, and might have entered Suabia, and prevented the defeat of General Muller, before Manheim. The end of this campaign would have realized a part of the projects formed by the French, at its commencement, left them in force upon the Necker and the Danube, and given them Germany for winter-quarters, and for plunder.—The French Republic has certainly not shewn indulgence in this war to the Generals who served it, and yet this one was neither accused nor punished ; on the contrary, he

was loaded with praises and rewards. There is one circumstance which may explain this difference between the treatment deserved by Massena, and that which he experienced :—it is, that all the other commanders in chief of the Republican armies, were constantly defeated in this campaign, and that he alone maintained his ground, and obtained signal successes. In consideration of what he *had* done, they shut their eyes upon what he *ought* to have done, and the French Government was first too feeble, and then too insecurely established, to dare to present to the public, and to the soldier, the spectacle of a victorious General disgraced.

It is impossible to decide whether the inaction of the army in Switzerland, during the months of October and November, is to be attributed to Massena, or to the French Government. At any rate, to which ever side the blame may be due, it is surprising that the armies of Switzerland and the Rhine, did not concert their operations, and both assume the offensive at the same time : they reckoned nearly 100,000 men, and the Archduke, since the departure of Marshal Suworow, had not 70,000 to oppose to them. Why then, in spite of the want of provisions, of equipment, and the means of transport,

transport, did not the army of Switzerland advance 20 or 25,000 men into Suabia!—If it was incapable of doing that, why did the army of the Rhine then expose itself to three successive defeats? The ill-founded hope of taking Philipsburgh, was not a sufficient consideration to determine it to run such risks: its marches upon the Necker had no longer any object really useful, as soon as the prospect of support from the army of Switzerland was lost. The last-mentioned army was not in danger, and needed not a diversion in its favour. Nothing can appear more ill-judged, than the last parts of this campaign by the French; happily by this conduct, resulting no doubt, from their financial distresses, and their political convulsions, the disunion of the Austrians and Russians, and the retreat of the latter, became much less injurious to the interests of Europe, than was to be feared.

Looking at things from their origin, and considering them in a point of view purely military, the Austrians might be blamed for not having at the same time that they entered the country of the Grisons, occupied, under some pretext, the Valteline, which had been shut against them for a century and a half, by the politics of Cardinal Richelieu:

Richelieu : the possession of it would have enabled them to seize some posts in the Italian bailiwicks*. The possession of these countries would have placed them at once upon the flank of Switzerland and Italy, would greatly have facilitated their operations in the latter country, and must have advanced the campaign several weeks in the former. It was in the counties of Bormio and Chiavenna, that General Bellegard's army should have been stationed;

* The reader probably knows that the Valteline, situated at the foot of the Alps, between the State of Venice, the Milanese, the Tyrol, and the Grisons, belonged to the latter state, by which it was acquired in 1516, immediately after Francis the First, King of France, had taken possession of the Milanese. The Spaniards seized it four years afterwards, and this country was, for several years, a subject of dispute among France, the Grisons, Venice, and the Duke of Savoy on the one side, and the Spaniards and the Pope on the other. At length, in 1635, France sent the Duke de Rohan there, who, having marched across Switzerland, with an inferior force, was enabled, by his abilities, to maintain himself against the joint efforts of the Emperor, and the King of Spain. The Valteline was, in consequence, definitively given up to the Grisons in 1637.

The Italian bailiwicks were dismembered from the Milanese, nearly three centuries ago, as a compensation to Switzerland, for sums due to her by the Dukes Maximilian and Francis Sforza.

tioned ; instead of being buried in the defiles of the Engadin and the Tyrol, where it allowed itself to be attacked and beaten.

When, in spite of their cautions and timed politics, the Austrians entered the country of the Grisons, it was undoubtedly because they felt the extreme importance of that upper bulwark of Switzerland. Since they had felt the consequence of acquiring it to themselves, they ought also to have felt how important it was for the French to drive them from it ? Why then did they not send a sufficient force to defend it. Why did they not place in it 12,000 instead of 6,000 men ?

The six weeks that elapsed between the moment in which the Archduke repulsed Jourdan's army beyond the Rhine, and that in which he passed that river to enter Switzerland, would heavily accuse the Prince, unless as we have shewn, he had partly been condemned to inaction—by the contradictions which he experienced from the cabinet of Vienna—by the derangement of his health, to which these contradictions contributed not a little—by the necessity of forming magazines, before attempting the invasion of a country so little productive of subsistence—and by the desire of beginning by the reconquest of the
country

country of the Grisons. However real were some of these excuses for delay, yet they are very far from absolving the Archduke, or those who gave him orders, in the eyes of military men, who judge by the established rules of the art, and not by the changeable views of politics. War is a forced state of things to which every consideration foreign to it, and every subaltern interest must bend: it is a game at which we lose, as soon as we cease to gain: either we must not play it at all, or we must be determined to profit boldly by all its chances, and never to forget, that if that be not done, the enemy is there to punish the omission. It is a game in which, with parity of stake and of skill, he who only aspires to gain a little, must end by becoming the victim of him who aspires to gain much. The Austrians have personated the first of these gamblers, during almost the whole course of this war, and particularly on the occasion in question.— By not taking advantage, if not immediately, at least in a short lapse of time, of the divers effects produced by the victories of the Archduke, upon the minds of his troops, and upon those of the French and Swiss, Austria gave Massena time to reinforce himself with the flower of the infantry of Jourdan's army,

army, with battalions of conscripts, and, in fine, with 4 or 5,000 Swiss, who have fought for him; permitted him carefully to fortify several positions amongst others that of Zurich) which cost much labour and effusion of blood; to reduce, with fire and sword, the insurgents of the country of the Grisons, of the lesser cantons, and of the Valais, who, in vain, called the Austrians to their assistance, from the summits of their mountains; and to suppress several other partial movements, which the approach of a powerful army would, no doubt, have multiplied, and probably have rendered general. In war, one event hangs upon another, and a great original fault is rarely without long-felt consequences. The Allies felt the weight of this during the whole campaign.

Scarcely had they undertaken and begun with success, the conquest of Switzerland, when they were obliged to interrupt it, to put Marshal Suworow in condition to push that of Italy. Almost the whole of the left of the Archduke's army crossed the Alps, and partly to replace it, the Prince was compelled to weaken his centre and right, but then he was no longer in sufficient force on any point to attack with the certainty of success, and was reduced to a mere defensive until the arrival of the Russian army, that is to say, until the end of Au-

gust. In the mean time, the enthusiasm of his army was cooled; the Swiss lost all hope of their deliverance, and the disposition to contribute towards it by their own efforts; Massena received new reinforcements, and again retook the lesser cantons; the Republic formed an army upon the Rhine; and when General Korsakow arrived, the utmost that he did, was to restore the balance.—The political misfortunes and the military faults which turned it in favour of the French during the months of September and October, are still too recent in the memory of the reader, to make it necessary to repeat them. It is more agreeable to remind him, that the consequences were far from causing so much regret, as they had inspired fear, and that the campaign in Germany was terminated as gloriously as it had commenced. Prince Charles there shewed in circumstances the most difficult, a combination in his defensive movements, a justness in his measures, and a mixture of prudence and vigour, worthy of the admiration of all military men. He seemed anxious to prove, that he could act well when permitted; that he had played, as to Switzerland, a forced part, and that in that respect he deserved rather to be pitied than blamed. The same opinion

we must undoubtedly form upon the manner in which he acted towards the Governments and inhabitants of the part of Switzerland, that he had conquered. If the cabinet of Vienna dictated the military conduct of the Prince, there is the more reason to think that it also regulated his political conduct.

After having exposed the system of this campaign, considered its local result, and examined the manner in which it was respectively conducted, it would remain to estimate what it has cost the two parties in men; and to investigate its influence upon the affairs of Europe. It being impossible under the latter head, to separate the war of Switzerland and Germany from that of Italy, the consideration of their joint effect shall be postponed to the end of this work.—As to the number of men who fell upon the mountains of Switzerland, and in the plains of Germany, it need scarcely to be observed, that it is as difficult to ascertain, as it is sad and painful to calculate. The collection of statements sent in the course of the campaign by the Generals in chief, to the war offices of Vienna and of Paris; would on this article be merely approximative; for there is no battle, there is no encounter of any kind

after which, it is possible to class with certainty the loss of men in killed, wounded, made prisoners, missing, or having deserted. This might be done in the regiments that may have fought in line, but could not among the light troops which enter first into action, and particularly among the Chasseurs, who are spread into woods or along their skirts. The loss sustained by the small corps of volunteers sometimes formed during the action, cannot either be always classed distinctly ; upon this point therefore a very loose calculation can only be expected. No pains have been spared, and the strictest impartiality has been observed in forming the following computations. They are believed to be as near the truth as possible, and the result is, that the loss of the Allies from the month of March to the end of December, in Germany and Switzerland, amounted to 25,000 men, killed or dead of their wounds, and that of the French to 30,000. It may be supposed, that at least one half of that number was rendered unfit for service, and therefore that the total waste of men able to bear arms, was on the part of the Allies 40,000, and on that of the French 45,000. There is good reason to believe, that the latter made about 30,000 prisoners, and

that they did not lose above 25,000. The loss by desertion was on both sides inconsiderable. This may appear extraordinary to those who know that in the short war of 13 months which took place 22 years ago, between the Prussians and the Austrians about Bavaria, the former lost 40,000 and the latter 30,000 men in that way.

But at that time it was Germans who deserted to Germans, and soldiers who on joining the opposite party, found the same manners, and the same discipline—None of these similitudes existed in the campaign of which we now treat, or indeed in the whole war. Frenchmen, Germans, or Russians, on joining their enemies, would have found very different language, habits, and military government; and it may with great truth be here remarked, that it is very much owing to these dissimilitudes, and principally to the former, that Europe has been able to retain soldiers, who have, during a period of eight years, blindly combated French principles in the persons of the French soldiers.*

B b 3

If

* This difference of language is not only between the French and German, for perhaps one half, or at least a full third of the Austrian army, does not understand even

If the *Rights of Man* had first been promulgated in Prussia, and supported by soldiers of that country, it is very doubtful if the Austrian army would had escaped the contagion, and *vice versa*—Another circumstance has likewise contributed much to diminish

even the latter of these languages. —All the Croats, the Hungarians, the Walachians, the Servians, the Bohemians, the Moravians, and the Galicians, are in that situation; and in the numerous corps formed of these different nations, the non-commissioned officers are the only persons who understand more of the German language, than the mere words of command, and it is through them that the superior officers have any communication with the soldiers. What prospect then has the Austrian deserter before him, when he goes over to the French!—He is ignorant of any handicraft, and is incapable of following the profession of a soldier, which is the only one he knows, by his being unable either to understand others, or to make himself understood by them.—The Author of this work remembers to have seen in 1795, a Bohemian soldier who having swam across the Rhine, and deserted to the French, returned in the same manner three weeks afterwards. He had not been able to make himself understood by any one, and consequently had been refused by all the French regiments, so that to support life, he had been reduced to devour the roots and herbs of the woods—Notwithstanding the certainty of a severe punishment, he determined to repass the Rhine, and gave the most immoderate proofs of joy upon rejoining his comrades, and hearing again the sounds of his native language.

finish desertion, and that is, that on both sides the armies are almost entirely composed of soldiers raised by conscription, who are attached to their relations, and their native soil, and who cherish the hope and desire of revisiting them. The first campaigns have cut off almost all those soldiers unknown, without country, and without family, who in times of peace form the principal part of armies, and of which the Prussian has more than an usual proportion, which is a great hurt to it.

Upon considering all that has been said, it will be observed that this campaign has occasioned no important change in the possession of territory, that during it, there has not been above three actions, to which the names of battles could be given; that there were but one siege, or rather blockade, and that the waste of human blood which it has occasioned, though considerable, has not been extraordinary, and that offering in these four points of view, which are the principal ones in every war, nothing remarkable, it seems at first sight, not to present any great interest to the historian. He will however give it not only a distinguished, but even a very particular place, for it has one very great characteristic feature, which as yet has only been

hinted at, and which arises from the novelty and singularity of its partial theatre, Switzerland.—After having in the 14th century, thrown off the yoke of the house of Austria—in the 15th escaped from that of the house of Burgundy—in the 16th struggled against the house of Valois—and in the 17th contended successfully with that of Savoy, this country, by the treaty of Munster, had its independence and its liberty confirmed, and had enjoyed, for above 150 years, these two precious political blessings. At peace with all its neighbours, religious disputes had troubled its domestic tranquillity, but these momentary divisions had been succeeded by most perfect harmony ; and for fourscore years, no sound of war had been heard within the circuit of the great Alps. The tranquil destiny of this Republic was very remarkable, from the geograpical situation of its territory, and the manners of its inhabitants. It is not a little singular, that surrounded as it is by France, Germany, and Italy, and being the shortest road of communication between the two former and the latter, Switzerland had never been the theatre of any of the wars, in which, since the middle of the 17th century, the houses of Austria and of Bourbon, have disputed the possession of Italy,

Italy. It is not less extraordinary that its inhabitants, educated from their infancy to the use of arms, and considering themselves during their whole life, as belonging to no other profession, should never have had occasion to use them for the interests of their country. The nature of the soil which offered no object for the ambition of their neighbours, and the composition of the government, which could give them no alarms, produced and preserved this phenomenon of a people never engaged in war, though always ready for it.

This happy composition, formed by nature and by human wisdom, was destined to vanish before the French revolution—The frankness and courage of the inhabitants of the Alps, defended them ill against the machiavelian machinations of the French.—A people of Republicans, was overcome by a people in revolution—A nation which knew how to enjoy liberty, was the victim of a nation which only knew how to abuse it—The country of William Tell fell under the yoke of the soldiers of Reubell.—It was from it, that they threatened Germany: it was therefore there, that its defender's were obliged to go to oppose them.

When

When the war broke out in the country of the Grisons, the attention of military men particularly turned to that new field of battle. Switzerland had never served as such in these modern times, since the art of war is become so connected with topographical knowledge ; since that knowledge is become so familiar from the perfection of maps ; since all Europe is no longer, but one vast field for military speculation ; since every thing favourable in any of its parts, for either attack or defence has been calculated ; and since the experience of every war has been carefully collected, and made to contribute its aid to those which followed ; Switzerland it may be repeated was a theatre entirely new, a virgin field. Any war to be carried on in it, could be assisted by no tradition, no precedent, or no authority ; and it has been seen, that the present campaign has furnished no opportunity of making any comparison, or of pointing out any resemblance to former times. The War Offices of Vienna and Paris, which are so rich in maps, and in military memoirs and recitals, possessed with regard to this country, no information of the kind sufficiently verified by experience. It was necessary then that on both sides they should study this field, which

which was not yet become classical. The French in this respect, were before-hand with their enemies. Having occupied Switzerland for a twelve-month, they had had time, and had hastened to lay down exact maps. They had been able to consult at Lucerne, the topographical model of Colonel Pfiffer,* and what was of much more consequence, they had it in their power to survey and examine the country itself with their own eyes. Possessing it too against the wish of the inhabitants, they had been obliged to follow the example of the Romans, in the countries they had conquered, and to seek out, and take possession of all the strong posts fit for defence, or advantageous for communication.

Not

* This famous model made of a kind of Mastich, covered over with wax, and which represents all the mountainous part of Switzerland, is so perfectly exact, that not only the various ranges of mountains, and the principal valleys and rivers are marked on it, but even all the villages, cottages, rivulets, bridges, woods, not forgetting the smallest hollows formed by the turnings of the mountains, are accurately figured. The French have something of the kind for part of the frontier of Flanders.

Not only was Switzerland a theatre of war perfectly new, but the kind of war it required was almost totally unknown to those who had to wage it. It was a war of mountains on the grandest scale, and with the employment of all the military means used in wars of plains, of rivers, or of sieges. The Generals on neither side, had much of either theoretical or practical knowledge in these matters. For they had not been able to acquire enough of the latter in the mountains of the Tyrol of Suabia, and of Piedmont; and as to the former, it was as generally neglected as it is difficult to learn. This part of the art of war is that which has been the least attended to, both by the ancients and the moderns, and very few individuals have perfectly understood it. Among the first, Sertorius shewed the greatest talents, and it may be said that he excelled. Among the latter Scänderberg, the Marquis de Feuquieres, and the Duke de Rohan are those who have been most distinguished.—It is likewise the kind of war upon which there exists the least of written information. The best work we possess on the subject is undoubtedly the memoirs left by the Duke de Rohan, upon the admirable campaign which he conducted in 1635 in the Valteline, but
it

it was short, carried on with small armies, and his operations did not extend beyond the country, which is situated between the sources of the Rhine and the Adda.* The campaign, of which a description has just been given, having had no precedent either with respect to the country in which it was carried on, or to the kind of war that was necessary, will serve both as a model and as a lesson.—

If ever Switzerland has again the misfortune of becoming the seat of a great war, the positions of the two great vallies of the Grisons, of the Thur, of the Linth, of the Limmat, of Albis, of the Sihl, of Mutton, of Schagen, of the Reuss, of St. Gothard

* It is not meant that this campaign was less interesting, because it was carried on by armies of no great force, for it is a principle that war may be better conducted among mountains with small bodies of troops than with large ones. A proof of this will be found in the following volume, where it will be seen with what equality the French resisted their opponents among the appennines, though inferior in number. It was intended to remark that the Austrian and French Armies opposed to one another in Switzerland in 1799, were four or five times more numerous than those of the Austrians, Spaniards, and French, which disputed the possession of the Valtelline, and of the country of the Grisons in 1635. The last mentioned campaign bore no proportion to that of 1799, and though it may serve as a lesson, it can never be made an object of comparison with it.

thard, and of Furca, all these capital positions, which have been tried by so many combats, and so many manœuvres, will become classic ground, and be rendered sacred in the eyes of military men. In future, those who wish to acquire a knowledge of mountain war, will study the attack of the Engadine, by General Lecourbe—the skilful recovery of the same country, by General Bellegarde—the attack of Luciensteig, by General Hotze—that of St. Gothard and of the valley of the Reuss, by General Haddick—the well concerted operations by which Lecourbe repossessed himself of the smaller cantons—the faults by which the Generals Korsakow and Petrarch lost, to the Allies, the possession of Switzërländ—the rapid march of Marshal Suworow and the heroic efforts of his troops, who, coming in hopes of conquest, were obliged to conquer, in order to retreat.—Every young soldier, inflamed with the love of his profession, will study this curious and terrible campaign in the country itself where it was carried on.—He will go to contemplate these enormous masses of rocks, upon which the inhabitants of the Pyrenean, and of the Carpathian mountains met with astonishment.—He will climb those precipitous paths, which nature seems to

reserve

reserved for the light mountain goat, and which, however, were ascended by entire battalions.—He will reach those higher pinnacles where armed men went to dispute the thunder of the skies—those arid rocks, where men exposed to every want, felt still the desire of destroying one another.—He will descend into these gloomy hollows, of which the clang of arms so often disturbed the solemn repose.—He will traverse those rich vallies ravaged by war, and perhaps not yet reanimated by the hand of industry.—He will then receive a double lesson.—War will present itself to his eyes both as an art and as a scourge.—He will study the one from the love for his country, and will detest the other from a love for humanity; and he will say to himself: If ever fate places me at the head of an army, may I be able to find in the art, the means of diminishing the scourge.—May I wage war with sufficient knowledge to make it short and decisive.—May I be indebted for victory, rather to my head, than to my arm—and may I thus merit the gratitude of my country, and the esteem of my enemies, by sparing, as much as possible, the blood of the soldier, the property of the citizen, and the benefits of civilization.

PRINTED BY J. BARFIELD, WARDOUR-STREET.



ERRATA.—VOL. III.

Page	Line	
3	1	For <i>what was</i> , read <i>what it was</i>
17		Last line, for 1788, read 1787
31	9	For <i>an</i> , read <i>and</i>
43		Last line, for <i>or</i> , read <i>for</i>
73	7	For <i>Schautzenberg</i> , read <i>Schwartzemberg</i>
76	6	For <i>Maskirk</i> , read <i>Moeskirch</i>
80		And elsewhere, for <i>debouches</i> , read <i>débouchés</i>
81		For <i>Strasberg</i> , read <i>Strasbourg</i>
91	16	For <i>had</i> , read <i>has</i>
98	21	For <i>Leudek</i> , read <i>Landeck</i>
100	5	For <i>Bergamase</i> , read <i>Bergamese</i>
133		Note, for <i>courageous justly</i> , read <i>courageous and justly</i>
133	20	For <i>Reufs</i> , read <i>Reuss</i>
184	23	For <i>effecting</i> , read <i>effective</i>
185	12	For <i>Turrean</i> , read <i>Turreau</i>
190	2	For <i>nor war. The Allies</i> , read <i>nor war, the Allies</i>
202 and 206		For <i>Jelbayen</i> , read <i>Meyen</i>
208	11	For <i>Aoast</i> , read <i>Aoust</i>
209	2	For <i>front</i> , read <i>in front</i>
229		Last line, for <i>frontier towns</i> , read <i>forest towns</i>
251	4	For <i>Mayensfeld Dissentis</i> , read <i>Mayensfeld to Dissentis</i>
263	6	For 17,000, read 16,000
316	4	For <i>engage it</i> , read <i>engages it</i>
358	22	For <i>of year</i> , read <i>end of the year</i>

MEMORANDUM



1. The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various positions in the Department of the Interior, and the date of their appointment.

Name	Date of Appointment
John A. Smith	1880
John B. Jones	1881
John C. Brown	1882
John D. White	1883
John E. Black	1884
John F. Green	1885
John G. Hall	1886
John H. King	1887
John I. Lee	1888
John J. Miller	1889
John K. Davis	1890
John L. Wilson	1891
John M. Moore	1892
John N. Taylor	1893
John O. Anderson	1894
John P. Jackson	1895
John Q. Adams	1896
John R. Nelson	1897
John S. Phillips	1898
John T. Campbell	1899
John U. Parker	1900
John V. Evans	1901
John W. Roberts	1902
John X. Turner	1903
John Y. Scott	1904
John Z. Walker	1905
John AA. Young	1906
John AB. Allen	1907
John AC. Wright	1908
John AD. King	1909
John AE. Lee	1910
John AF. Miller	1911
John AG. Davis	1912
John AH. Wilson	1913
John AI. Moore	1914
John AJ. Taylor	1915
John AK. Anderson	1916
John AL. Jackson	1917
John AM. Adams	1918
John AN. Nelson	1919
John AO. Phillips	1920
John AP. Campbell	1921
John AQ. Parker	1922
John AR. Evans	1923
John AS. Roberts	1924
John AT. Turner	1925
John AU. Scott	1926
John AV. Walker	1927
John AW. Young	1928
John AX. Allen	1929
John AY. Wright	1930
John AZ. King	1931
John BA. Lee	1932
John BB. Miller	1933
John BC. Davis	1934
John BD. Wilson	1935
John BE. Moore	1936
John BF. Taylor	1937
John BG. Anderson	1938
John BH. Jackson	1939
John BI. Adams	1940
John BJ. Nelson	1941
John BK. Phillips	1942
John BL. Campbell	1943
John BM. Parker	1944
John BN. Evans	1945
John BO. Roberts	1946
John BP. Turner	1947
John BQ. Scott	1948
John BR. Walker	1949
John BS. Young	1950
John BT. Allen	1951
John BU. Wright	1952
John BV. King	1953
John BW. Lee	1954
John BX. Miller	1955
John BY. Davis	1956
John BZ. Wilson	1957
John CA. Moore	1958
John CB. Taylor	1959
John CC. Anderson	1960
John CD. Jackson	1961
John CE. Adams	1962
John CF. Nelson	1963
John CG. Phillips	1964
John CH. Campbell	1965
John CI. Parker	1966
John CJ. Evans	1967
John CK. Roberts	1968
John CL. Turner	1969
John CM. Scott	1970
John CN. Walker	1971
John CO. Young	1972
John CP. Allen	1973
John CQ. Wright	1974
John CR. King	1975
John CS. Lee	1976
John CT. Miller	1977
John CU. Davis	1978
John CV. Wilson	1979
John CW. Moore	1980
John CX. Taylor	1981
John CY. Anderson	1982
John CZ. Jackson	1983
John DA. Adams	1984
John DB. Nelson	1985
John DC. Phillips	1986
John DD. Campbell	1987
John DE. Parker	1988
John DF. Evans	1989
John DG. Roberts	1990
John DH. Turner	1991
John DI. Scott	1992
John DJ. Walker	1993
John DK. Young	1994
John DL. Allen	1995
John DM. Wright	1996
John DN. King	1997
John DO. Lee	1998
John DP. Miller	1999
John DQ. Davis	2000
John DR. Wilson	2001
John DS. Moore	2002
John DT. Taylor	2003
John DU. Anderson	2004
John DV. Jackson	2005
John DW. Adams	2006
John DX. Nelson	2007
John DY. Phillips	2008
John DZ. Campbell	2009
John EA. Parker	2010
John EB. Evans	2011
John EC. Roberts	2012
John ED. Turner	2013
John EE. Scott	2014
John EF. Walker	2015
John EG. Young	2016
John EH. Allen	2017
John EI. Wright	2018
John EJ. King	2019
John EK. Lee	2020
John EL. Miller	2021
John EM. Davis	2022
John EN. Wilson	2023
John EO. Moore	2024
John EP. Taylor	2025
John EQ. Anderson	2026
John ER. Jackson	2027
John ES. Adams	2028
John ET. Nelson	2029
John EU. Phillips	2030
John EV. Campbell	2031
John EW. Parker	2032
John EX. Evans	2033
John EY. Roberts	2034
John EZ. Turner	2035
John FA. Scott	2036
John FB. Walker	2037
John FC. Young	2038
John FD. Allen	2039
John FE. Wright	2040
John FF. King	2041
John FG. Lee	2042
John FH. Miller	2043
John FI. Davis	2044
John FJ. Wilson	2045
John FK. Moore	2046
John FL. Taylor	2047
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John FN. Jackson	2049
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John FS. Parker	2054
John FT. Evans	2055
John FU. Roberts	2056
John FV. Turner	2057
John FW. Scott	2058
John FX. Walker	2059
John FY. Young	2060
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John GB. King	2063
John GC. Lee	2064
John GD. Miller	2065
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John TS. Miller	2417
John TT. Davis	2418
John TU. Wilson	2419
John TV. Moore	2420
John TW. Taylor	2421
John TX. Anderson	2422
John TY. Jackson	2423
John TZ. Adams	2424
John UA. Nelson	2425
John UB. Phillips	2426
John UC. Campbell	2427
John UD. Parker	2428
John UE. Evans	2429
John UF. Roberts	2

